

The Republican Party in the United States, 1968-2001

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
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ABSTRAKT

Bakalářská práce mapuje a analyzuje vývoj Republikánské strany v letech 1968 až 2001. Zaměřuje se na prezidentské volby, charakteristiku jednotlivých Republikánských lídrů a voličskou základnu. Jejím cílem je zhodnocení vývoje této politické strany. Práce obhajuje tvrzení, že Republikánská strana neprošla v tomto období závratnou změnou.

Klíčová slova: Spojené Státy Americké, Republikánská strana, Demokratická strana, volby, president, voliči, domácí politika, zahraniční politika, válka, ekonomie, společnost.

ABSTRACT

The thesis charts and analyzes the development of the Republican Party from 1968 to 2001. It focuses on presidential elections and characterizes Republican leaders as well as voters. The thesis evaluates the Republicans and argues that the Republican Party remained surprisingly consistent during the period from 1968 to 2001.

Keywords: the United States of America, the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, elections, president, voters, domestic policy, foreign policy, war, economy, society.

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	11
1 THE PRESIDENCY OF RICHARD NIXON	12
1.1 The 1968 Elections	12
1.2 The Presidency.....	15
1.2.1 Politics of détente.....	15
1.2.2 The Black Capitalism Initiative	19
1.2.3 Watergate	20
2 GERALD FORD	24
2.1 Ford until 1976	24
2.2 Elections of 1976.....	25
3 THE REAGAN REVOLUTION	26
3.1 The campaign of 1980.....	26
3.2 The Reagan Administration	28
3.2.1 The end of the Cold War	28
3.2.2 Moral Leadership	29
3.2.3 The Economy.....	30
4 GEORGE H. W. BUSH	32
4.1 The elections of 1988.....	32
4.2 The Bush Administration.....	33
4.2.1 The War on AIDS and Drugs	33
4.2.2 Economic Crisis	34
4.2.3 The Gulf War	35
5 THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION IN 1990S	37
5.1 The 1992 Elections	37
5.2 Revolution of 1994	38
5.3 The Republicans in the Congress	40
5.4 The elections of 1996.....	40
6 GERGE W. BUSH	42
6.1 Elections of 2000	42
6.2 The Administration until 2001	44
6.2.1 No Child Left Behind Act.....	44
CONCLUSION	46
BIBLIOGRAPHY	47

APPENDICES	50
LIST OF FIGURES.....	68

INTRODUCTION

The United States of America has its own specific and unique political system with just two sides, a red one and a blue one. The Republican Party represents the conservative and religious part of the nation. The Republican platform promotes the free market, limited government, low taxes and the preservation of national strength. The Democratic Party represents liberals and promotes environmental protection, social programs, and heavy government involvement in the economy and in society. The fight between these two parties has already lasted for more than a hundred years, but this thesis charts and analyzes the development of the Republican Party during the vibrant period from 1968 to 2001, with focus on several issues. First, it concentrates on each presidential election, successful as well as failed, and determines the key factors that contributed to the particular result. Second, it characterizes the most influential and controversial Republican leaders and their administrations. In many cases, they were not able to fulfill their promises, even despite their enthusiasm. Finally, this thesis characterizes the voters and demonstrates how the Republican base changed and evolved during the period in question. Ultimately, this thesis argues that, despite events that might have led to changes within the party and its platform, the Republican Party remained surprisingly consistent during the period 1968-2001.

1 THE PRESIDENCY OF RICHARD NIXON

Despite the membership of the Republican Party, Richard Nixon was not always a conservative man. In domestic policy he drifted left, and conservatives consoled themselves that at least he behaved as solid anticommunist. His détente politics were misunderstood and after the Watergate scandal, few regretted his resignation.¹

1.1 The 1968 Elections

The 1960s was one of the most vibrant times in American history. Demonstrations increased as the number of American troops in Vietnam reached a new high and prospects for restoring peace dimmed. Blacks demanded their rights. The assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy led to social unrest and riots in the streets. The prestige of the United States had fallen to a low point. Society became deeply divided and public trust in government was diluted. All these events created a great opportunity for political parties, an opportunity to offer citizens new hope and restore order in the country. And yet, in the two party system, only one party could win.

The assassination of Robert Kennedy made Vice-president Hubert H. Humphrey the Democratic presidential candidate. Humphrey promoted the expansion of civil rights and welfare programs, both of which were cornerstones of Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society program. Humphrey also supported Johnson's war policy. But, the Democrats suffered from one big imperfection which made them weak during the election. It was their disagreement over the Vietnam War. This division culminated at the Democratic national convention of 1968 where delegates were debating about the policy of Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam. This debate evoked rioting outside the convention hall. As a result, Humphrey's campaign was undermined from the beginning, making Republican nominee Richard Nixon the front runner in the election. Nixon's campaign was aimed at unifying the nation, returning dignity to the presidency, stabilizing American foreign policy, restoring "law and order" in the streets and providing welfare programs. He also claimed he had a plan for ending the war in Vietnam but did not provide details.²

¹Roman Joch, "Od senátora rebela po rebelující daňové poplatníky," Občanský Institut, <http://www.obcinst.cz/cs/Od-senatora-rebela-po-rebelujici-danove-poplatniky-c1595/> (accessed April 2, 2010).

²ushistory.org,"1968: Year of Unraveling," U.S. History Online Textbook, <http://www.ushistory.org/us/56f.asp> (May 05, 2010).

In order to appeal to those former Democrats in the South who were disaffected by the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act by a Democratic Congress, and the enforcement of these Acts by the Johnson Administration, Nixon started to popularize a “Southern Strategy”.³

As a reaction to threat of the Black Power Movement Nixon developed a Black Capitalism Initiative, which was a domestic version of his widely publicized foreign policy initiative of détente. During his election campaign he promised that his administration would step up loans and other aid for Negroes to start their own businesses. The government, he believed, should act decisively to help Negroes gain their fair “piece of action”. The rather general idea that Negroes could lift themselves up through business ownership, as many other ethnic groups had done in the United States, inspired hope and garnered some votes among people of all races. According Nixon, to the extent that his programs would be successful, ghettos should gradually disappear.⁴

However, Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey were not the only two candidates in the race. Independent candidate George Wallace also appeared on the ballot in all 50 states. Wallace’s campaign was based on a pro-segregation policy. The public initially gave Nixon wide support, but toward the end of the campaign, Humphrey changed his strategy and started to oppose Johnson’s politics. The lead narrowed, and the election on November 5 was not so certain for Nixon.⁵

³About Sociology, “Southern Strategy,” http://www.aboutsociology.com/sociology/Southern_strategy (accessed March 3, 2010).

⁴Robert E. Weems and Lewis A. Randolph, “The National Response to Richard Nixon’s Black Capitalism Initiative-The Success of Domestic Detente”, *Journal of Black Studies* 32, no.1 (September, 2001), 66-83, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2668015> (accessed March 16, 2010).

⁵Southern Methodist University, “The Impact of Vietnam on Domestic Politics: The Election of 1968,” <http://faculty.smu.edu/dsimon/Change-Viet3b.html> (accessed March 3, 2010).




Figure 1 The Elections, 1968

The winning margin was very narrow in popular votes. California, Ohio, Florida and Illinois gave the Republicans their victory. Finally Richard Nixon won with 301 votes in the Electoral College. Hubert Humphrey gained 191 votes and 46 votes went to the Independent candidate George Wallace, who gained support from conservative whites from the South.⁶

As a result of the Southern Strategy, every state that had been in the Confederacy, except Texas, voted for either Nixon or Southern Democrat Wallace, despite a strong tradition of supporting Democrats. The results of the elections were also hugely influenced by a group of people called “the silent majority”^{*} a segment of the populace that does not express opinions publicly. The silent majority included conservative people, mainly older, but also young people in the Midwest, West and in the South. They were characterized as hardworking Americans who paid taxes, opposed the Vietnam War (many of them served in Vietnam), desired a restoration of law and order, but did not demonstrate.⁷

⁶Anthony Summers, *The Arrogance of Power* (New York: Penguin Putnam Inc, 2000): 446-447.

^{*} For the whole speech, see appendix 1.

⁷Randall Bennett Woods, “LBJ, Politics, and 1968,” *South Central Review* 16/17, vol. 16, no. 4 - vol. 17, no. 1(Winter, 1999 - Spring, 2000), 16-28, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/info/3190073> (accessed March 2, 2010).

In 1968 the power of the Republican Party was in its unity. Strong and integrated anti-war opinions and plans for dealing with social unrest led the Republicans to victory. People were exhausted by charge and uncertainty and started to incline towards more traditional and moral values, becoming more oriented towards the right.

The presence of the silent majority in elections has become crucial for the Republicans. Still nowadays just 25% of American citizens identify themselves as Republicans publicly. But, in elections the party achieves much better results.⁸

The situation has changed for the Republicans since 1968 but the Republicans of that time laid a strong foundation for today's.

1.2 The Presidency

1.2.1 Politics of détente

Nixon, who was a strong anticommunist and keen observer of international relationships, did not intend to make concession in Soviet question. However, he realized the feasibility and limits of American international diplomacy. Nixon drafted a new foreign policy with Henry Kissinger, who served as advisor for National Security and later Secretary of State. This proponent of Metternich and Realpolitik diplomacy became a creator and executor of détente politics.⁹

The basic assumption for successful détente politics is triangular diplomacy. The monolithic Soviet-Chinese block was breaking down at the end of 1960s. Geopolitically, the reasons for rapprochement between the United States and China existed for a long time. Neglecting China and trying to build a global balance without China's participation would have been imprudent. Problems in Vietnam and the ideology of Americans prevented them from correctly analyzing the extent of Soviet-Chinese quarrel. The general opinion was that China was provoking the quarrel and this opinion probably have endured if the Soviets had not queried how the United States would react in the case of a Soviet pre-emptive strike on China. Nixon and Kissinger analyzed the situation and realized that these cracks in the

⁸Vladimíra Dvořáková et al., *Komparace politických systémů I*. (Praha: Oeconomica, 2005), 191.

communist bloc could open the door for needed and necessary diplomacy. In 1969 Nixon warned the Soviets against attacking China, thereby creating an undeclared alliance with China against Soviet expansionism. In spite of this, Nixon had no reason to stand by China's side and take over the responsibility for China's security. He knew that the United States should cooperate with China as long as the Soviet threat would last. Negotiating with China placated the Soviet Union because they were aware of the danger of war on two fronts. That is why the Soviets acted carefully so as not to strengthen the American-Chinese bonding.¹⁰

Nixon administration secured diplomatic flexibility and the opportunity to parley from a position of power thanks to triangular diplomacy. In negotiating with the Soviets were used three principles:

- 1) The principle of concreteness; Nixon and Kissinger insisted on addressing concrete reasons of tension at each negotiation. Atmosphere was not perceived as a prerequisite for successful talks. They knew the ideology of Soviet leaders as well as their inconsistency of interests in some areas and they wanted to negotiate where it was possible.
- 2) The principle of moderation; Nixon agreed with the Soviets that a good relationship between both superpowers cannot endure if one of them strived for one-sided benefits. He intended to face any Soviet challenge as well as was ready to negotiate peacefully.
- 3) The principle of interconnection and linking; the relationship with the Soviet Union was not perceived as a whole. It was perceived as a mixture of problems with various degrees of resolution. Nixon's effort was linking all numerous factors of a relationship in to one overall approach, which was not entirely confrontational nor entirely conciliatory. He put emphasis on areas where the cooperation was possible and used this cooperation to modify Soviet behavior of dispute. This principle became an object

⁹Longin Pastusiak, "Objective and Subjective Premises of Detente," *Journal of Peace Research* 14, no.2 (1977): 185-193, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/422480> (accessed March 16, 2010).

¹⁰ushistory.org, "Triangular Diplomacy: U.S., USSR and China," U.S. History Online Textbook, <http://www.ushistory.org/us/56g.asp> (April 05, 2010).

of critique by liberals. Nixon refused to improve the relationship in one area regardless of Soviet aggressive behavior in other areas.¹¹

Nixon and Kissinger never forgot that the Soviet Union was an opponent, geopolitical and ideological, but they knew that in nuclear times the U.S. had to have partners. They never expected that politics should end the Cold War and understood this strategy as a tool. It was tactics in concrete conflicts of interest. Thanks to these tactics they could keep unfriendly relationships under control. Nixon and Kissinger tried to create a more stable and predictable strategic situation. They did not intend to diminish the shape the military which still stayed the basis of the politics.¹²

The Vietnam War demonstrated that the United States could lead some military conflict only if Americans could be persuaded about its inevitability. Any confrontation, that Americans would not perceive as unavoidable could divide the country and cause conflict with European allies. Thanks to detente politics the Soviets could not start a crisis in time when the United States suffered from huge domestic strife. And if the Soviets started a crisis they would be blamed for this and the United States would look as if it did not have any choice and would gain international support. Détente politics did not resist Soviet expansion but it did give it a psychological framework. Nixon's administration tried to imply to the American public and European Allies that they could contain communism.¹³

Nixon and Kissinger averted Soviet expansion in 1969-1970. The American government made the effort to appease the international situation, diminish the Soviet influence and create space for a moral and religious renewal in an American society, still highly traumatized by Vietnam War.

The president did not pick this strategy, it was forced by circumstances and their only chance was to give a right content that would not destroy the American foreign position. Without a proper approach the politics of détente could evoke an incorrect impression that

¹¹ Andrej Duhan, "Americká Politika Détente," Občanský Institut, <http://www.obcinst.cz/cs/Americka-politika-Detente-c1457/> (accessed March 27, 2010).

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

the Cold War was going to end. This did not happen but conservatives were so scared that they almost “threw Nixon overboard” even though his politics brought results.¹⁴

In these times emerged a movement called neoconservatism. The neoconservative movement originated in the 1960s among conservatives and some liberals who were repelled by or disillusioned with what they viewed as the political and cultural trends of the time, including leftist political radicalism, lack of respect for authority and tradition, and hedonistic and immoral lifestyles. Neoconservatives supported a free-market economy with minimum taxation and government economic regulation; strict limits on government-provided social-welfare programs; and a strong military supported by large defense budgets. They also believed that government policy should respect the importance of traditional institutions such as religion and the family. Unlike most conservatives of earlier generations, neoconservatives maintained that the United States should take an active role in world affairs, though they were generally suspicious of international institutions, such as the United Nations and the World Court, whose authority could intrude upon American sovereignty or limit the country's freedom to act in its own interests. The main aim was to force the Republican Party and American conservatives in general to accept a new version of conservative politics that would be more suitable for governing in a modern democracy. Neoconservatism was full of hope and optimism. The initial discrepancy between Nixon's administration and neoconservatives was neoconservatives considered the Soviet threat from the point of departure in any strategy against Soviets. Nixon and Kissinger believed that thanks to tactical maneuvering they would be able to keep the Soviets within the bounds and Americans would be mobilizing to aversion just in case of a serious and real danger. Maybe they understood neoconservatism very well. Maybe they even identified with this movement. But they were affected so much by Vietnam that they did not believe that the American society was able to persevere for long in aggressive vigilance.¹⁵

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.; Wendy Brown, “American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization,” *Political Theory* 34, no.6 (Dec., 2006), 690-714, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20452506> (accessed April 1, 2010).

American society refused the détente politics and preferred moral purgation over geopolitical stability. Americans needed this purgation in order to regain strength for the Cold War. Only thanks to détente could renescent America wake up.¹⁶

1.2.2 The Black Capitalism Initiative

Though the term Black capitalism represented a skillful use of political rhetoric during the 1968 campaign, Nixon had to move beyond mere words. Unfortunately for the new president, his campaign proclamations concerning Black capitalism came back to haunt him. Because Nixon, during the campaign, had promoted Black capitalism as a major remedy for America's racial ills, expectations regarding this initiative, which follow on the heels of Johnson's Great Society campaigns, were extremely high. Although Nixon did not achieve his institutional goals (campaign promises) related to Black capitalism, he did, indeed, achieve his larger ideological goal of subverting African American radicalism.¹⁷ In 1969 Nixon created an Office of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE) to oversee Government efforts aimed at helping blacks and other racial minorities start their own businesses and expanded programs to lend more money to those striving firms. 1970 saw a growing number of African American entrepreneurs thanks to OMBE's promotion and implementation of what came to be known as minority business set asides. However, Black capitalism as articulated by Nixon in 1968 remained a fleeting dream, despite OMBE's improved stature and reputation.¹⁸ The black economist Robert S. Browne listed the biggest obstacles African Americans faced in their quest for economic self-determination. The obstacle was their lack of real access to the six basic levers of power in the United States:

1. huge personal wealth
2. the top 22 major corporations
3. the military industrial complex

¹⁶Andrej Duhan, "Americká Politika Détente", Občanský Institut, <http://www.obcinst.cz/cs/Americka-politika-Detente-c1457> (accessed March 27, 2010).

¹⁷Robert E. Weems and Lewis A. Randolph, "The National Response to Richard Nixon's Black Capitalism Initiative-The Success of Domestic Detente", *Journal of Black Studies* 32, no.1 (September, 2001), 66-83, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2668015> (accessed March 16, 2010).

¹⁸Ibid.

4. the federal and state governmental apparatus
5. the legislative apparatus
6. the crime syndicate¹⁹

According to Browne this lack of access to the instruments of power, supplemented by white America's vicious racial prejudice toward black people, had led to Blacks perpetual impoverishment, self-hatred and psychological insecurity, poor educational attainment and social disorganization. Despite this depressing claim, Browne asserted that Blacks could launch an effective attack on Black poverty. He viewed the various local development projects, small business programs, job training, consumer education, school improvement, and other community programs as both useful to African Americans and nonthreatening to the national power structure.²⁰

In retrospect, the first Nixon administration reflected an unprecedented national interest in promoting substantive African American economic progress. Furthermore, although OMBE provided only limited assistance to Black businesspeople and none of the numerous independent proposals for Black economic development came to fruition, the period's discourse regarding Black capitalism helped Nixon accomplish his larger ideological objective of containing potential domestic Black radicalism. Most African Americans apparently either gravitated toward the various derivatives of Black capitalism or toward complete integration into American Society.²¹

1.2.3 Watergate

In June 1972 in Washington, D.C. five people broke into the Democratic National Headquarters to bug the telephones. The group, which consisted of former FBI agents and CIA agents, was strongly Republican. This scandal influenced both domestic and foreign policies and resonated throughout public life. It had a substantial influence on the political parties and political ideology and left consequences for the future as well.²²

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²ushistory.org, "Undoing a President," U.S. History Online Textbook, <http://www.ushistory.org/us/58a.asp> (March 05, 2010).

Watergate profoundly affected struggles for the leadership and ideological control of the major political parties. Richard Nixon's fall from grace strengthened the claims of Republican conservative ideologues. It can be seen as a Democratic triumph but in reality, Watergate facilitated the conservative takeover that reinvigorated the Republican Party. Although the Democrats temporarily profited, they left the unattended gap in their old coalition and ignored the need for fashioning programs. Conservatives had muted their criticism of Nixon, confining it to occasional attack on isolated policies. But with Nixon's resignation, conservatives dropped their restraints, launched an ideological assault on his overall policies, and criticized Ford for maintaining them. They blamed him for passing strategic superiority to the Soviet Union, for sowing the seeds of economic destruction because of his inability to make difficult choices, for dismantling the American Navy, and for expanding the Great Society contrary to his campaign promises. Many policies favored by Nixon had become discredited because of their association with him. The conservative fury against Nixon and his successor nearly resulted in denying the 1976 Republican nomination of Ford, an event that would have been unprecedented in the twentieth century. It definitely stopped the growth of the Republicans for a while. In 1974, at the height of interest in the scandal, the Democrats added seventy-five new members to the House.²³

Watergate changed the public perception of the presidency. It transformed and reshaped American attitudes toward government, and especially the presidency, more than any single event since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Americans alternately inflicted anger and derision on the office and "the man". The invective appeared on a massive scale. Once peerless and invincible, presidential majesty seemed diminished, and Nixon and his immediate successors served as an easy prey for cruel, even contemptuous, humor. The media criticism of the presidency, and the preoccupation with presidential sins of omission or commission, had gathered such momentum in the Nixon years that it seemed impossible to run off the spigot.²⁴

²³Stanley I. Kutler, *The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 574-611.

²⁴Ibid.

How the public opinion was changed can be seen on a presidential election result map from years 1972 and 1976.




Figure 2 The Elections, 1972

In 1976 Nixon overwhelmingly defeated McGovern. He gained publicity mainly from his success in foreign policy.




Figure 3 The Elections, 1976

Whereas in 1976, the Democrats took over the supremacy, Watergate, on the whole, has lingered in public memory. But it threatened the position of the president as “man” much more than the Republicans as a party. In fact, this scandal blocked the flowering of the Republican Party just for a while. Without any doubt it influenced the inner strategy of the party and stirred up new ideas and new approaches. Finally, the Republicans could put this scandal to good account.²⁵

²⁵Ibid.

2 GERALD FORD

2.1 Ford until 1976

While the Watergate affair gained control over the political scene, the resolution of essential domestic and foreign problems were largely ignored. The oil crisis was becoming worse as well as inflation and recession. Gerald Ford inherited all these troubles and besides had to deal with his new function.²⁶

Ford enjoyed a high reputation just for a short time. In 1974, he gave Nixon a full and unconditional pardon for any crimes he may have committed against the United States during his presidency. This action caused a public uproar. As president, Ford assumed a negative attitude toward opposition, which denied the federal intervention into domestic issues. During his fifteen months in office, Ford vetoed thirty-nine proposals. By repelling the Congressional demand on lowering taxes and increasing federal expenses, he instigated an economic collapse. In 1975 the rate of unemployment rose 39% and in 1976 the budget deficit reached 60 billion dollars.²⁷

Foreign policy was fully led by Henry Kissinger who continued to promote Nixon's goals:

- to stabilize the situation in the Middle East,
- to establish a diplomatic relationship with China and unbrace the tension with the Soviet Union

In 1974 Ford participated in a meeting with the Soviet leader Leonard Brezhnev and acceded to deal concerning missile control, which became a basis for SALT II. Meanwhile Kissinger's diplomacy brought results in a dispute between Cairo and Tel Aviv. Israel pledged to reconvey a major part of the Sinai Peninsula back to Egypt, which it gained during a war in 1976. Both nations committed to solving problems rather by negotiating than military force.²⁸

These successes helped Ford's reputation. Unfortunately for the President, the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 elicited unrests and criticism among people. The fourteen-year

²⁶George B. Tindall, *Dějiny Spojených Států Amerických* (Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 1998), 730.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 730.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 731.

American effort in Vietnam seemed to be useless, and even the Cambodian communist movement of the Khmer Rouge celebrated victory by unleashing a bloody massacre.²⁹

2.2 Elections of 1976

With all of these problems, the Democratic Party sensed an opportunity to win the presidency. Jimmy Carter as a Democratic candidate profiting from the Watergate Scandal, promised truth to American nation and intended to clean up Washington. Although Ford was personally unconnected with Watergate, he was seen by many as too close to the discredited Nixon administration.³⁰




Figure 4 The Elections, 1976

Carter won a very narrow victory over Ford. He took 23 states with 297 electoral votes, while Ford won 27 states and 240 electoral votes. Carter gained support from southern white men, blacks, urban workers and minorities. Research suggests that the contribution of black voters from the South was responsible for his victory.³¹

²⁹Ibid., 731

³⁰Ibid., 731.

³¹Historycentral, "Election of 1976," <http://www.historycentral.com/elections/1976.html> (accessed April 20, 2010).

3 THE REAGAN REVOLUTION

Ronald Reagan, the charismatic leader of conservatives, gained support from three voting groups:

1. supporters of the free market and low taxes,
2. opponents of socialism
3. and moral conservatives, those against abortions, pornography, prohibition of religious lessons, neoconservatives and protestant evangelicals, who were politically neutral until then.

These voting groups incorporated a major part of population, and it was this coalition, that elected Ronald Reagan as the 40th president of the United States. Despite a huge budget deficit and some foreign policy errors, most people remember of him as a president who could instill optimism among the American populace.³²

3.1 The campaign of 1980

Ronald Reagan entered the elections with a typical conservative campaign aimed at strengthening the nation's military, improving the economy and restoring the position of the United States as a world leader.³³

In the mid 1970s the U.S. economy was in deep troubles. Unemployment rates reached double digits and inflation was high. Reagan as a follower of supply-side theory believed that the only solution is to lower taxes. He emphasized the way to prosperity through activeness and creativity. The taxes are seen as demotivating punishment for entrepreneurs, resulting in a falling business cycle. Reagan believed that federal government intervention into the business would harm the economy.³⁴

Another group supported by Reagan was the New Right. The New Right was focused on social issues and national sovereignty. It introduced new policies and marketing strategies in order to promote strongly conservative policies. A part of the New Right was a group called the Moral Majority formed by Jerry Falwell. These fundamentalist Christians

³²Roman Joch, "Od senátora rebela po rebelující daňové poplatníky", Občanský Institut, <http://www.obcinst.cz/cs/Od-senatora-rebela-po-rebelujici-danove-poplatniky-c1595/> (accessed April 2, 2010).

³³ushistory.org, "Morning in America," U.S. History Online Textbook, <http://www.ushistory.org/us/59a.asp> (accessed, April 16, 2010).

³⁴Ibid.

supported directly evangelical concerns, such as the teaching of creationism in public schools, while opposing the Equal Rights Amendment³⁵, homosexual rights, abortion, and the U.S.-Soviet SALT treaties. The group raised money to defeat liberal officials. They sought to control school boards on the local level to advance their conservative agenda. Ronald Reagan freely accepted contributions from the New Right on his way to presidency.³⁶

Reagan's way to presidency was cleared thanks to the public perception of Jimmy Carter. In 1979 Jimmy Carter was blamed for the second oil crisis and his popularity started to fall. An Iranian revolution led to the capturing of American citizens of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. A month later the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan and Carter appeared weak. Another disappointment, the failure of an operation to rescue the hostages in Iran, meant the end for Jimmy Carter. According to public opinion, Jimmy Carter failed the country.³⁷




Figure 5 The Elections, 1980

Reagan's victory was an electoral vote landslide. The results were expected. He gained 489 votes to Carter's 49. In fact Carter endured an approval rating of 23 %, which was lower than Richard Nixon's in the darkest days of Watergate. The Republicans took control

³⁵The Equal Rights Amendment –affirmation that women and men have equal rights under the law.

³⁶Joseph Tamney and Stephen Johnson, "Explaining Support for the Moral Majority," *Sociological Forum* 3, no. 2 (Spring, 1988), 234-255, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/684366> (accessed April 16, 2010).

³⁷[ushistory.org](http://www.ushistory.org), "Morning in America," U.S. History Online Textbook, <http://www.ushistory.org/us/59a.asp> (accessed, April 16, 2010).

over the Senate for the first time since 1945. Jimmy Carter criticized Reagan's campaign but never produced a concrete plan for solving the economic depression. Reagan came as a "deliver from troubles". People were threatened from danger of the Cold War, but Liberals argued that people were voting against Jimmy Carter and not for Reagan's conservative agenda.³⁸

Also interesting was the participation of "New Republicans". These voters shifted from the Democratic Party or had not voted at all in preceding elections. They were more conservative than non-Republican voters on all issues and did not differ from Old Republicans in any consistent way. New Republicans were neither more religious nor less likely to trust government than the other voting groups. These Americans identified economic issues as most important and inclined towards Reagan's agenda.³⁹

3.2 The Reagan Administration

3.2.1 The end of the Cold War

The important mile during Reagan's Administration was reaching the end of the Cold War. Obviously Republicans took credit for winning the war. They claimed that it was the military spending policies of the Reagan-Bush years that forced the Soviet Union to the brink of economic collapse. Reagan participated in four summits with Gorbachev which culminated in the freedom of Eastern Europe. However it was not just good negotiating skills that led to this success.

Ronald Reagan was convinced anticommunist and was the first president who was not afraid to say it openly, loudly and publicly. Former presidents were restrained with their opinions. Even President Nixon was not so open in his speeches. Reagan could persuade not just Americans but crowds around world. A fact confirmed by the fourth summit in Moscow, when Reagan was welcomed as a national hero by common people.

Another action crucial to the end of the Cold War was the program Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), called "Star Wars". This expensive program became the object of criticism

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Jerome L. Himmelstein and James A. McRae, Jr., "Social Conservatism, New Republicans, and the 1980 Election", *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48, no.3 (Autumn, 1984), 592-605, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2748946> (accessed March 16, 2010).

from the Democratic Party and from scientists. Democrats deemed it too costly, and scientists questioned its feasibility. The aim was to build a defense system in space and economically exhaust the Soviets. In practice it worked. Under the influence of this program, in consequence of the realization that the Soviet economy would not be able to fund a similar project, Gorbachev reached the conclusion that the Soviet system must be reformed. He became aware of a possible failure in armament competition with the United States. As a result Perestroika reform was launched. The problem of each tyrannical regime is liberalization, which could make it vulnerable and lead to collapse. This was the case with the Soviet Union. Ronald Reagan forced the Soviets to make reforms that led to liberalization and to collapse.⁴⁰

On the other hand, was he not just in the right place at the right time? The Soviet Union suffered from three weaknesses that would never let them win: a deep economic crisis which forced the government to make concessions; the failures of communism itself; and Mikhail Gorbachev, who launched reforms that caused chaos and who allowed the peaceful break-up of the Union. In short, both countries contributed to the end of the Cold War, and claiming that just one side caused the end is nonsense.⁴¹

3.2.2 Moral Leadership

Ronald Reagan was not only conservative and Christian but also a statesman of liberty. He believed that a human can be fully free only when he is moral. Political freedom is not enough for the full liberty of man. The reason for this is that if the man chooses something in his life and does not opt for what is right according to his common sense and conscience, but lets himself be corrupted by his passions, then this man is a slave of sin. The only way to free himself is to learn how to control his own passions, listen to common sense and behave morally. Morality, for Reagan, was very closely related with the preservation of liberty. In

⁴⁰Roman Joch, "Ronald Reagan," Občanský Institut, <http://www.usainfo.sk/article.php?104> (accessed March 16, 2010); ushistory.org, "The End of the Cold War," U.S. History Online Textbook, <http://www.ushistory.org/us/59e.asp> (April 16, 2010).

⁴¹Peter Schweizer, *Reaganova válka* (Praha: Ideál, 2007), 15-70.

order to stay free, people must be prepared to defend freedom at all costs and never voluntarily reconcile with its loss.⁴²

Another connection between liberty and morality arises in the question of abortion. Ronald Reagan was a member of the Pro-life movement focused on opposition to abortion. Under his administration the Republican Party took major involvement in the Pro-life movement. This party stance stemmed from its roots in second half of 19th century, when the party of opposition of slavery was created. Reagan himself considered abortion as such blot on free western society that during his presidency he wrote an essay "Abortion and the conscience of the Nation". Here he stated that the biggest mistake of his political career was his agreement with a law legalizing abortion in California (during his governor ship). At that time he relented to the argument that legalizing some abortions could obviate the greater evil of illegal abortion. Since then he was an adamant opponent in this field. Reagan knew that legalizing some abortions was just a step of lobbyists to make them all legal. That was something threatening for Reagan because much like Lincoln he took human rights seriously. "All people" including blacks for Lincoln and the unborn for Reagan, should have rights.⁴³

The main inspiration for his devotion to freedom was his Christian faith. Faith in God and faith that God wants from us to do what is right led Reagan conservatives to vehemently defend those political attitudes for which they stood.⁴⁴

3.2.3 The Economy

In the second half of the 1970s the United States was caught in economic stagflation, which meant slow economic growth and high unemployment (stagflation) while prices rose (inflation). As a result the theory of supply-side became a preferred method to current Keynesian theories. The supply-side theory became popularize by *The Wall Street Journal* and one of the biggest supporters was Ronald Reagan. He realized the real enemy is not „big business“, but an extensive state with regulations and taxes which suppress economic

⁴²Roman Joch, "Ronald Reagan a morální vůdcovství", Europortál, <http://www.euportal.cz/PrintArticle/2125-ronald-reagan-a-moralni-vudcovstvi.aspx> (accessed March 16,2010).

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid.

growth and keep the country in poverty. He became a supporter of free market and claimed that wealth is created not by the country and government but by people's creativity, activeness and diligence. The best action of the government is to keep out of the way and not place barriers. The apparent solution how to get out of the economic troubles was to lower taxes.⁴⁵

The greatest intervention into the economy was the lowering of taxes from 70% to 28%. The result was economic growth and prosperity. So why was one of Reagan's economic heritage a budget deficit? Because, even if the state incomes were growing, the state expenses were growing much faster. The Reagan government augmented expenditures for defending in order to weaken the Soviet Union. Through increased revenues and lower taxes he was able to fund massive spending on the military without any deficit. The important situation was the in the House of Representatives, which approves the budget. The majority in the House was members of the Democratic party and they persisted on increasing social expenditures. In order to reach a compromise, Reagan agreed so that Democrats agreed on military expenditures in return. If the government had lowered the taxes without increasing social expenditures, the economy would have been healthier.⁴⁶

Paradoxically, Ronald Reagan was a leftist Democrat during his youth and he was also a member of a labor union. Due to his economic beliefs he left the Democrats and joined the Republican Party.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Roman Joch, "Ronald Reagan," Občanský Institut, <http://www.usainfo.sk/article.php?104> (accessed March 16, 2010); ushistory.org, "Reaganomics," U.S. History Online Textbook, <http://www.ushistory.org/us/59b.asp> (April 16, 2010).

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid.

4 GEORGE H. W. BUSH

President Bush was often described as the public figure with the perfect resume, but he was also known as “the man who left no footprints.”⁴⁸

4.1 The elections of 1988

The Democratic nomination was won by Michael Dukakis, Governor of Massachusetts. A son of Greek immigrants, who was known for his modesty and directing ability, he achieved a balanced budget during his administration as a Governor. Dukakis also adopted a liberal posture on controversial issues. He capitalized on hostility towards the death penalty, stood for obligatory health insurance, championed proposals concerning firearms and supported elimination of nuclear power stations.⁴⁹

The Republican nomination went to Reagan’s Vice President, George H. W. Bush. Bush promised to fight against religious fanaticism, illiteracy and homelessness. He also resisted launching new taxes. He claimed credit for some of Reagan’s successes, but in comparison with Reagan he lacked charisma and rhetorical skills.⁵⁰

The Republican Party had two major advantages. The year 1988 was a year of prosperity, and Republicans benefited from some demographic advantages. The 1980s saw rapid population growth in typical Republican Sun Belt states. For decade the citizens moved from “democratic cities” into “republican suburbs”. Apart from this fact, the leftist orientation of the Democratic Party in year 1984 led a lot of conservative Democrats and a growing number of independents to vote for the Republican Party.⁵¹

The Republicans selected an offensive strategy against the Democratic candidate. They blamed Dukakis for increasing federal expenses, taxes, defense programs, non-intervention against communism in foreign countries and for not being a patriot. Michael Dukakis did not respond on these claims.⁵²

⁴⁸Fred I. Greenstein, “The Prudent Professionalism of George Herbert Walker Bush.” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 31, no.1 (Winter, 2001), 385-392, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/207088> (accessed April 27, 2010).

⁴⁹George B. Tindall, *Dějiny Spojených Států Amerických* (Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 1998), 752.

⁵⁰Ibid., 753.

⁵¹Ibid., 753.

⁵²Ibid., 754.




Figure 6 The Elections, 1988

The Republican damaged the worse organized and less concentrated Democratic campaign. As a result the election produced a majority for Bush in the popular vote and a lopsided majority in the Electoral College. Bush's greatest area of strength was in the South.⁵³

4.2 The Bush Administration

4.2.1 The War on AIDS and Drugs

Supposedly the most discussed and feared social problem in the United States was the rapid spread of AIDS. A new malignant disease, which initially hit only homosexuals and drug addicts, started to spread into other groups of the population. Before 1991 almost 110 000 Americans died and 1.5 million people were infected by this disease. Almost 90 % of all sick were men and in almost every case the drug addicted were Afro-Americans and Americans with Latin origin. In order to stop the spread of HIV, Reagan's surgeon general initiated a controversial program, which supported safe sex through the use of condoms. By virtue of any method of cure and high expenses of treatment, AIDS became this issue one of the gravest problem of the 1990s.⁵⁴

⁵³Ibid., 755.

⁵⁴George B. Tindall, *Dějiny Spojených Států Amerických* (Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 1998), 755.

Bush's campaign against drugs was rather symbolic than a real concern. During the 1980s a sizeable segment of society became addicted to cocaine. Bush promised to make drugs the focus of his domestic policy. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act established the Office of National Drug Control Policy in order to eradicate drug use, manufacturing and trafficking. Bush's campaign against drugs had three major orientations:

1. stricter enforcement of bills,
2. having drugs under control in the workplaces,
3. heightened effort to stop the inflow of drugs from Columbia and Peru.⁵⁵

Although the number of arrests increased 20%, cocaine was still available and accessible. In 1989, 375 000 babies were born with addiction. Bush concentrated his policy on arrest and prohibition, but this did not resolve the basic question: Why did so many young people take drugs? The answer involves many factors but often the using of drugs and alcohol by poor people indicated that the main culprit was the lifestyle of slums. These people were dependent on social benefits and lived in squalid houses, where criminality occurred and ghettos appeared.⁵⁶

4.2.2 Economic Crisis

Reagan's Administration left some problems which required Bush's attention of the White House. In February 1989 Bush started to solve the most acute of them – the economic crisis. The situation was critical. During 1991, 20% of the labor force was without employment. At the beginning of year 1992, approximately 2 million jobs disappeared. The most plausible explanations of this unpleasant situation were that the economy suffered from excessive private and public indebtedness and excessive capacity. Between 1980 and 1992 the indebtedness of households tripled and the indebtedness of public sector rose fourfold. The analysis of a senatorial committee concluded that George Bush was the only president under whom the standards of living really declined. Attempts to solve the crisis remained unclear. The Federal government cut interest rates. The Democratic Congress was at variance with the president regarding a package for recovery. As a result, few remedies

⁵⁵Ibid., 756.

⁵⁶Ibid., 757.

were adopted. These domestic issues did not create anything positive for the 1992 elections.⁵⁷

4.2.3 The Gulf War

After the end of the Cold War the first major foreign crisis occurred in August 1990. The Dictator of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, ordered his army across the border into Kuwait. This was no ordinary act of aggression. The United States had provided massive military aid to Iraq, giving them the fourth largest army in the world. Kuwait was a major supplier of oil to the United States and the Iraqi takeover posed an immediate threat to neighboring Saudi Arabia, another major exporter of oil. If Saudi Arabia fell to Saddam, Iraq would control one-fifth of the world's oil supply. All eyes were on the White House, waiting for a response. President Bush stated simply: "This will not stand."⁵⁸

The United States participated in the defense of Saudi Arabia in a deployment known as Operation Desert Shield in the last months of 1990. American troops were placed in Saudi Arabia in case of an Iraqi attack on the Saudis. Iraq was an ally of the Soviet Union, who held veto power over any potential UN military action. Looking westward for support for their dramatic internal changes, the USSR did not block the American plan. The United States condemned Iraq and helped form a coalition to fight Saddam militarily. The President, remembering the lessons of Vietnam, sought public support as well. The vast majority of Americans and a narrow majority of the Congress supported his actions. When all the forces were in place, the United States issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein: leave Kuwait by 15 January, 1991 or face a full attack by a multinational force. The Iraqis did not respond and Desert Shield became Desert Storm. Bombing sorties pummeled Iraq's military targets for the next few weeks. On many days there were over 2500 missions. Iraq responded by launching Scud missiles at American military barracks in Saudi Arabia and Israel. The aim was to persuade all the neighboring Arab nations to join the Iraqi cause. After intense diplomatic pressure and negotiation, the Arab nations stood against Iraq.⁵⁹

⁵⁷George B. Tindall, *Dějiny Spojených Států Amerických* (Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 1998), 770-771.

⁵⁸ushistory.org,"Operation Desert Storm," U.S. History Online Textbook, <http://www.ushistory.org/us/60a.asp> (April 29, 2010).

⁵⁹Ibid.

The ground war began on 24 February. American ground troops declared Kuwait liberated just 100 hours later (although the bombing lasted for weeks). Soldiers moved through Kuwait and entered southern Iraq. This posed a dilemma for the United States. The military objectives were complete but Saddam was still ruling Iraq from Baghdad. Bush feared that the allies would not support an occupation of Baghdad. Concerns were raised that if Saddam's regime were toppled, the whole nation could disintegrate into a civil war. Soon Iraq agreed to terms for a ceasefire. The conflict subsided.⁶⁰

The war was a television event. Americans saw footage from cameras placed on smart bombs that struck Iraqi targets. Most Americans felt confident in their military and technological edge once more but it lasted just for a short time. Bush's popularity tumbled thanks to his passive attitude towards economic decline.⁶¹

George Bush felt more comfortable with the international arena than the domestic. At home, ideological differences between Democratic and Republican activists continued to widen. The Republicans were becoming more individualistic and more hierarchical and the Democrats more egalitarian.⁶²

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Kerry Mullins and Aaron Wildavsky, "The Procedural Presidency of George Bush", *Political Science Quarterly* 107, no.1 (Spring, 1992), 31-62, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152133> (accessed April 27, 2010),

5 THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION IN 1990S

5.1 The 1992 Elections

In 1991 a scandal occurred, which challenged the public perception of political scene, occurred. Over 300 members of the House of Representatives wrote over 800 bad checks. This action resulted in people's contempt for both parties.⁶³

At the beginning of the year 1992, formerly unassailable George Bush was attacked from his own party. Conservative journalist Peter Buchanan, who served as an advisor of presidents Nixon and Reagan opened a negative campaign against George Bush's nomination for the Republican Party. According to Buchanan, George Bush spent a huge amount of money, raised taxes and abandoned principles of the Republican Party. These words attracted a lot of young activists, predominantly upset and angry young men, who were convinced that the unprincipled pragmatism of George Bush was a betrayal of Reagan's inheritance. Buchanan gained from 20-30% support in primaries in each state (New Hampshire 37%). Although Buchanan had no chance to win the nomination he continued to campaign. Permanent support proved that Bush's position in his party was very fragile.⁶⁴

On the Democratic side stood young politician Bill Clinton, who made the effort to gain back the support of white middle class voters who went over to the Republican Party in 1980s. The Democratic campaign revolved primarily around economic issues. Clinton promised to low military spending, provide tax allowances to the middle class, create a specific program of student loans and help the countries of the former Soviet Union. The public enthusiasm towards Democrats started to grow, leading to insecurity inside the Republican Party.⁶⁵

⁶³George B. Tindall, *Dějiny Spojených Států Amerických* (Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 1998), 771.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Ibid., 773.

The elections of 1992 were also made interesting by the candidacy of Ross Perot. Running as an Independent, Perot crusaded against the Gulf War, supported the Pro-choice stance, protectionism on trade, gun control and mainly deficit reduction.⁶⁶




Figure 7 The Elections, 1992

Bill Clinton won the election by a wide margin in the U.S. Electoral College, receiving 43% of the popular vote against Bush's 37%. Perot earned 19% of the popular vote, but won no electoral votes and earned the enmity of those who blame him for a Clinton win because he drew conservatives' votes away from George Bush.⁶⁷

An economic recession and doubts of whether Bush ended the Gulf War properly decreased his popularity. He broke his promise "No New Taxes" and consequently many members of his conservative base stopped to believe in him.

5.2 Revolution of 1994

Bill Clinton was elected as a centrist but started to govern as a left-wing president. He planned to launch state health care and allow homosexuals to join the army. As a result in 1994 the Republican Party took control over the House of Representatives as well as the

⁶⁶ushistory.org, "A Baby Boomer in the White House", History Online Textbook, <http://www.ushistory.org/us/60b.asp> (April 27, 2010).

⁶⁷Ibid.

Senate. Leading this charge was Newt Gingrich; Georgia Representative who made a Contract with America* aimed at the regulation of federal power.⁶⁸

The contract consisted of proposals championed by the Republicans for a long time without the option to get these proposals voted on Congress. For forty years the Congress was controlled by the Democrats. They made decisions about which proposal could get into plenary and which not. Most of these proposals were quite popular but the approval would weaken the Democratic control over the Congress. For that reason Democrats did not countenance the voting. In several cases, when the Democrats could not forestall voting, they voted against the proposal.⁶⁹

Newt Gingrich composed the Contract and on 24 September 1994 gathered hundreds of Republican candidates from the whole country on the stairs of the Congress. He chose speakers, each presenting one of the items of the Contract. They succeed hugely in gaining the attention of the media.⁷⁰

All critics were confident about its failure. According to them people were interested much more in local problems than national and preferred somebody who would be able to support specific district. But their opinions proved erroneous.⁷¹

Gingrich was highly criticized for the ideological character of the campaign even from people inside the Republican Party. They protested that center voters could be repulsed, but Gingrich proved the reverse action. He forced voters to make decision and they selected Republicans. The victory was emphatic. Republicans gained governors in several untypical states, such the North Carolina, the South Carolina, Wisconsin and California. The decisive factor was that the conservative voters, which in previous years voted for Democrats especially in the North, voted for Republicans.⁷²

The idea had also considerable influence on voters, who voted for Ross Perot in 1992. Those people voted massively for the Republicans.⁷³

* For the whole Contract, see appendix 2.

⁶⁸Roman Joch, "Od senátora rebela po rebelující daňové poplatníky," Občanský Institut, <http://www.obcinst.cz/cs/Od-senatora-rebela-po-rebelujici-danove-poplatniky-c1595/> (accessed April 2, 2010).

⁶⁹Paul M. Weyrich, "Analýza Americké Politické Scény," Občanský Institut, <http://www.obcinst.cz/cs/ANALYZA-AMERICKE-POLITICKE-SCENY-c569/> (accessed March 16, 2010).

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid.

5.3 The Republicans in the Congress

The Republicans gained a majority in both Houses. But the Republicans, elected in 1994 to the Senate were different from those in the House of Representatives. That is why the Senate did not incline to changes and reforms. In the first 100 days ambitious plans were made and most key elements of the Contract were passed. But as a result of a dispute in the Senate, the number of opponents inside the Republican Party started to grow.⁷⁴

The Contract's main theme was the decentralization of federal authority: deregulation, tax cuts, reform of social programs, increased power for states, and a balanced federal budget were its chief ambitions. All particular interests funded by the Federal government were connected and championed in a coordinated way. After the election the Democrats were in shock because they did not expect the Republican victory and were not get used to fighting for their existence. For 60 years when any federal program was passed the continuation was sure. The situation for these particular interests was serious. If the Republicans denied funding to a project, the Democrats launched propaganda creating visions of starving people and suffering children thanks to the Republican budget. After this, some of the Republicans started to diverge from their own program. It caused very serious consequences for the future elections. The Republican Party started to be divided. Even though Gingrich wanted to fulfill promises, he was betrayed by his followers. Finally they did not enforce the promises in the Contract. When Gingrich managed to push a bill through the House of Representatives it was denied in the Senate.⁷⁵

Another Republican problem was that they did not control the Congress for such a long time. Bill Clinton was dealing with scandals connected with his administration, but Republicans were not able to profit it. In fact, the Democrats took the initiative, and everything went bad for the Republicans.⁷⁶

5.4 The elections of 1996

The Republican candidate was 73 year old Robert Dole, who entered the elections with campaign aimed at income tax reduction. The biggest problem was his insufficient base of

⁷⁴Paul M. Weyrich, "Analýza Americké Politické Scény", Občanský Institut, <http://www.obcinst.cz/cs/ANALYZA-AMERICKE-POLITICKE-SCENY-c569/> (accessed March 16, 2010).

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid.

supporters. Dole was seen as a demotivating, weak leader. People were also skeptical about the Republican's ability to fulfill their promises with regard to their failure in the Congress.⁷⁷

On the Democratic side Bill Clinton sought re-election. The Democrats came with the tactic to scare voters into thinking that Robert Doyle would destroy the Social Security System.⁷⁸




Figure 8 The Elections, 1996

President Clinton won with 379 electoral votes compared to 159 for Dole. The election helped to cement Democratic prospects in states including California, Vermont, Maine, Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Delaware, and Connecticut. Each of these states would vote Democratic in subsequent Presidential elections, having voted Republican in the three prior to 1992. Those states also voted for Richard Nixon in the 1972 landslide. The year 1996 marked the first time since the 1944 Presidential contest that New Hampshire voted for a Democrat in two successive elections.⁷⁹

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸[ushistory.org](http://www.ushistory.org/us/60c.asp), "Republicans vs. Democrats," U.S. History Online Textbook, <http://www.ushistory.org/us/60c.asp> (April 27, 2010).

⁷⁹Ibid.

6 GERGE W. BUSH

6.1 Elections of 2000

The elections of 2000 were the closest presidential elections in modern history and for the first time the Supreme Court had to intervene into the process.

Republican candidate George W. Bush concentrated his campaign on domestic issues, budget surplus, reforms of Social Security, Medicare healthcare, cutting taxes and aiding minorities. He portrayed himself as compassionate conservative. Democratic candidate Al Gore supported gay rights, maintained separation between church and state, promised to appoint pro-choice judges with more liberal leanings and maintained distinction between church and state.⁸⁰




Figure 9 The Elections, 2000

Although the 2000 presidential election concluded with Vice President Al Gore winning half a million more popular votes than George Bush, he lost the presidency in the Electoral College by five votes (271 to 266), which was hinged on the popular vote in Florida. The closeness led to a recount.⁸¹

⁸⁰Eric Laurent, *Tajný Svět George W. Bushe* (Praha: Intu, 2004), 120-135.

⁸¹John Kincaid, "The State of U.S. Federalism, 2000-2001: Continuity in Crisis," *Publius* 31, no.3 (Summer, 2001), 1-69, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3330993> (accessed April 27, 2010).

Most of the post-election recount contest occurred in local, state, and federal courts because the matters at stake turned on interpretations of Florida law and because party control of the state's various institutions advantaged or disadvantaged each candidate. While both candidates appealed to the court of public opinion, Gore sought support from Florida's judiciary, especially the state's liberal Supreme Court, all seven members of which were appointed by Democratic governors. The Florida legislature was Republican, Florida's secretary of state was a Republican and Bush supporter, and Florida's governor, Jeb Bush was not only a Republican but also George Bush's brother. Bush sought support from the more Republican friendly U.S. Supreme court, pitting the federal court against the Democratic Florida Supreme Court and Democratic ballot-counters in the four Democratic counties in which Gore requested recounts. Despite a vigorous debate about a decline of American political parties since the 1960s, Bush and Gore recognized that partisan control of crucial government institutions in the federal system would affect their fortunes in this close election. Finally the US Supreme Court stopped the vote recount because of the argument that the use of different standards among Florida's counties violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.⁸²

Bush drew support from the religious right. Significantly, those who attended religious services at least once a week voted for Bush. Bush was also supported by those for whom honesty and trustworthiness in a president matters most, gun owners and opponents of stricter gun laws, voters who value "moral leadership" from a president more than "managing government", Protestants, and voters who said that the country's moral condition is on the "wrong track". Gore did well among gays and lesbians, voters who said that environmental protection is more important than economic growth and people who regarded the candidates' stands on issues as being more important than their personal qualities. The election also reflected some traditional twentieth-century demographic cleavages. Gore gained votes, for example from African-Americans, Jews, Latinos, unmarried women, city residents and member of labor-union households.⁸³

The surveys proved that the public responded calmly and just few Americans regarded the contest as a constitutional crisis. Despite criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court, a national poll found that 61% of Americans trusted the Court to make the final decision, compared to

⁸²Ibid.

17% who trusted Congress, 9% who trusted Florida Supreme court, and 7% who trusted the Florida legislature to do so. However, the public's patience was due not only to civic virtue but also to civic apathy, the comfort of a still strong economy, and the fact that few voters felt passionately about Gore, Bush, or their campaign issues.⁸⁴

Nevertheless, the election revealed growing polarization, a polarization due significantly to voters and Republicans' reaction to the nationalization of many social and cultural issues since the 1950s (minority civil rights, affirmative action, abortion, gay rights, gun control, school prayer, environmental protection, and capital punishment). Those issues have a zero-sum character that makes political compromise difficult, which have passionate supporters and opponents, and which were once only state and local concerns.⁸⁵

6.2 The Administration until 2001

6.2.1 No Child Left Behind Act

Bush's first initiative was the controversial No Child Left Behind Act. The premise of the No Child Left Behind Act was that American schools were failing and, therefore the change was necessary. The purpose of the NCLB Act was to raise the achievement of all students in the nation and eliminate the achievement gap seen among students differentiated by race, ethnicity, poverty, disability, and English proficiency.⁸⁶

Although its aim of raising the achievement levels of all students was well-intentioned, the unintended consequences of the NCLB Act at the local, state, and national levels have led to much discussion. The NCLB Act has engendered controversy that is centered in part on the increased role of the federal government in educational policy. The majority of Americans believe that decisions about what is taught in public schools should be made at the local level by the school board, rather than at the state level or the federal level. Results of surveys indicated that people also disagree with major strategies NCLB uses to

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Kirk Wolter et al., "Reliability of the Uncertified Ballots in the 2000 Presidential Election in Florida," *The American Statistician* 57, no.1 (Feb., 2003), 1-14, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3087271> (accessed April 27, 2010).

⁸⁵John Kincaid, "The State of U.S. Federalism, 2000-2001: Continuity in Crisis," *Publius* 31, no.3 (Summer, 2001), 1-69, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3330993> (accessed April 27, 2010).

⁸⁶Marcia Harmon Rosenbusch, "The No Child Left Behind Act and Teaching and Learning Languages in U.S. Schools," *The Modern Language Journal* 89, no.2 (Summer, 2005), 250-261, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3588685> (accessed April 26, 2010).

determine whether a school is or is not in need of improvement. For instance, 83% of those surveyed believe that testing only in English and mathematics will not yield a fair picture of a school, 73% say It is not possible to judge a student's proficiency in English and mathematics on the basis of a single test, and 81% are concerned that basing decisions about school on students' performances in English and mathematics will mean less emphasis on art, music, history, and other subjects. The NCLB focus on standardized testing is resulting in a narrowing of the curriculum and a "sorting of students" and could halt the development of truly significant improvements in teaching and learning. It is seen by some as an obstacle to improving public education because of its focus on "punishments rather than assistance," and "mandates rather than support for effective programs".⁸⁷

This landmark legislation is falling short of its intentions at the high school level. Rather than effectively and consistently identifying and stimulating improvement in low-performing high schools, was created a confusing landscape where improvement in some low-performing high schools id deemed inadequate, whereas even less improvement in other schools is considered adequate.⁸⁸

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸Robert Balfanz et al., "Are NCLB's Measures, Incentives, and Improvement Strategies the Right Ones for the Nation's Low-Perfoming High Schools?", *American Educational Research Journal* 44, no.3 (September, 2007), 559-593, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30069428> (accessed April 26, 2010).

CONCLUSION

The Republicans did not evolve much between 1968 and 2001, a fact demonstrated through their campaigns. Every year the platform stayed almost the same; minor adjustments were made as required. There were less conservative campaigns, such as Nixon's, as well as highly conservative campaigns, such as Reagan's. Both were successful. The key lay in the unity of the party and in the communicative skills of the politicians. The best example was the elections of 1994, when Newt Gingrich convinced the populace to buy into his Contract with America. This example also reveals a key weakness of the Republicans: they had a hard time fulfilling their promises. Congress was controlled by the Democrats, who were most often not in favor of Republican proposals and rejected them. In the case of the voters, the United States of America is roughly evenly split between the two parties. Each of the two political parties has its own voter base, so the task is to attract the "swing voters" who adapt their voting decisions according to a particular campaign or current events and issues. The Republicans, not surprisingly, have both benefited and suffered from the swing vote.

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APPENDICES

P I The “Silent Majority” Speech

P II The Contract with America

APPENDIX P I: THE “SILENT MAJORITY” SPEECH

"The Silent Majority" Speech (November 3, 1969)

Good evening, my fellow Americans:

Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world--the war in Vietnam.

I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.

How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?

How has this administration changed the policy of the previous administration?

What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefield in Vietnam?

What choices do we have if we are to end the war?

What are the prospects for peace?

Now, let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20.

--The war had been going on for 4 years.

--31,000 Americans had been killed in action.

--The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule.

--540,000 Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number.

--No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.

--The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad.

In view of these circumstances there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces.

From a political standpoint this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat which would be the result of my action on him and come out as the Peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson's war to become Nixon's war.

But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my administration and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation and on the future of peace and freedom in America and in the world.

Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson's war becomes Nixon's war.

The great question is: How can we win America's peace?

Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place?

Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.

In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.

Now, many believe that President Johnson's decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others-I among them-have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.

But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?

In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.

For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before.

--They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.

--We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.

--With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities of Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation-and particularly for the million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.

For the United States, this first defeat in our Nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the world.

Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.

In 1963, President Kennedy, with his characteristic eloquence and clarity, said: ". . . we want to see a stable government there, carrying on a struggle to maintain its national independence.

"We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Viet-Nam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there."

President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.

For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.

--A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.

--Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.

--This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace-in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.

Ultimately, this would cost more lives.

It would not bring peace; it would bring more war.

For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and battlefield.

In order to end a war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.

In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other occasions I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.

--We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within 1 year.

--We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision.

--We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as

an organized political force. And the Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the elections.

We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference, Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings.

Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms, which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave.

We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized, in January, that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.

Tonight I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace-initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.

I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace.

--Soon after my election, through an individual who is directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi's replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations.

--Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge, and I, personally, have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with

representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date produced results.

--In mid-July, I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where I am now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh [President, Democratic Republic of Vietnam] on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh.

I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end. Let me read from that letter to you now.

"Dear Mr. President:

"I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf, I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one--least of all the people of Vietnam. . . .

"The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture, both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war."

I received Ho Chi Minh's reply on August 30, 3 days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative.

The full text of both letters is being released to the press.

--In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam's chief negotiator in Paris in II private

sessions.--We have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communication which may still prove to be productive.

But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago and since this administration came into office on January 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.

Well now, who is at fault?

It has become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government.

The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.

There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi's deciding to negotiate, to negotiate seriously.

I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth-the bad news as well as the good news where the lives of our young men are involved.

Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front.

At the time we launched our search for peace I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace-a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.

It is in line with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July, 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine-a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam, but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.

In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.

Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: "When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them."

Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia:

--First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

--Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

--Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.

The defense of freedom is everybody's business-not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.

The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.

The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.

In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams' orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.

Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 percent.

And now we have begun to see the results of this long overdue change in American policy in Vietnam.

--After 5 years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally bringing American men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam-including 20 percent of all of our combat forces.

--The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.

Two other significant developments have occurred since this administration took office.

--Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack, over the last 3 months is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year.

--Most important-United States casualties have declined during the last 2 months to the lowest point in 3 years.

Let me now turn to our program for the future.

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.

I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program. And there are obvious reasons for this decision which I am sure you will understand. As I have indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts.

One of these is the progress which can be or might be made in the Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.

The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June. Now, this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable.

We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.

Along with this optimistic estimate, I must-in all candor-leave one note of caution.

If the level of enemy activity significantly increases we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.

However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point.

At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago, there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam. I want to be sure

that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal Program.

We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties, and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors.

If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy.

Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy, which as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, I am making in meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.

My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war.

--I can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.

--Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization if necessary—a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.

I have chosen this second course.

It is not the easy way.

It is the right way.

It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace—not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.

In speaking of the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America.

Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.

We have faced other crisis in our history and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what had to be done when we knew our course was right.

I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved.

In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading: "Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home."

Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view. But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this Nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.

For almost 200 years, the policy of this Nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all of the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this Nation has no future as a free society.

And now I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this Nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war.

I respect your idealism.

I share your concern for peace.

I want peace as much as you do.

There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It is very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.

--I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam.

--But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam someplace in the world.

--And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.

I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed.

If it does succeed, what the critics say now won't matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won't matter.

I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days. But I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion

Two hundred years ago this Nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world. And the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free world leadership.

Let historians not record that when America was the most powerful nation in the world we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.

And so tonight-to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans-I ask for your support.

I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.

The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.

Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.

Fifty years ago, in this room and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: "This is the war to end war." His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard realities of great power politics and Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.

Tonight I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars. But I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated-the goal of a just and lasting peace.

As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path to that goal and then leading the Nation along it.

I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.

Thank you and goodnight.

APPENDIX P II: THE CONTRACT WITH AMERICA

The Contract with America

As Republican Members of the House of Representatives and as citizens seeking to join that body we propose not just to change its policies, but even more important, to restore the bonds of trust between the people and their elected representatives.

That is why in this era of official evasion and posturing, we offer instead a detailed agenda for national renewal, a written commitment with no fine print.

This year's election offers the chance, after four decades of one-party control, to bring to the House a new majority that will transform the way Congress works. That historic change would be the end of government that is too big, too intrusive, and too easy with the public's money. It can be the beginning of a Congress that respects the values and shares the faith of the American family.

Like Lincoln, our first Republican president, we intend to act "with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right." To restore accountability to Congress. To end its cycle of scandal and disgrace. To make us all proud again of the way free people govern themselves.

On the first day of the 104th Congress, the new Republican majority will immediately pass the following major reforms, aimed at restoring the faith and trust of the American people in their government:

FIRST, require all laws that apply to the rest of the country also apply equally to the Congress;

SECOND, select a major, independent auditing firm to conduct a comprehensive audit of Congress for waste, fraud or abuse;

THIRD, cut the number of House committees, and cut committee staff by one-third;

FOURTH, limit the terms of all committee chairs;

FIFTH, ban the casting of proxy votes in committee;

SIXTH, require committee meetings to be open to the public;

SEVENTH, require a three-fifths majority vote to pass a tax increase;

EIGHTH, guarantee an honest accounting of our Federal Budget by implementing zero base-line budgeting.

Thereafter, within the first 100 days of the 104th Congress, we shall bring to the House Floor the following bills, each to be given full and open debate, each to be given a clear and fair vote and each to be immediately available this day for public inspection and scrutiny.

THE FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT

A balanced budget/tax limitation amendment and a legislative line-item veto to restore fiscal responsibility to an out-of-control Congress, requiring them to live under the same budget constraints as families and businesses.

THE TAKING BACK OUR STREETS ACT

An anti-crime package including stronger truth-in-sentencing, "good faith" exclusionary rule exemptions, effective death penalty provisions, and cuts in social spending for this summer's "crime" bill to fund prison construction and additional law enforcement to keep people secure in their neighborhoods and kids safe in their schools.

THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT

Discourage illegitimacy and teen pregnancy by prohibiting welfare to minor mothers and denying increased AFDC for additional children while on welfare, cut spending for welfare programs, and enact a tough two-years-and-out provision with work requirements to promote individual responsibility.

THE FAMILY REINFORCEMENT ACT

Child support enforcement, tax incentives for adoption, strengthening rights of parents in their children's education, stronger child pornography laws, and an elderly dependent care tax credit to reinforce the central role of families in American society.

THE AMERICAN DREAM RESTORATION ACT

A \$500 per child tax credit, begin repeal of the marriage tax penalty, and creation of American Dream Savings Accounts to provide middle class tax relief.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY RESTORATION ACT

No U.S. troops under U.N. command and restoration of the essential parts of our national

security funding to strengthen our national defense and maintain our credibility around the world.

THE SENIOR CITIZENS FAIRNESS ACT

Raise the Social Security earnings limit, which currently forces seniors out of the work force, repeal the 1993 tax hikes on Social Security benefits and provide tax incentives for private long-term care insurance to let Older Americans keep more of what they have earned over the years.

THE JOB CREATION AND WAGE ENHANCEMENT ACT

Small business incentives, capital gains cuts and indexation, neutral cost recovery, risk assessment/cost-benefit analysis, strengthening the Regulatory Flexibility Act and unfunded mandate reform to create jobs and raise worker wages.

THE COMMON SENSE LEGAL REFORM ACT

"Loser pays" laws, reasonable limits on punitive damages and reform of product liability laws to stem the endless tide of litigation.

THE CITIZEN LEGISLATURE ACT

A first-ever vote on term limits to replace career politicians with citizen legislators.

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 The Elections, 1968	14
Figure 2 The Elections, 1972	22
Figure 3 The Elections, 1976	22
Figure 4 The Elections, 1976	25
Figure 5 The Elections, 1980	27
Figure 7 The Elections, 1988	33
Figure 8 The Elections, 1992	38
Figure 9 The Elections, 1996	41
Figure 10 The Elections, 2000	42