

U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1953-1963

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
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ABSTRAKT

Tato bakalářská práce se zabývá zahraniční politikou Eisenhowerovi a Kennedyho administrativy v Latinské Americe a v Karibiku. Zároveň analyzuje podobnosti a odlišnosti ekonomické a militární pomoci, ale také vyhodnocuje dosažení navržených anti-komunistických cílů obou administrativ v Latinské Americe a Karibiku. Práce dochází k závěru, že i přes různé politické vyznání Eisenhower a Kennedy byli zastánci stejné zahraniční politiky v Dominikánské republice a na Kubě, ale na druhé straně v případě Latinské Ameriky se jejich zahraniční politika lišila v ekonomické a militární pomoci.

Klíčová slova: Monroeova doktrína, Organizace amerických států, zahraniční politika, Latinská Amerika, Spojené státy americké, Sovětský svaz, západní hemisféra, komunismus, anti-komunismus, komunistická hrozba, demokracie, Eisenhowerova administrativa, republikáni, Kennedyho administrativa, demokrati, ekonomická pomoc, militární pomoc, CIA, Karibik, Kuba, Fidel Castro, Batista, Dominikánská republika, Trujillo, Aliance pro rozvoj, Maršálovův plán, Nixonova cesta, hemisférická obrana, vnitřní obrana.

ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with the foreign policy of the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administrations towards Latin America and the Caribbean. At the same time, it analyses similarities and differences of their economic and military aid and evaluates the achievements of the proposed anti-communistic goals of the two administrations in Latin America and in the Caribbean. It concludes that even though Kennedy and Eisenhower were of different political affiliations, both followed the same foreign policy pattern in the case of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, but on the other hand, in the case of Latin America their policies differed in a conduct of military and economic aid.

Keywords: The Monroe Doctrine, the Organization of American States, foreign policy, Latin America, the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the Western Hemisphere, Communism, anti-communism, communist menace, democracy, the Eisenhower administration, the Republicans, the Kennedy administration, the Democrats, economic aid, military aid, the CIA, the Caribbean, Cuba, Fidel Castro, Batista, the Dominican Republic, Trujillo, the Alliance for Progress, the Marshall Plan, the Nixon trip, hemispheric defense, internal security.

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INTRODUCTION

The United States of America has always been in favor of democracy and against the regimes that tried to suppress it. In 1823, U.S. president James Monroe signed a key document, the Monroe Doctrine, which had a crucial impact on the policies within the Western Hemisphere. This doctrine, which established the superiority of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, was amended in 1904 by Theodore Roosevelt. The refined document, known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, determined the U.S. policy principles towards the countries by stating that the U.S. had the right to intervene in any country within the hemisphere, in order to protect its interests, in the Western Hemisphere during the Cold War era.

The U.S. aim in the Cold War era was to keep the Western Hemisphere out of reach of communist influence, resulting in anti-communist policies towards Latin American and Caribbean countries. One of the factors that influenced these anti-communist policies was the Cuban Revolution led by Fidel Castro. The rise to power of Castro led U.S. policy makers to take stronger precautions in order to protect the hemisphere against the spread of Soviet influence and to eliminate Castro's popularity in Latin America. Furthermore, the 1960 U.S. presidential election led to a change in power in the United States, as Democratic president John F. Kennedy replaced Republican president Dwight D. Eisenhower in the White House. What remained to be seen is how this change would influence American foreign policy, if at all.

This thesis will focus on a comparison of the administrations of two U.S. presidents, Eisenhower and Kennedy, and will deal with their policies towards the Latin American countries and the Caribbean. Although both men had different political views, there was a measure of consistency in their foreign policies. However, their policies did differ in some key aspects. This thesis identifies and analyses these similarities and differences during both administrations, and evaluates the administrations' programs in respect to the achievement of their anti-communist goals. Ultimately, this thesis will suggest that even though both presidents were of different political beliefs, on one hand, both Kennedy and Eisenhower followed a similar foreign policy pattern towards Cuba and the Dominican Republic, but on the other hand, in the case of Latin America their policies differed according to their political priorities, views on democracy, and their views regarding military and economic aid.

1 IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS INFLUENCING THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

The United States, as a self-appointed caretaker of the Western Hemisphere, has always tried to promote democracy and secure the hemisphere against despotic regimes. Moreover, states political scientist Fred Rippy “the Western Hemisphere was long assumed to be of greatest importance in the attainment of national security and prosperity [which are] two fundamental objectives of the United States.” However, to achieve the hemisphere’s targets and protect its people against outward aggression has not always been part of the U.S. vision. Instead, official U.S. policy towards the hemisphere evolved over time. The following paragraphs detail the most important documents influencing this evolution. These documents, taken in their aggregate, help explain U.S. foreign policy in Latin America and the Caribbean during the Cold War era.¹

1.1 The Western Hemisphere and the Monroe Doctrine of 1823

The first and the most crucial document associated with U.S.-Latin American relations is the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 established the superiority of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and placed Latin American countries in the sphere of influence of the United States. The Western Hemisphere’s “safeguarding,” according to the Monroe Doctrine, should be protected from “European and Asiatic interference,” which was “applied only to independent governments in the Americas however, not to areas that were colonies at that time.” The Monroe Doctrine was later amended in 1904 by President Theodore Roosevelt. In the refined document, known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, “Roosevelt asserted that European nations should not intervene in countries to the south of the U.S., however under certain conditions, United States intervention might be justified.”²

¹J. Fred Rippy, *Globe and Hemisphere. Latin America's Place in the Postwar Foreign Relations of the United States* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1958), 1.

²Stephen Duggan, “The Western Hemisphere as a Haven of Peace?,” *Foreign Affairs* 18, no. 4 (July 1940): 617, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=5&hid=11&sid=aaa91ebc-1e12-4c82-b66a-5f16ee3a9bf%40sessionmgr13&bdata=JmFtcDtsYW5nPWZJnNpdGU9ZWVhc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=14770514> (accessed February 10, 2010); The Theodor Roosevelt Association, “Roosevelt Corollary and the Monroe Doctrine,” Theodore Roosevelt, <http://www.theodoreroosevelt.org/life/rooseveltcorollary.htm> (accessed February 14, 2010).

1.2 Cuba and the Platt Amendment of 1901

In 1898 the United States won in the Spanish-American War and Cuba, a Spanish colony, gained her independence. The American troops agreed to withdraw from Cuba on several conditions, which became part of what is now known as the Platt Amendment of 1901. Under the Platt Amendment the United States had “the right to intervene in Cuban affairs in order to defend Cuban independence and to maintain a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty.” The Platt amendment was written into the Cuban Constitution and later was substituted in 1933 by Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy.³

1.3 Panama Canal and Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty 1903

The Panama Canal was one of the key issues during the twentieth century and during the Cold War. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty is a contract between the United States and the Republic of Panama passed in November 1903 allowing the United States to build “a ship canal across the Isthmus of Panama to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.” The construction of the canal was finished in 1914 and “granted rights to the United States as if it were sovereign in a zone roughly 10 miles wide and 50 miles long. In that zone, the U.S. would ... administer, fortify, and defend it in perpetuity.” The fact that the Canal Zone was divided into two parts, one in Panama and the other in Nicaragua, caused uneasiness for the U.S. and complicated matters during the Cold War, however, it became a strategic place during the Cold War, for the Kennedy administration established schools for Latin Americans in the zone in order to provide them with special training in anti-Castro measures.⁴

³U.S. Department of State, “The United States, Cuba, and the Platt Amendment, 1901,” <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/86557.htm> (accessed November 30, 2009); Rippy, *Globe and Hemisphere*, 109.

⁴Avalon Project - Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, “Avalon Project - Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal (Hay -Bunau-Varilla Treaty), November 18, 1903,” Avalon Project, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/> (accessed February 15, 2010); U.S. Department of State, “Panama Canal (03/09),” U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/p/121368.htm> (accessed February 15, 2010).

1.4 Transformation of foreign policy and Good Neighbor Policy 1933

When Democratic President Franklin Delano Roosevelt assumed office in 1933 he promised to change existing policies and to better the relations with Latin America. He proclaimed his new policy in his first inaugural address stating that “the good neighbor is the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others.” Roosevelt’s policy was discussed more in detail during the Montevideo Conference, Uruguay in the same year by his Secretary of State Cordell Hull where he stated: “No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.” The Good Neighbor Policy became very important for Roosevelt’s successors and their foreign policies towards Latin American countries and the Caribbean. Moreover, Roosevelt’s policy nullified the Platt Amendment of 1901. Since the proclamation of the Good Neighbor Policy, the United States was “opposed to military intervention” which caused a fundamental shift in the existing foreign policies of U.S. policy makers.⁵

1.5 The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934

Another of Roosevelt’s steps for the improvement of U.S.-Latin American relations was when Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Under the new act the United States could arrange a “number of trade agreements” with Latin American countries. The president was given the right “to reduce tariffs by up to 50 percent in exchange for equivalent concessions.” There were no such measures for trade agreements with Latin America until the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act came into being, and Latin Americans had eagerly awaited such measures. However, during the Cold War era such measures were rarely taken.⁶

⁵U.S. Department of State, “Good Neighbor Policy, 1933,” U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/17341.htm> (accessed February 14, 2009).

⁶“U.S. Latin American Policy, 1823-1965,” *Congressional Digest* 44, no. 11 (November 1965): 259, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=22&hid=106&sid=14beeddb-42ee-4d43-8830-557750ddc3ec%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JmFtcDtsYW5nPWZJnNpdGU9ZWwhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=10576034> (accessed December 8, 2009); Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 8; The Reciprocal Trade Agreements - by 1940, the United States arranged trade agreements “with eleven Latin American countries.

1.6 The Containment Policy

After the WWII was over, a new menace appeared to worry the United States, the Soviet Union. In 1946, George Kennan, a U.S. diplomat on the Soviet front, sent a long warning telegram to U.S. officials informing them about “the Soviet Union’s postwar intensions” that could lead to a possible spread of Communism throughout the world. The Kennan long telegram marks an official birth of containment policy which main purpose was to prevent the communist spread. In response to Kennan’s stimulus, President Harry S. Truman launched his policy of containment in 1947, known as the Truman Doctrine, stating that “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Moreover, Truman added that “Whenever and wherever an anti-Communist government was threatened, by indigenous insurgents, foreign invasion, or even diplomatic pressure ... , the United States would supply political, economic, and most of all, military aid.” Therefore, on 12 March 1947 Truman asked for an allocation of \$400 million in military and economic assistance for Turkey and Greece in order to forestall the Soviet Union’s infiltration and a fall of the countries to Communism.⁷

1.7 The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 1947

In 1947, during the Truman administration, the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security was held in Rio de Janeiro. The participating countries agreed on the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known also as the Rio Pact. The centerpiece of the pact was that “an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American states,” therefore the pact called for the “collective action to maintain peace and security within the hemisphere” which could not “occur without the consent of two-thirds of the parties agreeing and, that no individual state could be forced into action by the others.” Signing the Rio Pact, stated historian Thomas A. Bailey, caused the “multilateralization of the Monroe Doctrine.” Furthermore, the Rio Conference became a very

⁷Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, “Truman Library, Truman Doctrine Activity,” Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/teacher/doctrine.htm> (accessed April 27, 2010); Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938*, 8th rev. ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 81-82; John D. Clare, “Truman Doctrine,” *Greenfield History Site*, http://www.johndclare.net/cold_war8_TrumanDoctrine.htm (accessed April, 27).

important milestone for U.S.-Latin American relations, for it opened a door to further inter-American coactions.⁸

1.8 The Charter of the Organization of American States

In 1948 a conference of the American States was held in Bogotá where the participants signed the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS). Members of the OAS pledged to “achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, economic, social, and cultural development, ... to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence.” The Charter went into effect in December 1951. There were few occasions when the principles of the Charter of OAS were violated during the Cold War era prompting OAS action. However, since its promulgation, the Charter of OAS became a very vital document for U.S. foreign policy and inter-American relations.⁹

1.9 The Mutual Security Act of 1951

The Mutual Security Act was signed by President Truman in 1951 due to the spread of communist influence throughout the Western Hemisphere. Under the auspices of the Mutual Security Act, the United States guaranteed “to unite military and economic programs with technical assistance.” In addition, the new act of 1951, in the words of President Truman, was created “to assist free peoples around the world who want to develop and safeguard their freedom and maintain the peace.” Moreover, the United States would provide “military equipment for troops who want to be able to defend their homelands if attacked.” The new policy was principally meant for underdeveloped countries in Latin America and was designed so that Latin American countries would not buy military equipment from other countries and that the United States would be the sole supplier of such equipment.¹⁰

⁸Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, “Encyclopedia of U.S.-Latin American Relations,” <http://www.routledge-ny.com/enc/USLatinRelations/sample1.html> (accessed February 15, 2010); “U.S. Latin American Policy, 1823-1965,” 259.

⁹OAS - Organization of American States, “Secretariat for Legal Affairs: Charter of The Organization of American States (A-41),” http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States.htm (accessed February 16, 2010); OAS - a regional organization of American states which was established in Washington, D.C., 1889-1890; “U.S. Latin American Policy, 1823-1965,” 259.

¹⁰John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, “Harry S. Truman: Statement by the President Upon Signing the Mutual Security Act,” The American Presidency Project,

2 THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA

A new era of the Republican administration started after the Presidential election of 1952 which brought General Dwight D. to power. “Ike,” a WWII hero assumed office on 20 January 1953. Eisenhower started his first presidential term with Senator Richard Nixon as the Vice President and John Foster Dulles as the Secretary of State. Furthermore, the Republicans had “slight majorities in both houses of Congress,” where they continued in a conduct of the containment policy, the policy of President Truman and U.S. diplomat G. Kennan, which contained policies of “communism with a ring of military alliances, nuclear deterrence, and the strengthening of foreign forces in strategic areas.”¹¹

After assuming the presidency, the main aim of the Eisenhower administration was to diminish the pressures of the ongoing Cold War with the Soviet Union. The United States tried to eliminate the spread of Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere and it “defined the hemispheric solidarity as the key objective in inter-American relations.”¹²

2.1 First term policies towards Latin America prior to 1956

As far as Eisenhower’s foreign policy is concerned, Latin America was not his main issue during his first presidential term. He “left the conduct of foreign policy” to the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and also to his brother Dr. Milton Eisenhower who was one of “his most influential...advisors on Latin America.” Furthermore, in his presidential campaign of 1952, Eisenhower “deplored the state of inter-American relations” and “did not propose any new

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=13944> (accessed February 14, 2010); U.S. Agency for International Development, “USAID: USAID History,” http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html (accessed February 14, 2010).

¹¹The White House, “Dwight D. Eisenhower,” The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/DwightDEisenhower> (accessed February 14, 2010); “Biography: Dwight D. Eisenhower,” Dwight D. Eisenhower: What’s New at the Eisenhower Foundation, <http://www.dwightdeisenhower.com/biodde.html> (accessed February 14, 2010); James M. Hagen and Vernon W. Ruttan, “Development Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy,” *The Journal of Developing Areas* 23, no. 1 (October 1988): 4, <http://www.jstor.org/pss/4191718> (accessed February 14, 2010).

¹²Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 6, 27; The White House, “Dwight D. Eisenhower,” The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/DwightDEisenhower> (accessed February 14, 2010); “Biography: Dwight D. Eisenhower,” Dwight D. Eisenhower: What’s New at the Eisenhower Foundation,

policies for Latin America.” However, he did remark that he “would return to the principles” of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy. Nevertheless, the ongoing Cold War and possible spread of Communism in Latin America induced him to form foreign policy principles towards Latin America and the Caribbean.¹³

2.1.1 Military aid

The first major initiative of the Eisenhower administration for inter-American relations was when the President announced his new policy on 18 March 1953 calling for “military assistance.” The U.S. wanted to arm Latin America in case of another war and moreover, because the U.S. was threatened by the possible spread of the Soviet influence in the hemisphere. The main objective of this policy, known as NSC 144/1, was that Latin Americans would “continue to accept U.S. military control.” Apart from the military aid, NSC144/1 tried to better “the political and economical issues” for Latin American countries so that they would become “more effective members of the hemisphere system.” Pronouncing NSC 144/1 as Rabe notes, “the United States wanted Latin America to support them at the United Nations and to eradicate the “menace of internal Communist or other anti-U.S. subversion, [and to] produce strategic raw materials,” for they were vital for the U.S. Furthermore, the United States asked Latin America for its “cooperation in defending the hemisphere.” On one hand, applying NSC 144/1, the U.S. wanted to eliminate a possible Communist threat in Latin America, but on the other hand, NSC 144/1 did not state how the Soviet Union menaced Latin America. A few months after the promulgation of Eisenhower’s policy, NSC 144/1 was launched to test its anticommunist policies in Guatemala, as the U.S. was suspicious of the Guatemalan government’s Communist-like activities.¹⁴

Another document calling for aid for Latin America came into being in 1954, the Mutual Security Act of 1954. The main objectives of this policy were “the concepts of development assistance, security assistance, a discretionary contingency fund, and guarantees for private investments.” Regarding military aid, the money asked by Congress for the following year 1955

<http://www.dwightdeisenhower.com/biodde.html> (accessed February 14, 2010); Hagen and Ruttan, “Development Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy,” 4.

¹³Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 1, 6, 28.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 22, 32-33; Rabe, “Eisenhower and Latin America: Arms and Dictators,” 50; Bevan Sewell, “A Global Policy in a Regional Setting: The Eisenhower Administration & Latin America, 1953-54,” Conference

should be used to “maintain equipment and provide training in its use,” and moreover, the act was signed in order to “further the defense of the hemisphere.”¹⁵

2.1.2 Economic Aid

Not only Communism worried the Eisenhower administration, but also economic nationalism, an ideology which prefers “national interests above private property.” Eisenhower revisionists claim that his administration “grievously misunderstood and underestimated ... Third World nationalism...confusing nationalism with communism,” but notwithstanding the threats, economic aid for Latin American countries was not among the major objectives of the Eisenhower administration during its first term, at first. Nevertheless, the strains of the ongoing Cold War induced the President to “discuss the economic demands of Latin Americans.” The Republican administration asserted policies concerning free trade and investment, for it believed that both could help to better the economic situation in Latin America.¹⁶

The new concept of economic aid was “trade not aid.” U.S. foreign policy makers tried to achieve their aims by encouraging their southern neighbors to be open to private enterprise and to create the right “climate to... attract private investment.” Nonetheless, Latin Americans were nervous about the new U.S. approach mainly for the reason that Latin America was rich in raw-materials and the foreign investors would have exhausted them. Even though the United States launched its new approach, which did not call for any economic aid, because U.S. officials thought that the new concept would discourage Latin Americans from embracing the new strategy, Latin American leaders still felt neglected, as free trade and private investment was not sufficient enough for them. Moreover, they were perplexed due to the U.S. policy strategy in

Special Edition, *49th Parallel*, (Summer 2006): 5,

http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/special/Sewell_IkeLatinAmp.pdf (accessed February 16, 2010).

¹⁵Michael J. Francis, “Military Aid to Latin America in the U.S. Congress,” *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 6, no. 3 (July 1964): 393, 395, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/164914> (accessed February 23, 2010); U.S. Agency for International Development, “USAID: USAID History,” U.S. Agency for International Development, http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html (accessed February 20, 2010).

¹⁶Matthew Loayza, “An 'Aladdin's Lamp' for Free Enterprise: Eisenhower, Fiscal Conservatism, and Latin American Nationalism, 1953-61,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 14, no. 3 (September 2003): 83-85, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=6&sid=d58e42f3-8c34-4a76-9158-85f13cba23af%40sessionmgr13&bdata=JmFtcDtsYW5nPWZJnNpdGU9ZWVhc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=11418521> (accessed February 27, 2010); Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 64; David Szakonyi, “The Rise of Economic Nationalism under Globalization and the Case of Post-Communist Russia,” *Vestnik, The Journal of Russian and Asian Studies* 6, (Summer 2007), http://www.sras.org/economic_nationalism_under_globalization (accessed March 20, 2010).

other areas of the world because according to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, “the United States fought communism in Asia and Europe with economic aid and depended on “politico-police” methods in Latin America.”¹⁷

On 3 September 1954 a new policy concerning the economic issues of Latin America came into being, NSC 5432/1 which reaffirmed the main aims of the Republican administration to “expand trade and to encourage Latin Americans to create a political and economic climate conducive to private investment, of both domestic and foreign capital.” The policy embraced the proposal of the president’s brother Dr. Milton Eisenhower to allow the Export-Import Bank to make loans to finance “sound projects” for development. U.S. officials favored loans “instead of grants” for the economic progress in Latin America. NSC 5432/1 replaced the previous NSC documents, 144/1 and 5419/1.¹⁸

Another move towards the discussion of economic aid for Latin America was meant to be held during the Rio Conference that was held on 15 November 1954. Nevertheless, the discussion did not happen, causing dissatisfaction and disappointment among Latin American leaders. At the conference, the U.S. concluded that U.S. foreign policy would “avoid large economic grant aid programs,” stating that “...the American Republics must rely principally on the normal factors of international and domestic commerce.” However, the Latin American leaders would have welcomed the ‘Marshall Plan’ - economic assistance provided by the United States in the wake of World War II to devastated European countries to restore their economies and infrastructure - for their countries more than private investment, but such a program was not part of the U.S. Cold War strategy towards Latin America.¹⁹

¹⁷Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 65-66, 73; Rippey, *Globe and Hemisphere*, 77; Loayza, “An 'Aladdin's Lamp' for Free Enterprise,” 84.

¹⁸Bevan Sewell, “A Perfect (Free-Market) World? Economics, the Eisenhower Administration, and the Soviet Economic Offensive in Latin America,” *Diplomatic History* 32, no. 5 (November 2008): 851, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=108&sid=ef1d6f8f-9906-4986-bb84-e809342afbae%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JmFtcDtsYW5nPWZJnNpdGU9ZWWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=34660958> (accessed February 28, 2010); Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 70-72.

¹⁹Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 76; Loayza, “An 'Aladdin's Lamp' for Free Enterprise,” 98; Our Documents, “Our Documents – Marshall Plan (1948),” Our Documents, <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=82> (accessed March 20, 2010); Sewell, “A Perfect (Free-Market) World?,” 851.

All in all, the main objective of Eisenhower's economic policy towards Latin America prior to 1956 was to expand foreign investment and to practice free trade policy "to meet U.S. objectives." Furthermore, even though the Republicans did not favor economic aid for Latin America, Eisenhower instructed the Export-Import Bank to provide loans for development projects. Washington D.C. would provide economic aid only to the countries which were "under the direct assault from the Communist menace."²⁰

2.2 Eisenhower versus Guatemala

During the first half of the 1950s thirteen dictators held power in Latin America. On one hand, "Communists, not dictators, were the enemies of the United States," but on the other hand, the U.S. did not favor dictators either but was instead for pro-democratic rulers. Moreover, the Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere was still miniscule, but there were pockets of Communist infiltration that worried the United States. Therefore, anti-communism became a key issue of U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America in 1953 and 1954. One of the first Latin American countries where Eisenhower tried to combat the Communist menace was Guatemala, as he suspected the Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán of having connections with the Soviet Union.²¹

Guatemala had been in the hands of despotic dictators such as Jorge Ubico until 1951 when "the first peaceful transition of power" occurred and Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán came to power as a president of Guatemala in free presidential elections. Before Arbenz assumed the presidential office, he served as a defense minister of his predecessor Juan José Arévalo. After assuming the presidential office, Arbenz's target was to better the conditions of Guatemalan people by making Guatemala an "economically independent" country. Arbenz regarded "Guatemala's unequal land distribution in a predominantly rural society as the main obstacle to economic development." Therefore, in 1952 he passed the Agrarian Reform Bill which set conditions for the "expropriation" of unused and fallow land. According to the bill, the expropriated land would be redistributed and "landowners" would be given "interest-bearing Guatemalan bonds." The

²⁰Sewell, "A Perfect (Free-Market) World?," 849; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 65.

²¹Ibid., 39-40.

Eisenhower administration was displeased with the bill as the largest amount of expropriated land belonged to the U.S. owned United Fruit Company. The United Fruit Company was dead set against the new law and felt that the expropriated land was worth much more than the Arbenz government offered in compensation. With regard to the value of land, the Arbenz government appraised the land at just \$3 an acre, while United Fruit claimed that the “land was worth at least \$75 an acre.” The United States, of course, supported United Fruit’s claim. As a result of the new bill, a United Fruit main shareholder, Samuel Zemurray, approved “an anti-Arbenz campaign in the American media and the U.S. Congress in order to portray President Arbenz as a Communist threat in the Western Hemisphere.”²²

Even though as Rabe and Blasier argued “there has never been convincing evidence that the Guatemalan Communist...dominated the Arbenz government,” the Eisenhower administration saw a potential danger in the new agrarian bill, for its principles seemed communist. Regarding the number of Communists in Guatemala, the Eisenhower administration calculated Guatemalan “Communist strength” at around 1,000 members. Definitely it was not such a high number to scare U.S. policy makers. However, the administration was still prepared to present its case at an upcoming conference of foreign ministers in Caracas, Venezuela that Guatemala was a menace that could have a negative impact on internal security.²³

2.2.1 The Caracas Declaration of 1954

Between 1 March and 28 March in 1954 the Tenth Inter-American Conference was held in Caracas during which the Declaration of Caracas was announced. On one hand, the key purpose of the Caracas conference was to discuss “economic issues” of Latin America, but on the other hand, Secretary of State Dulles was in attendance to bring the Guatemalan case before the conference, resulting in a shift in the emphasis of the conference. The conference participants came to the conclusion that the Organization of American States (OAS) had to take prompt steps

²²United Fruit Historical Society, “United Fruit Company – Jacobo Arbenz,” United Fruit Company, <http://www.unitedfruit.org/arbenz.htm> (accessed February 27, 2010); Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 44-46, 51.

²³Ibid., 51; Lars Schoultz, “Combating Communism with Friendly Dictators,” in *Beneath The United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 340-342; Gordon L. Bowen, “U.S. Foreign Policy toward Radical Change: Covert Operations in Guatemala, 1950-1954,”

against Communist-like activities which appeared in Guatemala. With regard to the Caracas Declaration itself, the OAS “condemned international Communist activities as intervention in American affairs” for which the American States had to “take necessary measures to protect their political independence against such intervention.” Some Latin American countries declined to employ the declaration to the “internal affairs of individual countries,” therefore, “the administration decided to intervene unilaterally” in Guatemala. Applying to intervene unilaterally, the U.S. rejected the past treaties such as the Charter of OAS. Moreover, according to Secretary of State Dulles, by signing the Caracas Declaration, the Monroe Doctrine became “a multilateral pact,” extending its meaning.²⁴

2.2.2 The CIA and PBSUCCESS

After the Caracas Conference later in 1953, President Eisenhower assumed that Guatemala had been infiltrated by Communists for the reason that “President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán was too willing to cooperate with local Communists, even though they seemed to have a limited role in his government.” Hence, Eisenhower assigned the CIA to prepare the “first... clandestine operation” of anti-Arbenz measures and to organize “military opposition in Honduras” after he urged Arbenz to “sever” the ties with Guatemalan Communist and to “restore the holdings of United Fruit.” Arbenz refused to do both. Moreover, he tried to assure the U.S. that Guatemala is a democratic country, whereas the United States was of a different opinion. Due to Arbenz’s stance, Eisenhower decided to cool diplomatic relations in order to show Guatemala her “dependence on the United States.” The administration imposed a military equipment “embargo” on “the Guatemalan military.”²⁵

Latin American Perspectives 10, no. 1 (Winter 1983): 91, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2633365> (Accessed February 24, 2010).

²⁴“U.S. Latin American Policy, 1823-1965,” 259; Bowen, “U.S. Foreign Policy toward Radical Change: Covert Operations in Guatemala, 1950-1954,” 99; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 42.

²⁵Ibid.; “U.S. Latin American Policy, 1823-1965,” 259; The Cold War Museum, “The Cold War Museum – Guatemala, The Cold War Museum, <http://www.coldwar.org/articles/50s/guatemala.html> (accessed February 24, 2010); Miller Center of Public Affairs, “American President: Dwight David Eisenhower: Foreign Affairs,” Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, <http://millercenter.org/academic/americanpresident/eisenhower/essays/biography/5> (accessed February 24, 2010); Bowen, “U.S. Foreign Policy toward Radical Change: Covert Operations in Guatemala, 1950-1954,” 92.

When the Guatemalan government received arms from Soviet Czechoslovakia, the Eisenhower administration did not hesitate to launch a covert operation prepared by the CIA under the code name PBSUCCESS. The covert program was launched on 18 June 1954 when the military opposition led by Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, “trained” and armed by the CIA officials, crossed the border of Guatemala from Honduras. Much to the surprise of U.S. officials, Jacobo Arbenz’s military resigned. As CIA director Dulles put it, “the foray was... more dependent upon psychological impact rather than actual military strength.” Arbenz was shocked by the covert operation and resigned on 27 June 1954. As a result of PBSUCCESS, Guatemala was then under the control of Castillo Armas. After assuming office, Armas returned the expropriated land to the United Fruit Company and sowed the seeds for foreign investments in Guatemala. During his administration, until his assassination in 1957 by a guard of the presidential residence, Guatemala received \$46 million in foreign assistance.²⁶

Some historians have argued that the Guatemalan case and the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz was more about the United Fruit Company than the Communist threat against internal security. Nevertheless, the Eisenhower administration violated the concept of the OAS Charter by intervening in Guatemalan internal affairs, “even though it was a covert operation.” No matter what the “real” purpose of the Eisenhower administration in Guatemala was, Eisenhower justified his actions before he launched the covert action in Guatemala. On 27 May 1954, almost one month before the PBSUCCESS operation, he passed a new document regarding Latin American policies, called “U.S. Policy in the Event of Guatemalan Aggression in Latin America.” The new document proved to be a good calculation of the administration, for it was aimed at the overt operation in Guatemala, and in a way it tempered the possible tensions which the covert operation could have caused. On recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower included in the new policy “the statement that the United States would collaborate with the OAS to the extent feasible but would take military action unilaterally only as a last resort.”²⁷

²⁶Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 53-57, 62; The Miami News – Google News Archive Search, “Castillo Armas Assassination Still Unsolved,” The Miami News, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2206&dat=19580718&id=jaEyAAAIAIAJ&sjid=pOoFAAAAIAIAJ&pg=6190,848593> (accessed February 24, 2010).

²⁷Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 59-60.

It can be speculated what the real purpose of the Eisenhower administration was in Guatemala, because as already mentioned, the number of Communist in Guatemala was so miniscule that it could not have such a harsh impact on internal security and the spread of Soviet influence in the hemisphere. Nevertheless, Eisenhower managed to put in force new anti-communist policies and measures for Latin America which became his “primary goals” of his other policies towards Latin America.²⁸

2.3 First term policies towards Latin America since 1956

During the second half of its first term, the Eisenhower administration maintained its anti-communist policies to guard the hemisphere against communist infiltration and tried to follow a path of hemispheric defense. The number of Communists in Latin America was still small and there was no need to revise the existing foreign policies. Yet, the administration passed a new document concerning aid for Latin America. The U.S. faced new Soviet-Latin American ties established by the Soviet leader Nikolai Bulganin at the beginning of 1956, followed by an influx of Soviet aid to strengthen the relationship by expanding trade and improving, “...diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations...” with Latin American leaders. This led to an “economic aid contest” between the United States and the Soviet Union.²⁹

A new U.S. document concerning Latin America, NSC 5613/1, came into being on September 25, 1956. Under the new policy, military aid remained unchanged; the United States kept “transfer[ring] arms and training [to] Latin American officers and soldiers,” as they wanted to have friendly anti-communist relationships with Latin American leaders and moreover, to assure themselves that these leaders would not buy arms from non-hemispheric countries.³⁰

As for the economic policies, NSC 5613/1 responded to the established Soviet-Latin American ties, which of course the United States did not welcome in the hemisphere, stating that “closer relations between the Soviet Union and Latin America are against the security interests of

²⁸Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 61.

²⁹Ibid., 90; Hagen and Ruttan, “Development Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy,” 4; Sewell, “A Perfect (Free-Market) World?,” 841.

³⁰Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 89-90.

the U.S.” and if such ties had existed, the United States would have lessened any sort of assistance and diminish its relations with that country.³¹

2.4 Second Term Policies

During his first four years in office, Eisenhower made anti-communism a cornerstone of his foreign policy towards Latin America, even though he announced that “Communism in Latin America was only a potential danger.” He passed four NSC documents calling for military and economic aid to Latin America. He toppled Jacobo Arbenz’s Communist-like government with the help of CIA agents, fought off economic nationalism in Bolivia, and tried to promote free trade and investment in Latin American countries. Moreover, his administration had to face new Soviet-Latin American ties and the growth of Soviet economic influence in the hemisphere. Regarding his first term as a president, on one hand, he fulfilled his proposed tasks and was satisfied with his accomplishments, but Latin Americans on the other hand, felt neglected and envied other countries for the help which benefited from the post WWII Marshall Plan. Even though Eisenhower was satisfied with the measures he had taken, a wave of criticism appeared during the mid-1950s; the American public shared a negative opinion on his support and sort of friendship with the oppressive and dictator regimes.³²

Nevertheless, despite the negative voices and Eisenhower’s poor health conditions, (he suffered a heart attack), he decided to run for a re-election in 1956. However, foreign policy for Latin America was not part of the presidential campaign; the only reference to his foreign policy towards Latin America was the Guatemalan case, which he regarded as a success during his first term. The administration decided to continue with existing foreign policies and fight against Communism, although, it had to support “so-called dictator governments” to achieve its goal of defending the hemisphere, which was in the words of a *New York Times* editor “the greatest weakness of the United States toward the Hemisphere...” In addition, as a result of the

³¹Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 91.

³²Loayza, “An 'Aladdin's Lamp' for Free Enterprise,” 93; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 40, 96, 99.

established Soviet ties with the South ... “economic assistance was becoming a regular feature of the overall security package of the United States...”³³

2.4.1 Military Aid prior to Nixon’s trip

Concerning military aid during Eisenhower’s second presidential term, the U.S. Congress passed a new Mutual Security Act of 1957. The new program was not only designed after “a rising tide of criticism building up against this type of aid,” but also to make such assistance “more effective in fulfilling the basic goal of defending the Western Hemisphere.” Moreover, the United States was of the opinion that “contact between Latin-American military men and their U.S. counterparts was said to help give the Latin Americans an understanding of the role of the military as an obedient force under the authority of a civilian government, thereby lessening the direct involvement of the military in politics.” In addition, Latin America kept receiving not only “the lowest priority in allocations of arms,” but also the United States “was unable to achieve its objective of being the sole source of arms for Latin America.”³⁴

2.4.2 Economic Aid prior to Nixon’s trip

Regarding economic policy, Eisenhower participated at an economic conference held in Buenos Aires in 1957 to discuss with other participating countries the possible improvement of the living conditions of Latin Americans. Even after the conference, the United States “constructs dictated that strategic imperatives [for the region] would still have to be attained in a manner in keeping with the ideals of free-market capitalism.” Nevertheless, in the same year for the first time during Eisenhower’s presidency, he asked for more money to be spent on economic aid than military. Moreover, in 1957 Eisenhower proposed that Congress establish the Development Loan Fund (DLF), which would provide money to finance everything except technical assistance, and also it would provide “soft loans for basic public projects.”³⁵

³³Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 85, 89-90; Hagen and Ruttan, “Development Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy,” 6; Rippy, *Globe and Hemisphere*, 208; The White House, “Dwight D. Eisenhower,” The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/DwightDEisenhower> (accessed February 14, 2010).

³⁴Francis, “Military Aid to Latin America in the U.S. Congress,” 396-397; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 88.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 95-96; Hagen and Ruttan, “Development Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy,” 6; U.S. Agency for International Development, “USAID: USAID History,” U.S. Agency for International Development, http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html (accessed February 20, 2010); John T. Woolley and Gerhard

All in all, the first half of Eisenhower's second term maintained existing anti-communist policies and life in the Western Hemisphere seemed to go in the right direction for U.S. foreign policy makers, and no threat seemed to menace the United States. The only factor which appeared to worry the U.S. was when the Soviet Union launched "the first man-made satellite, Sputnik," and such an act made the contest of the two rivals even more tense. The U.S. had to devise something more innovative than its Soviet rival to stay ahead of it.

2.4.3 The Nixon Trip and its influence on foreign policy

However, the optimism about the policies towards Latin America started to wane after Vice President Richard Nixon returned to Washington, D.C. from a South American tour. Until then, according to the International Cooperation Administration's Summary Presentation in June 1957, no change in existing policies was needed. According to them,

Massive grant aid programs are not called for in Latin America. Because of its geographical location there is no immediate threat of large-scale external Communist aggression... Latin America has had and probably will have more and larger opportunities than other geographic areas to obtain – through trade, through private and public enterprise, through private investment both local and foreign, and through loans from public institutions such as the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development-the external resources required for economic development.

But the situation had clearly changed by the spring of 1958 when Nixon made his tour.³⁶

Nixon's trip was a huge failure for U.S. policy makers. Nixon was welcomed by angry crowds full of anti-American sentiment, complaining about the U.S. "benign neglect" towards them, and his life was threatened by a mob in Caracas. Latin Americans blamed U.S. policy makers for their "social ills: the Eisenhower administration had supported repressive regimes, had denied Latin American economic assistance, and was...imposing tariff barriers against Latin American exports." Clearly, the United States had to come up with a new strategy for Latin American countries or risk losing them to the Soviets, a fact that prompted a debate over existing

Peters, "DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER: Statement by the President on the Buenos Aires Economic Conference," The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10886> (accessed February 28, 2010); Sewell, "A Perfect (Free-Market) World?," 864.

³⁶Hagen and Ruttan, "Development Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy," 6; Rippey, *Globe and Hemisphere*, 226.

policies. Moreover, the Nixon trip led to a dichotomy in the U.S. Cold war policies. On one hand, “where anticommunist dictators were able to maintain stability, U.S. support continued, particularly in the form of military assistance,” but on the other hand, the Eisenhower administration had to take new approaches for those who were not willing to follow the anti-communist line.³⁷

The administration had to adjust its existing policies and include issues which called for democracy and human rights. Thus, Eisenhower, “instead of awarding medals to dictators, ... began to express publicly his preference for political democracy and respect of human rights.” To back his new measures, he issued new NSC document 5902/1 in February 1959 which “called...for ‘special encouragement’ to representative governments.” Moreover, the document stated that the United States should still be the only provider of military hardware to Latin American countries “as a means of maintaining U.S. influence over Latin American military forces and through such forces on the political orientation of Latin American governments.” Regarding the so called relationships with dictators, Eisenhower was willing to change it, but he did not want to drop “a mainstay of ... [his] Latin American policy: military aid.” He did so in order not to endanger his anti-Communist policies. Eisenhower’s revised approach towards military aid met a wave of criticism from some Democrats. For example, according to Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy, “the money allocated was down the drain in military sense.” Even though the Eisenhower administration was criticized from various angles, by the end of its second term, “the administration expanded military aid programs,” as was suggested in the final report of the Draper Committee.³⁸

Concerning the economic policy in the wake of the Nixon trip, the Eisenhower “administration became more willing to extend economic aid to Latin America...” The new economic policy also took some of the suggested points from the Draper Committee report stating that “economic and military assistance were interchangeable, for without internal security

³⁷Robert J. McMahon, “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: a Critique of the Revisionist,” *Political Science Quarterly* 10, no. 3 (1986): 466, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2151625> (accessed November 18, 2009); Schultz, “Combating Communism with Economic Development,” in *Beneath The United States: a History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America*, 354; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 100-103.

and ...adequate military forces, there is little hope for any economic progress.” According to Nixon, the United States should cling to the policies of private investments, “loans to state enterprises, and development assistance for Latin America,” among the others principles such as the basic existing economic policies of promotion of capitalism and dissuasion of economic nationalism, all of which were included in NSC 5902/1.

Not only did U.S. officials want to change the existing economic policies, but officials from Latin America, such as Brazilian President Juscelio Kubitschek wanted them changed as well. Kubitschek called for “Operation Pan America, the Marshall Plan for Latin America” to improve the living conditions of Latin Americans. On one hand, not all the officials welcomed such proposals, but on the other hand, several favored “economic assistance” for Latin America, the Undersecretary of State C. Douglas Dillon being one of them. He called for a revision of “the U.S. position on commodity agreements.” His ideas came to fruition in 1959 when “most major coffee producers signed an agreement pledging to support prices by limiting coffee exports.” For improvement of U.S.-Latin American economic cooperation, Dillon also proposed that the U.S. would support “a regional development bank,” thus an Inter-American Development bank was established in October 1960 and started providing loans a year later. In 1960, the Eisenhower administration created another institution for economic assistance “to fight social ills such as poverty, illiteracy, and inadequate housing” in Latin America, a Social Progress Fund. Moreover, the administration achieved an important milestone for its foreign policy towards Latin America on 13 September 1960 when the Act of Bogotá was signed. Under the auspices of the new act, “the U.S. offered a government loan for social reforms repayable in local currencies.” Signing the Act of Bogotá “the United States recognized and accepted responsibility for the social and economic development of the area.” Later, during the Kennedy administration the Act of Bogota was expanded into a new program called the Alliance for Progress.³⁹

³⁸Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 104-109; Draper Committee -President Eisenhower appointed William Draper to revise the U.S. military assistance strategy in 1958, and in 1959 Draper issued a report which influenced Eisenhower’s policy decisions.

³⁹Loayza, “An 'Aladdin's Lamp' For Free Enterprise,” 99-101; Herbert L. Matthews, “The United States and Latin America,” *International Affairs* 37, no. 1 (January 1961): 16, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2611494> (accessed March 2, 2010); *Time*, “The Americas: Operation Pan American,” *Time.com*, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,891915,00.html> (accessed March 2, 2010); Hagen And Ruttan, “Development Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy,” 9; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 109-112, 142, 156.

By the end of Eisenhower's second term, President Eisenhower had modified his foreign policies due to the Nixon tour in South America. However, a new threat had appeared to menace the Western Hemisphere. In 1959 Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba, an event that would change the game in Latin America and the Caribbean and force new approaches to be taken.

When President Eisenhower left office, he bequeathed his successor a new approach towards Latin America that could "no longer afford to 'neglect' the region, for the Cold War had come to Latin America." Moreover, the issues of winning the Cold War in the Western Hemisphere and thwarting the Communist spread became important factors in the upcoming presidential elections.⁴⁰

⁴⁰Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 173.

3 THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA

The presidential elections of 1960 were held on 8 November between the Democratic candidate Senator John Fitzgerald Kennedy and the Republican nominee, Vice President Richard Nixon. The presidential campaigns of both candidates became a battlefield of their visions and targets in both domestic and foreign affairs. Moreover, the campaigns were “dominated by rising Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.” Concerning foreign policy towards Latin America and the new menace in Cuba, both Kennedy and Nixon “shared similar beliefs in the threat of Communism” in the Western Hemisphere, thus “the similarity in policy and ideas forced the campaigns to seek out other differences.” On one hand, it was not an easy task for Nixon to gain voters on his side, because the Eisenhower administration had to face up to criticism of its policies toward Latin America and Cuba. As Senator Kennedy put it, the Eisenhower administration was “soft on communism” and the new administration had to make a “greater effort in the fight against communism.” On the other hand, Nixon claimed that “he had the maturity and experience to deal with the Communists,” as opposed to Kennedy. Nevertheless, Kennedy “turn[ed] his youth into an advantage proclaiming...that ‘we stand today on the edge of a new frontier’... as a way of thinking and acting.” As the two candidates debated, Kennedy slowly started to win over voters. The results of presidential elections were very tight, giving the victory to Senator Kennedy who became “the youngest elected president, the only Catholic and the first born in the twentieth century.” The 1960 elections not only marked a change in the White House from the Republicans to the Democrats, but also the end of eight years of the conservative Eisenhower administration.⁴¹

⁴¹Kennesaw State University, “1960 Kennedy vs. Nixon,” Kennesaw State University, <http://www.kennesaw.edu/pols/3380/pres/1960.html> (accessed March 1, 2010); The Living Room Candidate, “The Living Room Candidate-Commercials-1960-Debate 2,” <http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1960> (accessed February 19, 2010); John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, “John F. Kennedy, The 35th President of the United States,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/historical+resources/biographies+and+profiles/biographies/John+F.+Kennedy+The+35th+President+of+The+United+States+Page+4.htm> (accessed February 19, 2010); John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, “Campaign Of 1960,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Jfk+In+History/Campaign+Of+1960.htm> (Accessed February 19, 2010); Anna Kasten Nelson, “President Kennedy’s National Security Policy: a Reconsideration,” *Reviews*

Kennedy assumed office on 20 January 1961 with new visions and approaches. His target was to change the existing policies towards Latin America and the Caribbean, “hoping to eliminate paternalism and exploitation from the U.S. stance toward the region.” As he put it, “Jack Kennedy would be a very different kind of president than Eisenhower,” claiming that a “hallmark ... [of his presidency is] the necessity to separate his administration from that of his predecessor.” Furthermore, the proclamation made by the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1961 that he would support “wars on national liberation” became a new source of worry and made Kennedy even more obsessed with the idea of obviating the spread of the Soviet infiltration and forestalling Castroite revolutions in the Western Hemisphere. With respect to the threats, President Kennedy made a remark about his new stance on policies toward Latin America during his inaugural address:

To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge--to convert our good words into good deeds--in a new alliance for progress--to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house.⁴²

3.1 The Alliance for Progress and its aid

As president, Kennedy had to confront unpleasant conditions in Latin America, which he referred to as “the most dangerous area in the world.” “The world inherited by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 was far different than the world of [President Eisenhower in] 1953,” the Cuban revolutionary’s machinations having a profound impact. Not only was Latin America afflicted by poverty, high illiteracy rates, malnutrition, low life expectancy, high children mortality, despotic

In American History 19, no. 1 (March 1991): 4, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703369> (accessed: October 6, 2009); The candidates’ debates were broadcast on TV for the first time in history.

⁴²Nelson, “President Kennedy’s National Security Policy,” 5-6; John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, “Historical Resources-Inaugural Address,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03Inaugural01201961.htm> (accessed March 1, 2010); Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 9; Michael E. Latham, “Ideology, Social Science, and Destiny: Modernization and the Kennedy-Era Alliance for Progress,” *Diplomatic History* 22, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 199, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=105&sid=c6152b02-520e-4d89-8f5e-c060b7bdaf54%40sessionmgr112&bdata=JmFtcDtsYW5nPWZJnNpdGU9ZWVhc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=30h&AN=419463> (accessed March 10, 2010).

tyrants and on the threshold of “embrac[ing] communism,” but also, the Latin American peoples expected a lot from the new administration. Thus, it was high time for President Kennedy to change the existing approaches of benign neglect and the “support [of] dictators who professed to be zealous anti-Communist” of his predecessor, and turn his campaign pledges into deeds. He pledged to “transform Latin America into a vibrant, progressive area of the world,” proclaiming that the “1960s [would be] a decade of development.”⁴³

On 13 March 1961, Kennedy made a stirring speech concerning his new policies towards Latin America in which he “outlined a ten-point program to transform the Americas during the 1960s,” his Alliance for Progress, stating,

Therefore I have called on all people of the hemisphere to join in a new Alliance for Progress -- Alianza para Progreso -- a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools - techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela.

The Alliance stressed three main aims: “economic growth and development, structural change, and political democratization.” Concerning economic development, the Kennedy administration wanted to achieve economic growth at the rate of “not less than 2.5 percent per capita per year,” which was essential “to underwrite improvements in health, education, and welfare.” To make the Alliance a reality, Kennedy asked Congress for “\$500 million to begin a campaign to eradicate illiteracy, hunger, and disease in the hemisphere.” In addition, according to U.S. officials, “the United States would enjoy lasting security only when Latin Americans lived in prosperous, socially progressive, free societies.”⁴⁴

⁴³The Eisenhowers: The President, “The Eisenhower Presidential Era: America Grows up and Paves the way to the 21st Century,” Dwight D. Eisenhower, <http://www.dwightdeisenhower.com/president.html> (accessed February 20, 2010); Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 7, 9; Stephen G. Rabe, “Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism,” in *Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963*, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1989), 105, 108.

⁴⁴Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 9, 148; Nelson, “President Kennedy’s National Security Policy,” 9; Rabe, “Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism,” in Paterson, 106, 108; John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, “New JFK Exhibit Celebrates US-Latin American Friendship,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK+Library+and+Museum/News+and+Press/New+JFK+Exhibit+Celebrates+US+Latin+American+Friendship.htm> (accessed March 1, 2010).

3.1.1 The Charter of Punta del Este

Later on 17 August 1961, the Charter of Punta del Este was signed during a conference in Uruguay marking the official birth of the Alliance for Progress. The signed charter called for “accelerat[ing] the economic and social development of the participating countries of Latin America, so that they may achieve maximum levels of well-being, with equal opportunities for all, in democratic societies adapted to their own needs and desires.” Moreover, at the conference, the U.S. delegation promised to provide “more than \$20 billion in public and private capital over the next ten years from the US, international lending authorities, charitable foundations, and private US investors.” The Alliance of Progress had grand visions, indeed, but time would show the Alliance’s potential to succeed in combating communism and social and economic development in Latin America.⁴⁵

3.2 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and USAID and economic aid

Another step to better the living conditions of the Latin American nations was made on 4 September 1961 when the Kennedy administration passed a new law concerning economic assistance in Latin America, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The act permitted President Kennedy to substitute the International Cooperation Administration of the Eisenhower administration for a new organization, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) founded by Kennedy on 3 November 1961. USAID “became the first U.S. foreign assistance organization” designed to “emphasize long-range assistance to promote economic and social development,” for U.S. policy makers shared the opinion that economic assistance for development in underdeveloped countries of the world “would help to forestall the expansion of communism.” According to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the receiving countries of economic aid under the auspices of the Foreign Assistance Act would not be compelled “into alliances or special commitments to the U.S.; however, aid would be conditional on the adequacy of their

⁴⁵Latham, “Ideology, Social Science, and Destiny: Modernization and the Kennedy-Era Alliance for Progress,” 211.

performance in the process of development.” Moreover, the receiving countries would have to adopt “self-help measures to reform and develop social and economic institutions.”⁴⁶

3.3 Military aid and Counterinsurgency Doctrines

President Kennedy dramatically changed the existing policies of his predecessor and deplored Eisenhower’s arming of dictators. While the Eisenhower administration focused on hemispheric defense, the Kennedy administration decided to adopt a different approach and focus on internal security with the assistance of internal security forces, which were meant to “contribute to nation-building by protecting the fragile development process” in developing countries in the Western Hemisphere. As Stephen Rabe notes, the Kennedy administration “scrapped the notion that the armed forces of Latin America had a responsibility to defend the hemisphere from outside attack,” and also, it decided to “use military aid as an incentive to persuade military officers that they should concentrate on internal security and national development.” The new military assistance of the Kennedy administration became an important anti-communist policy.⁴⁷

Castro and his Cuban revolution of 1959 had a profound impact on Kennedy’s military assistance. In 1961, President Kennedy decided to set his approach to internal security by changing the “protection of the Hemisphere’s coastline and sea lanes to internal defense of Latin American governments against Castro-communist subversion, terrorism, and guerilla warfare.” The administration emphasized that the new approach of military assistance focus on “the development of small, mobile forces trained in the techniques of counter-insurgency,” therefore the Latin American countries should “equip their forces with small arms, helicopters, and trucks, rather than heavier armaments such as tanks, jet aircraft, and large warship,” as they were doing during the Eisenhower administration. Furthermore, Kennedy believed that the Latin American leaders should be taught “how to control mobs and fight guerillas.” With regard to the counter-insurgency programs, the administration laid the major emphasis on “civic action” which

⁴⁶Hagen and Ruttan, “Development Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy,” 10, 22; U.S. Agency for International Development, “USAID: USAID History,” U.S. Agency for International Development, http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html (accessed February 20, 2010).

⁴⁷Schultz, “Combating Communism with Economic Development,” in *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America*, 357; Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in The World*, 125-126; William Rosenau, “The Kennedy Administration, U.S. Foreign Internal Security Assistance and the Challenge

essentially used the military forces to create helpful projects for the locals in various fields such as “education, public works, public health and agriculture.” Concerning all the issues of Kennedy’s military assistance and due to Castro’s supposed threat, Kennedy used the military as a tool to achieve social development.⁴⁸

To achieve his proposed goals of development and security, Kennedy saw potential to fulfill his goals in the modernization of Latin American military, which he made a key point in his policies towards Latin America. Consequently, he thought that the goals set in the Alliance for Progress could be achieved through military assistance. To make Latin American counterparts more active in achieving the U.S. objectives, Kennedy decided to establish military schools in the Panama Canal Zone where the Latin Americans would be taught about “democratic values, clandestine operations, communism, defoliation, the use of informants, interrogation of prisoners and suspects, handling mass rallies and meetings, [etc.]...” In establishing the military schools, the Panama Canal Zone began to “accommodate a rapidly growing number of Latin American students, and civic action teams of US military engineers [that] began building roads and related infrastructure in areas thought vulnerable to Castroite guerrilla activity.” In addition, the Kennedy administration established an Inter-American Policy Academy where Latin American police could come for “training and indoctrination.” Latin American leaders willingly accepted these new offers of training and equipment, even though “they did not give up their fondness for the prestige equipment associated with older hemispheric defense program.” Nonetheless, designing the new military assistance program, Kennedy violated his promise stated “in his Alliance for Progress Speech, to reduce military expenditures in the region.” Yet, he defended his measures stating that “internal security programs strengthened democratic institutions.” Arthur Schlesinger, however, was of a different opinion, reportedly telling a presidential aide that the counter-insurgency “was the worst folly [that] contributed to a ‘military assault’ on democracy.”⁴⁹

of ‘Subterranean War’, 1961-63,” abstract, *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 14, no 3. (Autumn 2003), <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a713636782> (accessed April 10, 2010).

⁴⁸John M. Baines, “U.S. Military Assistance to Latin America: An Assessment,” *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 14, no. 4 (November 1972): 473-474, 479, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/174767>, (accessed March 1, 2010); Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 127; Rabe, “Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism,” in Paterson, 114-115.

⁴⁹Schultz, “Combating Communism with Economic Development,” in *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America*, 358; Rabe, “Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance

In spite of Kennedy's visions of military assistance, the program proved to be difficult to handle. According to scholars, "U.S. counterinsurgency and civic-action policies implicitly encouraged the Latin American military to enter the political arena by linking security and development and urging the military to become deeply involved in all stages of society in order to defeat or forestall guerilla insurgencies." Drawing the conclusion from the beliefs of scholars it seems that the Kennedy administration "had expanded the role of the military in Latin America." Nevertheless, U.S. policy makers believed that their military assistance approach helped to eradicate "the region from Marxist-Leninists."⁵⁰

for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism," in Paterson, 118; Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 128, 130-131, 134, 142.

⁵⁰Ibid., 141, 147, 195.

4 KENNEDY VERSUS EISENHOWER IN LATIN AMERICA

As demonstrated, there was some degree of consistency between the two administrations in their approaches towards Latin America, but on the other hand, they differed in some key aspects. Both shared the vision to secure the Western Hemisphere from the Communist menace and both adhered to past doctrines, such as the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the Good Neighbor Policy of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of non-intervention into the internal affairs of the Latin Americans countries, or the Charter of the Organization of American States. There were occasions when intervention was needed in order to protect the hemisphere against communism, the Guatemalan case being a good example, followed later by Cuba. Furthermore, both made anti-communism a mainstay of their foreign policies towards Latin America, but in case of President Eisenhower anti-communism was not a mainstay of his policies from the beginning of his administration; it developed later within his first term in office. A major shift in Eisenhower's policies was made in the wake of the Nixon trip when the administration adopted a new approach to the state of inter-American relations far more similar to that of Kennedy and stopped professing a benign neglect. Moreover, they both tried to achieve the defeat of communism by different means. Kennedy saw considerable potential in the Alliance of Progress, while Eisenhower was of the opinion that military assistance, which exceeded economic assistance, went hand in hand with hemispheric defense. And above all, Castro forced both of them to adjust their policies.

4.1 Economic aid

During Eisenhower's first term, he did not concentrate on inter-American relations much, as opposed to Kennedy who devoted a great deal of effort improving them. With regard to economic policy during the first term, the Eisenhower administration established its aid for Latin America within the scope of Republican visions and ideals to promote free trade and private investment. Kennedy, on the other hand, was not "a free trader," for he was "aware of the perils of the uncontrolled movement of capital and goods for economic regions."⁵¹

⁵¹William S. Borden, "Defending Hegemony: American Foreign Economic Policy," in Paterson, 64.

Furthermore, according to U.S. officials during the Eisenhower administration no financial aid in the form of the 'Marshall Plan' for Latin America was needed. Kennedy was of a different opinion, and as a result he designed the Alliance for Progress which concentrated on economic assistance as a means to attain social development, economic growth, a higher degree of literacy and overall improved welfare in Latin America. However, as he conceded, "the Alliance for Progress could not be compared to the Marshall Plan" for various reasons, among them being that with the Marshall Plan "we helped to rebuild a shattered economy whose human and social foundation remained," but what we are trying to make today in Latin America is "a basic new foundation, capable of reshaping the centuries-old societies and economies of half a hemisphere." In addition, the Eisenhower administration claimed that it "recognized the need for socioeconomic reform in Latin America and built the framework for the economic aid program" as well as had founded the Alliance for Progress, and that the Kennedy administration only added an "appealing title." On the contrary, "Kennedy admirers had dismissed Eisenhower's paternity claim," arguing that the Kennedy administration had created a wide-ranging reform package, while the Eisenhower administration "had neither pledged to transfer \$20 billion to Latin America nor set economic growth targets for the region." Despite the dispute, the Alliance for Progress is mostly associated with the Kennedy administration. In spite of grand visions, however the Alliance ultimately failed. No Latin American country reached the annual economic growth rate of 2.5 %. Or if "the Alliance... brought about change, the reform did not necessarily create progressive, democratic societies." Anna Nelson summarizes the failure as follows:

The failure of the Alliance for Progress, for example, was not just a failure in implementation but reflected the original assumption upon which it was based: that the nations of Latin America would accept the American model of success; that the political and economic leadership of those nations would recognize the interdependence of democracy and economic growth; and that, like good New Dealers, they would support reform for the masses to stem the tide of revolution.

Others saw the failure originating in long and ineffective bureaucratic procedures causing a slowdown in aid, while still others argued that the Latin American oligarchic leaders were against change, or that U.S. policy makers "implicitly disparaged Latin American culture." Nevertheless, it can be argued that all of these reasons hurt the cause and that, as a result "the Kennedy administration failed to perform miracles in Latin America." Notwithstanding the failure,

President Kennedy made a greater effort to better inter-American relations than any president before him.⁵²

In addition, in the wake of the Nixon trip a considerable change was made to existing economic policies. Eisenhower decided “to guide the revolution of rising expectation along reformist lines ... [and] paved the way for ... [his] successors by reversing its opposition to economic development assistance,” increasing an allocation of money for economic assistance and establishing two important institutions for improvement of inter-American relations, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Social Progress Fund, which were both of critical importance fighting the Communist peril in the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, “with the Inter-American Bank, the United States could intervene in Latin America without having to accept the onus of responsibility for intervention.” Moreover, the establishments of the Alliance for Progress and the Social Progress Fund demonstrate continuity with the administrations, as both stressed the need for social development.⁵³

4.2 Military Aid

With regard to the security of the United States and of the hemisphere, a major contrast can be seen between the two administrations. While the Kennedy administration concentrated on internal security, for they thought that it strengthens the democratic institutions, the Eisenhower administration focused on hemispheric security to protect the hemisphere from outer communist infiltration.

Moreover, as far as military assistance during the first term of the Eisenhower administration is concerned, the United States’ main objective was that Latin America receives arms and military equipment only from the U.S. in order to avoid possible ties with Communist countries. Moreover, “the aid constituted the price the United States paid in order to get assistance from [Latin American] ... countries on political matters and in the defense of the Western Hemisphere.” Kennedy, on the other hand, saw a new potential in military forces as a tool for both social

⁵²Nelson, “President Kennedy’s National Security Policy,” 9-10; Rabe, “Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, The Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism,” in Paterson, 108; Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 3, 154, 161, 171.

⁵³Schoultz, “Combating Communism with Economic Development,” in *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America*, 354; Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area In The World*, 143.

development and to defeat communism. In addition, Kennedy deplored Eisenhower's "arming of dictators who professed to be zealous anti-Communists [stating that] money allocated was down the drain in military sense," nonetheless, his stance on military aid changed, for he provided Latin American military forces with a wide-ranging means. The administration established military schools for Latin Americans to teach them U.S. ideals and visions and offered special programs of counterinsurgency and training to avoid Castroite guerrillas. Nevertheless, the military did not bring social change but did help to protect the hemisphere against communist infiltration, for neither the Soviet Union nor Castro managed to infiltrate into Latin American affairs.⁵⁴

The United States was of the opinion during the Eisenhower administration that "contact between Latin-American military men and their U.S. counterparts was said to help give the Latin Americans an understanding of the role of the military as an obedient force under the authority of a civilian government, thereby lessening the direct involvement of the military in politics." On the contrary, during the Kennedy administration the opposite was happening, as his "counterinsurgency and civic-action policies implicitly encouraged the LA military to enter the political arena by linking security and development and urging the military to become deeply involved in all stages of society in order to defeat or forestall guerilla insurgencies."⁵⁵

4.3 Foreign Policies towards Latin America in a Nutshell

Even though both men had visions and aims for inter-American relations, neither of them succeeded to satisfy the Latin American leaders and fulfill the proposed pledges of economic growth and social development. Of course, both administrations had succeeded in some respect in forwarding their policies, but overall, they failed. The question is why. Both partially disparaged Latin American culture, for "there are [obviously] differences in the customs, patterns of value, and economic conditions of the two peoples of America and similarities in these respects between the various Latin nations themselves." Possibly due to a lack of knowledge in Latin American affairs, or possibly because they both were so blinded with their visions that they did not see the reality of what Latin America really wanted and needed from the U.S., both did what they assumed was right for the U.S. They placed U.S. interests first, when a greater benefit may have

⁵⁴Francis, "Military Aid to Latin America in the U.S. Congress," 395.

been achieved by placing Latin American interests first. According to Latin Americans, “the United States was moving, and trying to move the world, in the opposite directions. The two Americas were thus not in agreement in respect to this means of reaching Hemispheric goals.” To conclude, Luis Muñoz Marín, chief executive of the new “Commonwealth” of Puerto Rico put it nicely,

The [people of the] United States [must] realize the ever increasing need of bringing together the two basic streams of Western civilization which have give the New World such a commanding place in the struggle for freedom and human betterment. The Latin Americans [must] also realize it. But neither [people] is ...quite sure that the other does. It is a most worthy task to correct this misapprehension. [He believed]... that no fundamental disagreement exist with reference to their major objectives of peace, security, progress, democracy, and personal liberty-only disagreement regarding the methods of attaining them and on points of emphasis, and doubts regarding the measure of devotion of each of the two major groups to their common ideals.⁵⁶

⁵⁵Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 146; Francis, “Military Aid to Latin America in the U.S. Congress,” 396-397; Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 146.

⁵⁶Rippy, *Globe and Hemisphere*, 189, 193.

5 U.S. - CUBAN RELATIONS

Cuba has played a very important role in U.S. foreign affairs since the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898. A few years later, the U.S. promised to withdraw their troops from Cuba under several conditions which were codified in the Platt Amendment of 1901 under which the United States could intervene in Cuban affairs. Moreover, the U.S. forced Cuba to include the Platt Amendment into their constitution and two years later into the Permanent Treaty of 1903 which embraced “all the provisions” of the amendment. Furthermore, under the auspices of the Permanent Treaty the U.S. leased Cuban land to create a naval base was at Guantánamo Bay. The base, which was leased “in virtual perpetuity,” was strategic thanks to its position close to main shipping routes. Moreover, “the base helped protect the avenues of approach to the Panama Canal.” The Platt Amendment was ultimately revoked in 1934 when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt proclaimed his Good Neighbor Policy of non-intervention. Nevertheless, “the U.S. influence in Cuba remained enormous.”⁵⁷

5.1 Foreign policy of the Eisenhower Administration towards Cuba

U.S.-Cuban relations became very tense during the Cold War, and more specifically during the latter part of the 1950s, when a Cuban revolutionary Fidel Castro seized power during what is known as the Cuban Revolution. Castro’s steps were regarded as a threat for the United States and the whole Western Hemisphere, thus new approaches had to be taken.

5.1.1 Eisenhower versus Batista

When President Eisenhower assumed office in 1953, Cuba had been governed by Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar for a year already - he re-seized power in 1952 in an organized and bloodless

⁵⁷Our Documents, “Our Documents – Platt Amendment (1903),” Our Documents, <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=55> (accessed March 15, 2010); Thomas G. Paterson, “Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War against Castro,” in *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963*, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1989), 61; Geoffrey Warner, “Eisenhower and Castro: US-Cuban relations 1958-60,” *International Affairs* 75, no. 4 (October 1999): 804, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=6&hid=108&sid=2fdd23e6-be85-443b-bb6e-481670378865%40sessionmgr111&bdata=Jmxbmc9Y3Mmc2l0ZT1laG9zdC1saXZl#db=bth&AN=2552009> (accessed November 29, 2009); *The New York Times*, “Cuban Treaty Signed,” *The New York Times*, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9D07EFDF1639E433A25750C2A9639C946297D6CF> (accessed March 15, 2010).

coup d'état, after he returned from exile where he went after his first dictatorial regime, 1934-1944. Within a few days after assuming office, despite the fact that Batista supported Communists during his first term in office, Eisenhower "extended diplomatic recognition" to the Batista government, because he believed, as did Truman, that "a strong regime was urgently needed to quell the rising tide of political violence, gangsterism, and corruption that pervaded Cuba at the time." Batista was on good terms with the United States ever since and was fully enjoying military aid and the support of the Eisenhower administration until the close of the 1950s, when the rising tide of dissatisfaction with the Batista regime reached its peak, and he was forced into exile.⁵⁸

At first, the Batista regime seemed to follow the path the U.S. wanted it to. There were no ties with the Communists or the Soviet Union and no threats to U.S. interests. Throughout the Batista regime, President Eisenhower kept arming the dictator, for he professed to be a zealous anti-communist, however, through a constant supply of military equipment, the United States helped to build a very oppressive and brutal regime. Obviously, Batista took advantage of it and used the provided equipment to repress his enemies, instead of using it, as the United States intended, for hemispheric defense. Such actions were highly criticized among U.S. officials in both political parties, but mainly by the Democrats, and especially by Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy and Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright. They believed that there had to be something done, for such a regime was an embarrassment. The Nixon trip reflected changes in the state of foreign affairs between the United States, Latin America and the Caribbean. Hence, in the wake of the Nixon trip, the Eisenhower administration started to prefer governments which focused on democracy and called for human rights. Evidently, Batista's Cuba did not belong to the group of democratic regimes respecting human rights. Thus, in March 1958, President Eisenhower decided to "cut off arms request and shipments" to the dictator, as a result of the violation of "constitutional guarantees" such as "freedom of expression, right of assembly, freedom of movement," etc. Moreover, the Batista government had failed "to create favorable

⁵⁸Alen H. Luxenberg, "Did Eisenhower Push Castro into the Arms of the Soviets?," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 30, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 56, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/165789> (accessed March 1, 2010); Thomas G. Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1995), 16-17.

conditions for fair [and free] elections.” However, the suspension of arms did not cause real troubles and a shortage of military equipment to Batista. He kept receiving U.S. military equipment, not from the U.S. itself, but from other dictators such as Somoza of Nicaragua, or Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, who were still fully enjoying military aid from the Eisenhower administration.⁵⁹

5.1.2 The origins of the Cuban revolution and Castro versus Batista before 1959

Fidel Castro began to gain popularity in the early days of the Batista regime. On 26 July 1953 – “the date which gave Castro’s movement its name,” Castro, his brother Raul, their Argentinean friend Ernesto Che Guevara and more than a hundred students attacked Montada Barracks in Santiago city in order to overthrow the Batista regime. The attack failed, and the Castros were sentenced to jail for fifteen years, but were given amnesty in 1955 by Batista. During the years spent in prison, Castro became more obsessed with the idea of overthrowing the “corrupted” and “repressive” regime of Batista. After Castro was given amnesty, he left to Mexico to plan another attack, which he launched after he returned back to Cuba in 1956. This second attempt was also a failure, and most of Castro’s men died. Only he and eleven others managed to escape and hide in the Sierra Maestra Mountains, which became Castro’s shelter, where he began planning another move against the cruel dictator.⁶⁰

Tensions in Cuba began growing after the second attempt, and culminated in April 1958 when Castro led anti-Batista campaigns and set a General Strike, which did not bring an overthrow of Batista as the rebels wished, for luck was on Batista’s side and he won over the rebels. Nevertheless, towards the end of 1958 a strong feeling that Batista could no longer stay in

⁵⁹Rabe, “Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism,” in Paterson, 105; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 108; Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*, 25, 58, 127-128, 130, 135.

⁶⁰Luxenberg, “Did Eisenhower Push Castro into the Arms of the Soviets?,” 52; Harold H. Martin, “Can Castro Save Cuba?,” *Saturday Evening Post* 232, no. 5 (August 1959): 13, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=19&hid=102&sid=14beeddb-42ee-4d43-8830-557750ddc3ec%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JmFtcDtsYW5nPWZJnNpdGU9ZWZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=17830623> (accessed December 17, 2009); Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*, 18; Charles Phillips, “April 17, 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion,” *American History* 42, no. 1 (April 2007): 17-18, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=19&hid=102&sid=14beeddb-42ee-4d43-8830->

power predominated not only in Cuba, but also in the United States. U.S. officials tried in vain to find some alternative to both Castro and Batista. Despite the fact that free elections were held on 3 November and Rivero Agüero became the new president, Castro took over Cuba for the reason that he did not want a military junta to rule Cuba. By the end of December 1958, the Batista regime was forced to resign.⁶¹

5.2 The Eisenhower administration and Cuba during the Castro era

As the new year started, Batista fled Cuba, and took exile in the Dominican Republic. Castro took control on 1 January 1959. The feeling of victory was spread around the whole island, and all exiled Cubans cheered Batista's fall. U.S. sentiments about the new Cuban leader were mixed, but Secretary of State Dulles was of the opinion that, "The Provisional Government appears free from Communist taint and there are indications that it intends to pursue friendly relations with the US," which Castro affirmed by declaring "that Americans would face no difficulties in the new revolutionary Cuba." Consequently, President Eisenhower recognized Castro's government on 7 January. Even though Castro showed some anti-communist gestures, such as an expulsion of Communist leaders from various organizations, or a repudiation of Communism, the situation in Cuba began to turn in an unfavorable direction, causing considerable worries for U.S. policy makers.⁶²

Castro wanted to create a new Cuba according to his own visions and ideals, and without U.S. help. He "intended to bury Plattism" in Cuba "once and for all," stating that "The 'Platt Amendment is finished,' and the new Cuban leaders would 'neither sell themselves, nor falter nor

557750ddc3ec%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JmFtcDtsYW5nPWZJnNpdGU9ZWZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=23943931 (accessed December 17, 2009).

⁶¹Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*, 143, 230; "Fidel Castro," Biography.com, <http://www.biography.com/articles/Fidel-Castro-9241487> (accessed December 10, 2009); Mark Falcoff, "Cuba and the United States: Back to the beginning," *World Affairs* 156, no. 3 (Winter 1994): 114, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=19&hid=8&sid=14beeddb-42ee-4d43-8830-557750ddc3ec%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JmFtcDtsYW5nPWZJnNpdGU9ZWZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=9402147674> (accessed December 10, 2009); Luxenberg, "Did Eisenhower Push Castro into the Arms of the Soviets?," 59.

⁶²Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*, 227, 230, 233; "Fidel Castro," Biography.com, <http://www.biography.com/articles/Fidel-Castro-9241487> (accessed December 10, 2009); Robert Freeman Smith, "The United States and Latin-American Revolutions," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 4, no. 1 (January 1962): 100, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/164833> (accessed February 27, 2010).

become intimidated by any threat' [from the United States]." Such proclamations worried Washington and caused considerable political difficulties in the Western Hemisphere. Not only the declaration on Plattism concerned the U.S., but also a strong widespread anti-American sentiment in Cuba did trouble U.S. officials. Worsening relations even more, Castro once observed to Herbert Matthews, a *New York Times* reporter that " ... Americans keep complaining that Cuba is only ninety miles from ... [the U.S.] shore, [but] I say that the U.S. is ninety miles from Cuba and for us that is worse." Furthermore, when Castro visited Washington in April, Eisenhower refused to see him, for he was displeased with Castro's machinations and executions of Batista followers, leaving the task to Nixon. After the meeting with Castro, Nixon proclaimed about him that he is "either incredibly naïve about communism, or under communist discipline – my guess is the former." Despite Nixon's sentiment on Castro and communism, Eisenhower was of a different opinion.⁶³

5.2.1 The Agrarian Reform Law

A climax of the tensions came when Castro introduced his Agrarian Reform Law in May 1959 resulting in a further deterioration of U.S.-Cuban relations. The new law basically laid down an expropriation of Cuban land and "ended foreign ownership of cane-producing lands." Castro manifested a variety of nationalization deeds of "foreign, ... domestic industrial and commercial enterprise" through the Agrarian Reform Law, which moreover "adversely affect[ed] U.S.-owned properties." After the law proclamation, the U.S. and Cuba were at odds. As a result, Eisenhower became obsessed with the idea that Castro must be a Communist, taking into account the new law as affirmation of sympathizing with Communism, even though there was no evidence for it at that time. In consequence, Eisenhower started planning to overthrow Castro, and assumed that he had to be punished for his deeds.⁶⁴

⁶³Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*, 242, 246, 257; Alfonso Gonzalez, "Castro: Economic Effects on Latin America," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 11, no. 2 (April 1969): 286, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/165372> (accessed March, 12 2010); Luxenberg, "Did Eisenhower Push Castro into the Arms of the Soviets?," 52.

⁶⁴Martin, "Can Castro Save Cuba?," 40; Gonzalez, "Castro: Economic Effects on Latin America," 289; John Swift, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," *History Review*, no. 57 (March 2007): 7, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=9&hid=6&sid=1d55cdb0-aa76-4d2b-bb9c-21b983da197f%40sessionmgr14&bdata=JmFtcDtsYW5nPWZJnNpdGU9ZWwhvc3QtG2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9>

5.2.2 Cuba towards the close of the 1950s

Later in 1959, as the U.S. saw a potential danger in “Cuban nationalism” threatening not only Eisenhower’s business interests of private investments and of free trade, but also having a crucial impact on the U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, President Eisenhower started contemplating a plan to overthrow his Cuban enemy with the assistance of “anti-Castro groups within Cuba.” After Castro established economic ties with the Soviet Union in February 1960, Eisenhower did not hesitate to start working closely with the CIA and preparing a Guatemala style covert program against the Cuban foe.⁶⁵

To make Castro pay for his anti-American sentiment, nationalization of the Cuban economy and the establishment of ties with the Soviet Bloc, the Eisenhower administration decided to punish Cuba both economically and diplomatically. Hence, in July 1960, Eisenhower decided to cut significantly one of the Cuban major export articles, the Cuban sugar quota. To make economic sanctions more effective, Eisenhower “imposed a near-total trade embargo on Cuba, limiting exports to food and medicines” in October 1960. Nevertheless, such moves did not persuade Castro to change his mind and end the ties with the Soviets; quite the opposite. In fact, Eisenhower’s sanctions opened the door to the Soviet bloc even more widely, not only for the Soviet Union to become a major receiver of Cuban sugar instead of the U.S., but also for the Soviets to provide military equipment to Cuba. In consequence, Eisenhower broke diplomatic relations with Cuba on 3 January 1961.⁶⁶

5.3 U.S. foreign policy of the Kennedy administration towards Cuba

U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba became one of the key issues during the 1960 presidential campaign. Kennedy blamed the Eisenhower administration for “blunder, inaction, retreat and failure” and insisted that the US “arm fighters for freedom ... who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro.” Moreover, Kennedy cautioned that “Castro is only the beginning of our

h&AN=241602326 (accessed December 10, 2009); Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 123.

⁶⁵Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*, 258; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 127-128.

⁶⁶Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 163-164, 168; Gonzalez, “Castro: Economic Effects on Latin America,” 297; Swift, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” 7; Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*, 258.

difficulties throughout Latin A. The big struggle will be to prevent the influence of Castro spreading to other countries,” and “not to ‘lose’ [them] to Communism ... in the Western Hemisphere.” Even though Kennedy criticized the measures taken by his predecessor, he inherited the Cuban case and “made it worse.”⁶⁷

5.3.1 The Bay of Pigs

The covert program to topple the Cuban enemy, prepared by the CIA during the Eisenhower administration, and initially planned to be launched by Nixon, was the first test for the new Democratic president. “By the time Kennedy became [the] president, Cuban exiles had begun training at a secret base in Guatemala.” Nevertheless, it was Kennedy who “authorized a covert invasion of Cuba,” for the U.S. hoped that “when the exiles landed in Cuba, a spontaneous revolt among the mass of the population would take place, resulting in Castro’s downfall.” The reality was far different.⁶⁸

The invasion of “about 1,400 anti-Castro Cuban exiles” was launched on 17 April 1961 at the Bay of Pigs and lasted for two days. The invasion was a complete fiasco and led to U.S. humiliation. “Everything that could go wrong, did so.” The invasion was poorly equipped, “ill-conceived, hastily staged and based on the CIA-spawned fiction that large numbers of Cubans would rise up in support.” Nothing else remained to Kennedy but to move on, for it was just the beginning of his administration and he had other priorities.⁶⁹

⁶⁷Schultz, “Combating Communism with Economic Development,” in *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America*, 356; Nelson, “President Kennedy’s National Security Policy: 9; Paterson, “Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War against Castro,” in Paterson, 129.

⁶⁸Peter Kross, “Inside the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *Military History* 23, no. 8 (November 2006): 32, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=3&sid=2617948e-a7a4-48c0-b666-f5ef3bcc8d23%40sessionmgr12&bdata=JmFtcDtsYW5nPWZJnNpdGU9ZWZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=22773388> (accessed November 28, 2009); Phillips, “April 17, 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion,” 18.

⁶⁹Swift, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” 7; Philip Zelikow, “American Policy and Cuba, 1961-1963,” *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 317, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=3&sid=e3054fff-1bcd-4be4-a2fa-f72e2893232f%40sessionmgr10&bdata=JmFtcDtsYW5nPWZJnNpdGU9ZWZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=30h&AN=2954415> (accessed March 25, 2010); Phillips, “April 17, 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion,” 17-18.

5.3.2 Operation Mongoose

Since the failed Bay of Pigs invasion pushed Castro further into the Soviet arms, Kennedy decided to use any possible means to oust Castro and defend the Western Hemisphere from the communist peril. The new “secret war against Castro” began. The CIA was designing a range of covert operations consisting of various units that tried to destabilize Castro’s regime, the most important, Operation Mongoose, launched in November 1961. The U.S. thought that Operation Mongoose could topple the Castro government through the use of “indigenous resources,” but the final steps would have to be taken by “U.S. military intervention.” To make Mongoose work, the CIA triggered various clandestine machinations to elicit unrest and rebellion in Cuba, such as sabotage raids, the supply of defective goods by bribed overseas suppliers, or “political propaganda.” The main purpose of Mongoose was to worry Castro, which it did, but it also worried the Soviet Union. However, Mongoose failed to overthrow the dictator. Nor were the other CIA operations successful.⁷⁰

5.3.3 The Cuban Missile Crisis

As Kennedy aides and the CIA were working on Operation Mongoose in late 1961 and early 1962, Castro’s intelligence service infiltrated some of the institutions working on the operation, giving Castro an impression that the United States was up to something against him. As a result, he turned to the Soviet Union for help, leading to a considerable increase of Soviet military aid to the dictator. Castro’s fear of a U.S. invasion altered U.S. foreign affairs significantly. During the latter part of 1962 the world stood on the brink of the Third World War.⁷¹

While the U.S. was plotting against Castro, the Soviet Union had clandestinely installed medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba as a result of the U.S. anti-Castro measures. On 8 August 1962, the Kennedy administration was informed by the CIA about the “arrival of a large number of Russian freighters arriving in Cuba,” carrying missiles. However, in September, Soviet

⁷⁰Phillips, “April 17, 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion,” 17-18; Kross, “Inside the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 32; Swift, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” 7-8; Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*, 260; GlobalSecurity.org-Reliable Security Information, “Operation Mongoose,” Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ops/mongoose.htm> (accessed March 27, 2010).

⁷¹GlobalSecurity.org-Reliable Security Information, “Operation Mongoose,” Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ops/mongoose.htm> (accessed March 27, 2010); Zelikow, “American Policy and Cuba, 1961-1963,” 321; Kross, “Inside the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 31, 33.

diplomats denied that any missile installation was taking place in Cuba. They were lying. On 14 October 1962 a U-2 plane took photographs of Soviet missile sites in Cuba, resulting in what is now known as the Cuban Missile Crisis.⁷²

The crisis lasted thirteen days. On 18 October, Kennedy met with Soviet foreign minister Gromyko and assured him that the U.S. would not invade Cuba, as Castro and the Soviet premier Khrushchev expected, on the condition that the Soviet Union would remove the missiles. Gromyko ignored Kennedy's proposal, having in mind Khrushchev's vision, "If America could place its missiles near Soviet territory, why couldn't he place Russian missiles near American shores?" The confrontation continued and new proposals were formulated. Some in Kennedy's camp voted for an invasion with an airstrike, others for words of warning to Cuba and the Soviet Union, but Kennedy himself decided to put a naval quarantine on Soviet ships coming to Cuba, which he announced publicly on 22 October. If Soviet ships had crossed the quarantine line, they would have been attacked. A day later, when Soviet ships were heading towards the quarantine line, they "stopped and turned back." The world was relieved. However, the missiles were still on the island, and they had to be removed. In the following days, Washington exchanged two letters with Moscow. However, after a debate with aides, Kennedy decided to answer the first of the two letters from Khrushchev, agreeing on the Soviet proposal "to withdraw the missiles from Cuba in return for an end to the quarantine and a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba." Furthermore, the second letter proposed an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth deal. Khrushchev offered that he would withdraw the missiles from Cuba if the U.S. would remove its missiles from Turkey. Kennedy's brother Robert Kennedy assured Khrushchev, adding a private note to the latter letter, that the "missiles in Turkey would eventually be withdrawn, but that this would occur after the crisis was resolved." The crisis came to an end on 28 October when Khrushchev stated "In order to save the world, we must retreat." Both countries withdrew the missiles in following

⁷²Kross, "Inside the Cuban Missile Crisis," 31, 34; Zelikow, "American Policy and Cuba, 1961-1963," 321, 327; GlobalSecurity.org-Reliable Security Information, "Operation Mongoose," Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ops/mongoose.htm> (accessed March 27, 2010); Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*, 261; Swift, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," 8.

months after the crisis. In addition, “the peaceful ending of the Cuban Missile Crisis paved the way for the winding down of Operation Mongoose.”⁷³

In the wake of the crisis, both countries agreed on a relief of tensions between them. In June 1963 they agreed on a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, “a first step towards arms control.” Yet, as the evidence suggests, “had there been no exile expedition at the Bay of Pigs, no destructive covert activities, no assassination plots, no military maneuvers and plans, and no economic and diplomatic steps to harass, isolate, and destroy the Castro government in Havana, there would not have been a Cuban missile crisis.” The Soviet Union came to rescue its ally in the Western Hemisphere resulting in the most dangerous confrontation between the two Cold War foes. Fortunately it ended peacefully. Moreover, to improve U.S.-Cuban relations Kennedy had authorized “informal overtures” and U.S. policy towards Cuba “was moving in opposite directions – probing for talks but sustaining multitrack pressures,” during the latter part of 1963. Kennedy’s effort, however, were cut short by his assassination in Dallas, Texas on 22 November 1963.⁷⁴

5.4 Castro’s effect on Latin America

The United States had falsely identified the Cuban Revolution as Communist at first, for there were neither communist signs at the time the revolution was launched, nor was Castro himself identified with the Communists. However, as the anti-Castro measures increased, the Cuban-Soviet ties blossomed, and Castro slowly identified himself with Communist ideology and declared himself a Marxist-Leninist at the close of 1961. Nonetheless, it was obvious that the revolution “was going to hurt U.S. interests in Cuba and in other Latin American countries.” According to Castro, the United States was the key factor behind Cuba’s problems. Castro wanted to remake Cuba, independent of the United States, through his revolution; however, Washington saw a potential danger in Castro’s revolution, for it could lead to similar revolutions in

⁷³GlobalSecurity.org-Reliable Security Information, “Operation Mongoose,” Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ops/mongoose.htm> (accessed March 27, 2010); Zelikow, “American Policy and Cuba, 1961-1963,” 324-326, 330, 332; Kross, “Inside the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 32, 35-36; Swift, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” 10-11.

⁷⁴Kross, “Inside the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 36; Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*, 260, 262; GlobalSecurity.org-Reliable Security Information, “Operation

Latin America. Therefore, Latin American policy was given “paramount consideration.” The United States adopted new approaches, which had already started in the wake of the Nixon trip. With the rise of Castro, the U.S. increased military expenditures to maintain internal security and to provide military forces with special training in “guerrilla activities, terrorism, and rioting.” The U.S. not only supported military aid, but also tried to achieve socioeconomic reforms and development in Latin America, through the Social Progress Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank of the Eisenhower administration, and through Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. Even though Castro’s revolution had adverse effects on Latin American countries, some of his steps contributed to “beneficial effects” in South America such as greater “U.S. assistance and interest, greater attention to social services and attempts at socioeconomic reforms, revision of the U.S. sugar quota and some expansion of the United States as an export market, and increased tourism.” However, the improvement of Latin American conditions could have come earlier, if only the United States had tried to fulfill the needs and wishes of the Latin Americans.⁷⁵

5.5 Kennedy versus Eisenhower in Cuba

As the evidence shows, there was consistency between the two presidents in the case of Cuba. Both men tried to topple Castro, and both failed to do so. Kennedy, as did Eisenhower, worked closely with the CIA on covert programs to destabilize the Castro regime, for both were obsessed with their anti-communist policies with which they tried to secure the Western Hemisphere from the communist menace and its spread to other countries. In the case of Cuba, their policies failed. Even though the Bay of Pigs invasion was already planned during the Eisenhower administration, and Kennedy inherited it, he became so closely associated with it “that it became identified as his,” for he approved the invasion and had to face its failure. Moreover, despite all the efforts to persuade Castro to follow the anti-communist line, both men contributed to the “radicalization of the revolution,” and their anti-Castro steps “helped open the

Mongoose,” Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ops/mongoose.htm> (accessed March 27, 2010).

⁷⁵Herbert L. Matthews, “The United States and Latin America,” *International Affairs* 37, no 1 (January 1961): 13, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2611494> (accessed March 2, 2010); Swift, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” 6-

door to the Soviets.” When Castro introduced his Agrarian Reform Law in 1960, Eisenhower punished the dictator by economic sanctions and the cutoff of the Cuban sugar quota, causing a reverse effect than the administration hoped for, as the Soviet Union became a main supplier of economic and military aid and a trade partner of Cuban sugar. As far as Kennedy’s policies are concerned, his anti-Castro covert programs (the Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose) not only helped to tie Cuba more closely to the Soviet Union, but also caused a considerable confrontation of the two Cold War rivals. Nonetheless, the conflict was solved peacefully, leading to an agreement on the arms control between the two foes. Hence, it seems that the Kennedy administration was more successful in some respects than his predecessor. In January, 1962 Kennedy managed to persuade the OAS to expel Cuba from the organization, as opposed to Eisenhower who tried to do so during his last days in office, but failed. Furthermore, Kennedy opened lines of communication between Washington, Havana and Moscow to better relations, and his Cuban policy was moving in a positive direction at the time of his assassination. Nevertheless, it seems that both Eisenhower and Kennedy were obsessed with their anti-communist policies that did not produce the desired effects. On the other hand, both started to pay more attention to Latin America, which was given paramount consideration in the wake of the Nixon trip and the Cuban revolution, and had been eagerly awaited long before by the Latin American leaders.⁷⁶

All in all, U.S.-Cuban relations could have been far different, if only the U.S. had not been so anti-Castro. Had there been no anti-Castro measures from both Kennedy and Eisenhower, there would have not been so close ties with the Soviet Union and the U.S. could still have been the sole supplier of economic and military aid, but neither Kennedy, nor Eisenhower was willing to leave Castro to transform Cuba according to his visions and ideals, and without the U.S. influence, because for both men wealth and power were the basis of their foreign policies.⁷⁷

7; Gonzalez, “Castro: Economic Effects on Latin America,” 288, 292-294, 298; Luxenberg, “Did Eisenhower Push Castro into the Arms of the Soviets?,” 44.

⁷⁶Paterson, “Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War against Castro,” in Paterson, 129-130; Swift, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” 7; Gonzalez, “Castro: Economic Effects on Latin America,” 287; Latham, “Ideology, Social Science, and Destiny: Modernization and the Kennedy -Era Alliance For Progress,” 216.

⁷⁷Matthews, “The United States and Latin America,” 14, 17.

6 U.S.-DOMINICAN REPUBLIC RELATIONS DURING BOTH THE ADMINISTRATIONS

Another country where the United States tried to maintain its hegemony in the Caribbean region of the Western Hemisphere was the Dominican Republic (DR), a country which sugar and other crops kept tied closely to the United States. When Eisenhower assumed office in 1953, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina and the whole Trujillo family had been steering the Dominican wheel since 1930. Rafael himself had been president of the Dominican Republic already twice before the Eisenhower administration came to power and had established a very oppressive regime on the island, torturing the ones who were against his machinations. Nevertheless, despite his brutal practices, Eisenhower backed “publicly and privately” the Trujillo regime, providing him with military hardware to keep him out of communist reach. The support was mutual. Trujillo supported the U.S. and was an advocate of the U.S. Cold War deeds.⁷⁸

Relations deteriorated in the latter part of the 1950s, due to Trujillo’s men who had kidnapped and killed one of the anti-Trujillo people, a Spanish citizen and a scholar teaching at Columbia University in New York at that time, Jesús Galíndez, who published a book criticizing Trujillo’s regime. However, Trujillo henchmen did not kill only Galíndez, but also a pilot, Charles Murphy, who took Galíndez from New York to the Dominican Republic. They killed him just to make sure that no-one would find out about the murder of Galíndez. Nonetheless, these actions “gained national attention” and embarrassed the U.S. for its support of Trujillo’s brutal regime, resulting in a chill of Eisenhower-Trujillo relations, not only due to the assassinations, but also due to the Nixon trip. The Eisenhower administration had to re-evaluate its policies and stopped to support authoritarian regimes, for in 1958 “liberal democrats were replacing the ... dictators throughout Latin America.”⁷⁹

With the rise of Fidel Castro to power, the fall of Batista and of the Venezuelan dictator Marco Pérez Jimenéz, Trujillo felt endangered, as he was one of the few remaining dictators in power in the Caribbean. Accordingly, Trujillo expanded military expenditures and started to

⁷⁸Michael R. Hall, *Sugar and Power in the Dominican Republic: Eisenhower, Kennedy and the Trujillos*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 2000), 85.

⁷⁹Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, 154; Hall, *Sugar and Power in the Dominican Republic*, 85-7.

supply his army with European hardware, violating U.S. principles of military aid. Such actions led to the suspension of U.S. military aid to the Dominican Republic in 1959. Notwithstanding, Trujillo still had an ace in the hole to get U.S. support for his regime, “the guided missile tracking station [,] a strategic military interest [for the U.S.]”

Despite the missile tracking station, the U.S. kept distancing itself from Trujillo and tried to find other ways how to deal with his regime and to convince him to follow the democratic path. Hence, Eisenhower set up three clandestine visits of U.S. emissaries to the Dominican Republic to convince Trujillo to hold free elections and leave the country. All failed. Therefore, Eisenhower decided to cooperate with Dominican dissidents and decided that Trujillo had to be removed from power. The Dominican economic situation deteriorated and Trujillo, as a result, tried to show the U.S. that his regime was moving towards democracy and pledged that he would hold free national elections in 1962. Nevertheless, in August 1960 Trujillo broke his pledges of democracy and tried to assassinate Venezuelan President Rómulo Betancourt. Such an action was highly criticized among all OAS members leading to an expulsion of the Dominican Republic from the Organization of American States. On 20 August 1960 all member states agreed to break diplomatic relations with the Trujillo regime and imposed economic sanctions on the Dominican Republic. Moreover, the U.S. broke its diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic on 26 August 1960.⁸⁰

Nonetheless, in spite of the fact that Trujillo attempted to assassinate one of the U.S. allies, the Venezuelan leader, there were voices in U.S. Congress who were willing to cooperate with Trujillo. The purpose was clear. Trujillo had many supporters in Congress who he bribed, and in turn they supported him and were in favor of actions which Trujillo wanted to enforce in Congress. When Eisenhower cut off the Cuban Sugar quota, Trujillo, of course, wanted to benefit from it and asked the Eisenhower administration to provide the Dominican Republic with “the windfall” Cuban sugar quota. Therefore, after a long debate, Eisenhower “grudgingly accepted” Trujillo’s demand and “authorized purchase of the Dominican Republic share of the Cuban windfall quota.” However, Eisenhower did not make the deal as Trujillo wished. He “imposed a \$0.02 per pound special tax on the Dominican windfall quota, [which] proved to have a powerful

⁸⁰Hall, *Sugar and Power in the Dominican Republic*, 90-93, 97, 99-101.

psychological effect on the dictator.” In addition, towards the close of the Eisenhower administration, Trujillo still kept providing his army with European hardware, but at the same time, he held free municipal elections in order to show the U.S. his willingness to follow the democratic path. However, few believed that the elections were truly free.

When Kennedy assumed office at the beginning of 1961, Eisenhower bequeathed him two policies towards the Dominican Republic, clandestine visits of U.S. emissaries trying to convince the dictator to resign, and secret cooperation with the Dominican dissidents. Moreover, Kennedy decided to work closely with the CIA, as he did in the case of foreign policy towards Cuba. In 1961, he authorized the CIA to provide the dissidents with small arms and sabotage equipment just in case that Trujillo would have to be removed from power by force, which was not Kennedy’s main aim in the Dominican situation but was still a possibility. Instead, Kennedy tried to implement his Alliance for Progress to create a new pro-U.S. democratic regime in the Dominican Republic. Furthermore, as opposed to Eisenhower, Kennedy proposed to Congress that it deny the Dominican Republic the Cuban “windfall” sugar quota for the rest of 1961 stating that all the sanctions cannot be lifted “as long as Trujillo dominates ... the island nation.” The situation on the island changed rapidly, for on 30 May 1961 Trujillo was assassinated by a group of Dominicans. “There was no evidence of direct US participation in the killing.”⁸¹

In the wake of Trujillo’s death, “the main U.S. policy toward[s] the DR was to preserve order, eliminate the remaining vestiges of Trujillo’s dictatorship, and prevent the coming to power of a communist regime.” Kennedy conducted his mission to create a democratic country in the DR. There were three possibilities for the new regime: a democratic regime, “a continuation of the Trujillo regime or a Castro regime.” The U.S., of course, was in favor of the first possibility. To achieve Kennedy’s preference, the Cuban “windfall” quota became a good manipulation tool for political change. The purpose was clear as were the conditions of the Kennedy plan. The plan consisted of three main conditions: “1) the donation of the Trujillo sugar properties to a public foundation, 2) the formation of a coalition government under Balaguer, 3) the departure of Hector and Arismendi Trujillo from the island.” Finally, in the latter part of 1962, the Trujillo family fled

⁸¹Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 37; Hall, *Sugar and Power in the Dominican Republic*, 112, 116.

the Dominican Republic, Joaquín Balaguer, the nominal president of the Dominican Republic, announced a formation of Consejo de Estado, which “he preside[d] until all the OAS sanctions ... were lifted,” and last, the Trujillo family donated their sugar properties to a public foundation. After those actions, finally in January 1962 the OAS agreed to lift all the sanctions. “The U.S. resumed full diplomatic relations with the DR on 6 January 1962.”⁸²

As the evidence proves, the Kennedy administration inherited a compact set of policies towards the Dominican Republic from its predecessor, as in the Cuban case. At first, Trujillo was fully enjoying U.S. support, but due to his brutal machinations and assassinations of his opponents, Eisenhower launched a different approach towards the Dominican Republic in the wake of the Nixon trip, a far more similar to Kennedy, who was for a democratic regime in the Caribbean island from the beginning of his administration. Moreover, during both administrations, sugar served as a powerful incentive to achieve U.S. goals to move the DR down the road of democracy. However, the Kennedy administration had different conditions to achieve the U.S. goal after Trujillo was assassinated. Nevertheless, it was Kennedy who achieved a democratic regime in the Dominican Republic, which “represented a showcase for pro-US democracy in Latin America.”⁸³

⁸²Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 41; Hall, *Sugar and Power in the Dominican Republic*, 116, 124, 128.

⁸³*Ibid.*, 132.

CONCLUSION

The main purpose of this thesis was to analyze and compare foreign policies of the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administrations, with respect to economic and military aid, in Latin America and the Caribbean. The evidence shows that the foreign policies of the administrations towards Latin America differed in key political approaches of the Republicans and the Democrats, whereas in the Dominican Republic and Cuba, both administrations followed the same pattern of foreign policies and demonstrated a consistency in their anti-communist approaches.

Moreover, the United States, as the main caretaker of the Western Hemisphere, has always tried to promote democracy. However, the outcome of the Eisenhower administration policies was not always really democratic. As Nixon once said, “anti-communism had a higher priority than democracy.” That was apt. Eisenhower countlessly demonstrated, through six out of eight years of his administration, the support of undemocratic anticommunist regimes. Kennedy, on the other hand, highly criticized his predecessor’s approaches and tried to establish prosperous and democratic regimes both in Latin America and in the Caribbean from the beginning. Nevertheless, in the case of Cuba both men failed to protect the country from the communist peril. They both, with their policies and machinations, rather pushed Cuba into the Soviet arms. On the other hand, it was the only country in the Western Hemisphere which fell under Communist control and in which the U.S. did not manage to establish democratic regime. But all in all, both administrations failed to achieve all anti-communist pledges.⁸⁴

These findings suggest that the U.S. had evidently underestimated Hispanic culture. Fulfilling their anti-communist pledges, Eisenhower and Kennedy tried to convert the countries of the Western Hemisphere to the U.S. way of life and encourage them to embrace a set of U.S. values. However, trying to convert any culture to the western-style culture can be contra productive, as it was in the Cuban case. To understand what the real cause of failure was, a closer investigation on Hispanic culture and what values it shares with other cultures should be conducted, and also, what could have been done better in order to succeed and to make miracles in Latin America and in the whole Western Hemisphere.

⁸⁴Hall, *Sugar and Power in the Dominican Republic*, 95.

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