

The USA After September 11th

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ABSTRAKT

Tato bakalářská práce kriticky hodnotí situaci, ve které se Spojené státy nacházely po útocích z 11. září. Bezprostředně po útoku, domácí i zahraniční politika prošla rychlými a zásadními změnami. Jelikož Bushova administrativa stála proti silnému nepříteli, bylo nutné prosadit nové zákony bez ohledu na to, jaký vliv budou mít na občanská práva a svobodu. Bezpečnost se stala národní prioritou. Proto byla ustanovena nová opatření, která jsou součástí války proti terorismu a jež dopomohla k zajištění bezpečnosti. Protiteroristická opatření byla dále začleněna do zahraniční politiky USA. S ohledem na války v Iráku a Afghánistánu, tato práce se snaží zaznamenat nejvíce chybné kroky strategií, které byly použity vládou USA v těchto válkách.

Klíčová slova: 11. září, válka proti terorismu, U.S.A. vlastenecký akt, občanská práva, svoboda, bezpečnost, Al Káida, Afghánistán, Irák

ABSTRACT

This thesis critically assesses the situation in which the United States found itself after the attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of 9/11, both domestic and foreign policy underwent rapid and fundamental changes. As the Bush administration had to face a great enemy, new methods of law enforcement to ensure security needed to be established regardless of their impact on freedom and civil liberties. Security has become the national priority. Therefore, new tools which would help to ensure the security were introduced as a part of the war on terror. Furthermore, the counter-terrorist measures were integrated into the foreign policy. Regarding the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, this thesis tries to record the most erroneous assumptions of the strategies implemented by the U.S. government.

Keywords: September 11, war on terrorism, the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, civil liberties, freedom, security, al Qaeda, Afghanistan, Iraq

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INTRODUCTION

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the United States' appearance of invulnerability was decisively shattered. The perpetrators of the horrific attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon found the Achilles' heel of this world power: The attacks were meant to destroy the ideals of liberty and security, the foundational principles of the United States.

September 11th marked a significant turning point in both the history and mindset of the United States. The immediate aftermath of the attacks was a powerful melting pot of emotions. Suddenly, Americans faced overwhelming feelings of uncertainty, anger, sorrow and hate. A wave of panic spread over the United States, leaving people afraid and yet connected by their fears.

Due to the circumstances, it is obvious that George Bush, the U.S. President, was under great pressure. American citizens looked to the White House to immediately provide information about the organizers of the attacks and to directly outline the U. S. government's response to the catastrophe.

Therefore the Bush administration could not afford to spend much time mulling over strategy. Even though more sophisticated counter-terrorist measures should have been implemented, the situation called for a quick resolution. As a result, the war on terrorism was declared.

In order to prevent future attacks and ensure security within the country, government passed new legislation which gained the support of both Congress and the American public. In essence, people were willing to sacrifice their own liberties in the name of security, however deleterious the impact of such a decision could have been.

The first step on the road to better security was the establishment of Office of Department Security in the White House which became a headquarters for all executive agencies. In addition people were asked to cooperate with those agencies, primarily the FBI, by agency reporting suspicious activities.

The second step was the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act. Signing the act into law caused a wave of indignation. Opponents claimed that it had been hurried run through Congress without proper reading. If they had been given more time to review the act, Senators would have found that it authorized significant violations of civil liberties. Thus, being one of the most controversial laws, the Patriot Act has been subjected to many debates.

Furthermore, the Bush administration believed that ensuring security within the U.S. borders was not enough. Once the al Qaeda terrorist network confessed to organizing the 9/11 attacks, Afghanistan became the U.S. enemy number one, as the country was a safe haven for that organization. Thus, the United States declared war against Afghanistan. In the end, as the Bush administration did not weigh all the pros and cons, the war in Afghanistan could not have been won with George Bush in office.

Even Barack Obama, the Bush's successor, has not been able to end the war in Afghanistan yet. In fact, the strategies of both presidents were based on erroneous assumptions and fueled the spread of modes of violence. It appeared that neither of them had foreseen the obvious obstacles to progress, primarily corruption at the highest levels in Afghan government and the unwillingness of the Afghan people to cooperate.

The situation with Iraq is a bit different. Under the Bush's leadership, Iraq was attacked even though no direct links to either the events of September 11 or to al Qaeda terrorist organization operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan had been proved. Later on, after Saddam Hussein was overthrown, government documents revealed that there indeed had never been any connection between Hussein and 9/11 attacks. Moreover, the weapons of mass destruction so frequently mentioned at the beginning of the war have never been found. However, under Obama's leadership, most of U.S. troops have been already withdrawn from Iraq as the conflict in the country has calmed down.

1 THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11TH

Tuesday, September 11, 2001, started as any other ordinary day. Nevertheless, that was about to change very soon. At the height of New York's morning rush-hour, at 8:46 a.m. local time, one of the four hijacked commercial passenger planes crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center (WTC). Suddenly, panic broke out in the streets and nobody knew what happened. Another strike came just 17 minutes later, when the second hijacked plane destroyed the south tower of WTC causing a massive explosion.¹

The immediate aftermath of the attacks was marked by chaos. American citizens were scared to death and demanded that the White House give an explanation of what happened, who was behind those attacks, and how the Bush administration would respond.

Therefore, at 9:30 a.m., George W. Bush, the President of the United States, appeared before the public and confirmed the assumptions that the United States had just witnessed terrorist attacks. Just a few minutes later, the third plane crashed into the Pentagon building in Washington. Still, the last plane was in the air and there were concerns about the White House being the next target of terrorists, so it was evacuated. Luckily, the fourth plane crashed in a field in Pennsylvania before it was able to cause more damage.²

Later on that day, Bush's address to the nation was broadcast on TV all over the world and people were curious how Bush would deal with the situation. According to Bush, the perpetrators of the attacks intended to stir up fear and doubts among Americans, however, unlike the foundations of buildings, the principles of America could not be destroyed. Bush described the United States as "the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world" and claimed that those principles gave the reason for enemies to attack. He also announced that the investigation to find the terrorist organization which stood behind those horrible attacks had already started, and it was just a matter of time before its members would be brought to justice.³

¹The British Broadcasting Corporation, "America's Day of Terror: Timeline," The British Broadcasting Corporation, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in_depth/americas/2001/day_of_terror/timeline/default.stm (accessed April 2, 2011).

²Ibid.

³George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation," transcript, Thomson Reuters business, <http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/bushadrs091101.html> (accessed March 8, 2010).

1.1 The Aftermath of September 11

Two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) revealed the names of planes' hijackers and identified those men as members of the al Qaeda terrorist network operating in Afghanistan. Apparently, the events of September 11 were a well-thought-out step of an organization which had all necessary prerequisites to carry out the attacks. Factors such as money, determination, willingness to sacrifice their own lives and primarily perversion of religious faith, connected the terrorists and led to a successful execution of the attacks.⁴

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration was expected to react to the attacks and take necessary terrorism precautions as quickly as possible. Therefore George Bush decided to declare war on terrorism and came to seek support in Congress. According to the Constitution, Congress is the branch of the government entitled to either declare or authorize war. As some of Bush's forerunners, among them Bill Clinton, did not feel the need to get approval from Congress for declaration of any war in the past, Bush's request for authority from Congress seemed to be a good start of cooperation. Nevertheless, Bush's war was different from any other war waged in the past. It was a war on terrorism against an invisible enemy on the home front.⁵

Another strong player in the game was Attorney General John Ashcroft. On September 24, 2001, in the testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary, he critically assessed the post 9/11 situation within the United States. He stated that "the American people do not have the luxury of unlimited time in erecting the necessary defenses to future terrorist acts." Terrorist organizations, which could have been behind the attacks, had to be dealt with before they could hit again and even harder. Therefore, law enforcement as well as new security measures as a part of the war on terrorism needed to be established as soon as possible in order to defend the American nation and its citizens.⁶

⁴U.S. Department of Justice, *Attorney General John Ashcroft Testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary*, 1.st. sess., September 24, 2001, accessible from http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/testimony/2001/agcrisisremarks9_24.htm (accessed April 18, 2011)

⁵Louis Fisher, "Challenges to Civil Liberties in a Time of War," in *Transforming the American Polity: The Presidency of George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism*, ed. Richard S. Conley (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2004), 101-120.

⁶U.S. Department of Justice, *Attorney General John Ashcroft Testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary*, 1.st. sess., September 24, 2001, accessible from http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/testimony/2001/agcrisisremarks9_24.htm (accessed April 18, 2011).

In essence, there were great weaknesses in the existing U.S. laws dealing with terrorism. The laws did not fulfill certain requirements; particularly they were not tough enough. In addition, technology surpassed U.S. statutes in speed as most of the laws were created decades ago, thus, were not applicable to a modern, digital age. Therefore the Department of Justice responded by setting the fight against terrorism the highest priority. According to Ashcroft, it was necessary to come up with new law proposals; otherwise it would be like waging modern war with outdated weapons.⁷

1.2 Civil liberties, the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act and the Department of Homeland Security

The attacks of September 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the direction that the United States has taken for recent years, but the change in domestic policy was inevitable. Therefore in the eighteen months following 9/11, the Bush administration started to set up new rules, make the most crucial decisions and transform the American policy. It became increasingly clear that the actions taken by the government were not compatible with the Ashcroft's promises about preservation of Americans' civil liberties and values upon which the United States was built.⁸

The administration's plans to improve safety were met with a mixed response. Members of the Democratic Party in particular were rather against it. Shortly after the attacks, Patrick Leahy, who at that time represented the Democrats in the U.S. Senate, expressed his opinion on strengthening executive power at the expense of civil liberties. From his perspective, breaking the Constitution was literally the worst mistake which could be made. If the Bush administration did this, then it would be a victory for the terrorists. The same attitude was adopted by another Democratic Senator Russ Feingold who claimed that the war on terrorism had primarily been declared in order to preserve freedom and American values; however, the Bush's policy did the exact opposite. Furthermore, Feingold warned of the extended impacts of ignoring the Constitution as he inferred that sacrificing civil liberties for the anticipated victory over terrorists was not a good move. Actually, in his opinion, it was nonsense as the war on terrorism would not be

⁷Ibid.

⁸U.S. Department of Justice, *Attorney General John Ashcroft Testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary*, 1st. sess., September 24, 2001, accessible from http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/testimony/2001/agcrisisremarks9_24.htm (accessed April 18, 2011).

won by diminishing the liberties. Therefore Feingold was the only Senator who voted against the U.S.A PATRIOT Act which will be discussed in the next sections.⁹

1.2.1 Department of Homeland Security

The U.S. government initiated national focus on counter-terrorism issues. On October 9, 2001, the Office of Homeland Security in the White House came into existence. It became a head office for the agencies which were responsible for developing counter-terrorism plans, and its role was to watch and coordinate a national strategy to protect the American land from terrorists, and react to possible attacks in the future.¹⁰

Eight months later, in June 2002, Bush called upon Congress for the most significant transformation of the U.S. government since the presidency of Harry Truman. Bush drew up a plan to create a fifteenth Cabinet-level department, the Department of Homeland Security. As a result, he was given a free hand to make the changes he felt necessary. Until its creation, the competences were divided among forty federal agencies and almost 2,000 Congressional appropriations, which was not quite optimal. In essence, the newly established department was supposed to unify government's activities and programs of counter-terrorism issues by putting them into a single department. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security enabled to manage and supervise those federal agencies whose role is to deal with fighting terrorism on the home front. Thus, the creation of this department was considered another key step to protect the United States from enemies and make Americans safer.¹¹

In the proposal of 2002, Bush outlined the benefits of establishing the new Department of Homeland Security giving out eight main priorities. Those eight advantages owing to which the department would be able to ensure security are as following:

⁹Louis Fisher, "Challenges to Civil Liberties in a Time of War," in *Transforming the American Polity: The Presidency of George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism*, ed. Richard S. Conley (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2004), 101-120.

¹⁰Richard S. Conley, "Introduction," in *Transforming the American Polity: The Presidency of George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism*, 1-11.

¹¹George W. Bush, "The Department of Homeland Security," *President George Bush's Proposal to Create the Department of Homeland Security*, 2002, accessible from <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/book.pdf> (accessed April 26, 2011).; Richard S. Conley, "Introduction," in *Transforming the American Polity: The Presidency of George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism*, 1-11.; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Brief Documentary History of the Department of Homeland Security 2001-2008*, by Elizabeth C. Borja, p. 2-7, accessible from http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/brief_documentary_history_of_dhs_2001_2008.pdf (accessed April 27, 2011).

One department whose primary mission is to protect the American homeland;
One department to secure our borders, transportation sector, ports, and critical infrastructure;
One department to synthesize and analyze homeland security intelligence from multiple sources;
One department to coordinate communications with state and local governments, private industry, and the American people about threats and preparedness;
One department to coordinate our efforts to protect the American people against bioterrorism and other weapons of mass destruction;
One department to help train and equip for first responders;
One department to manage federal emergency response activities; and
More security officers in the field working to stop terrorists and fewer resources in Washington managing duplicative and redundant activities that drain critical homeland¹²

The Department of Homeland Security was formed in March 2003. This development was a crucial step in the mission to reduce the nation's vulnerability to terrorist's attacks by implementing new security measures.¹³

1.2.2 The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act

President George W. Bush, Attorney General John Ashcroft and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld played key roles in transforming American policy after September 11. In spite of all the initial promises to preserve and protect civil liberties of Americans, they could not live up to people's expectations, and liberties were significantly diminished. According to many scholars, the Bush administration went further than the situation required and broke the Constitution by implementing measures that would guarantee security and stress the importance of patriotism, but diminish civil liberties.¹⁴

1.2.2.1 Introduction of the Patriot Act

One of the most controversial dates in post 9/11 history is definitely October 26, 2001. That day, the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, which is an acronym standing for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, was signed into law. It is said that Congress had time only to skim through the

¹²George W. Bush, "The Department of Homeland Security," *President George Bush's Proposal to Create the Department of Homeland Security*, 2002, accessible from <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/book.pdf> (accessed April 26, 2011).

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Valerie L. Demmer, "Civil Liberties and Homeland Security," *The Humanist*, January/February 2002, 7-9.

bill as it appeared to be very complicated and the printed version was not available to the Congress members in advance. Thus the bill did not undergo the usual approval process.¹⁵

The middle part of the name indicates that it is a play on words which gives an impression that if an individual considers himself or herself a patriot, he or she will not protest against the act, however strict or exaggerated it might be. In this case, being patriotic means just to follow the rules set by the Patriot Act.

Even Ashcroft, just thirteen days after the terrorist attacks, pointed out in his September testimony that those who would dare express doubts about the post 9/11 actions taken by the US government, lacked patriotism and helped strengthen the position of terrorist. Therefore, after approval of the Patriot Act, many professionals formed a negative opinion on the government officials. Danny Goldberg, the President of the ACLU of Southern California, was among those who claimed that Bush and Ashcroft had always been eager for more executive power and less personal freedom independently of the events of September 11.¹⁶

1.2.2.2 The American Civil Liberties Union against the Patriot Act

“While the Administration and the public are understandably focused on waging war against terrorism, we ask Congress to ensure that the war on terrorism does not become a war on democracy.”

-Nadine Strossen, her testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary Senate on December 4, 2001

Since the end of the First World War, the ACLU Foundation has evolved. The ACLU, an acronym for the American Civil Liberties Union, is a non-profit organization dedicated to protecting the values upon which the United States is built, primarily personal freedom, and racial and religious equality. The 9/11 attacks were followed by the curtailment of civil liberties. These limits were compounded by the introduction of the Patriot Act, and the

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Danny Goldberg, “Introduction” in *It’s a Free Country: Personal Freedom in America after September 11*, 5-10.; Valerie L. Demmer, “Civil Liberties and Homeland Security,” *The Humanist*, January/February 2002, 7-9.

balance of liberty and security was apparently abolished. As a result, the membership of the ACLU increased by one-fifth bringing the total number of members to 330,000.¹⁷

When the Patriot Act came into effect, civil libertarians awakened. Their claim that their civil liberties were seriously under attack was profoundly true as the individual's personal freedom was significantly restricted in the name of security. According to the Bush administration, the Patriot Act has been the right tool for fighting terrorism as it confronts threats before they could strike. Thus, how far does the executive power reach?

The U.S. Constitution established three branches of government, an executive, legislative and judicial branch. According to Nadine Strossen, the ACLU President, if one of the branches has excessive power, which happened with the executive branch, it will have a huge impact on the functioning of the state and endanger democracy. To back up her claim of executive branch being too powerful, Strossen points out that military tribunals were established without an approval from Congress, wiretapping people was done with limited judicial oversight. These actions demonstrate the Bush administration's disregard for the legislative and judicial branches of the government.¹⁸

Although the ACLU expressed gratitude to the Department of Justice for its zealotness in fighting terrorism, it was aware of the fact that new policy powers and tactics gained by the Patriot Act to ensure security and confront terrorists, unnecessarily violated the civil rights. Moreover, the measures were applied to such a large number of people that they could not guarantee that the real terrorists would be captured.¹⁹

1.2.2.3 The Patriot Act's authorities

Under this seemingly anti-terrorist U.S.A. Patriot Act, apart from detaining or deporting suspects, the government has been authorized to spy on any American, anytime and anywhere. That has been enabled primarily owing to the modern technology as a communication via mobile phones, emails and social networks has formed an integral part of society. As a result, the government could eavesdrop on Internet communications; wiretap phone calls; monitor on financial transactions; and control emails and websites

¹⁷American Civil Liberties Union, "ACLU History," American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU Foundation. <http://www.aclu.org/aclu-history> (accessed May 1, 2010).

¹⁸U.S. Department of Justice "Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: The Massive, Secretive Detention and Dragnet Questioning of People based on National Origin in the Wake of September 11," *Statement of Nadine Strossen Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate*; December 4, 2001, accessible from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/strossen_001.asp (accessed April 22, 2011).

¹⁹*Ibid.*

visited. In addition, while carrying out criminal investigation, agencies such as the FBI were authorized to receive warrants which allowed them to break into the house or office of a suspected person. Then without knowledge of the individual, the FBI could copy all his data which they consider essential. Those are only a few examples of the newly acquired authorities of security agencies. The opponents of the act claim that most of the regulations were just spying on people which went far beyond the border in fighting terrorism.²⁰

The worst laws are those built up on negative emotions such as fear, frustration, antagonism or anger. The influence of these emotions is clearly demonstrated by the fact that before September 11, most parts of the Patriot Act were discussed in Congress but always rejected. After the attacks, as already mentioned, Democrat Russ Feingold was the only Senator who voted against the act during the first vote on the legislation. Still when George W. Bush was in the White House, many Democrats, including then-Senator Barack Obama opposed the act. In February 2006, the Improvement and Reauthorization Act, a bill to extend the Patriot Act, was introduced. Unfortunately, violations of privacy were left untouched as there were just ten Senators, Patrick Leahy among them, who voted against that renewal. So it happened that as there were enough bipartisan votes, Congress approved renewal of the Patriot Act and the law remained unchanged.²¹

²⁰David Silver, "Expert Perspective on Civil Liberties Curtailment," An interview with Nat Hentoff in *It's a Free Country: Personal Freedom in America after September 11*, ed. Danny Goldberg, Victor Goldberg and Robert Greenwald (New York City, NY: Nation Books, 2003), 37-45.; U.S. Department of Justice "Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: The Massive, Secretive Detention and Dragnet Questioning of People based on National Origin in the Wake of September 11," *Statement of Nadine Strossen Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate*; December 4, 2001, accessible from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/strossen_001.asp (accessed April 22, 2011).

²¹Brian Doherty, "Surveillance Unchecked: Patriot Shame," Reason, June 2010, <http://reason.com/archives/2010/04/25/surveillance-unchecked> (accessed May 4, 2011); Danny Goldberg, "Introduction" in *It's a Free Country: Personal Freedom in America after September 11*, ed. Danny Goldberg, Victor Goldberg and Robert Greenwald (New York City, NY: Nation Books, 2003), 5-10.; Louis Fisher, "Challenges to Civil Liberties in a Time of War: USA Patriot Act," in *Transforming the American Polity: The Presidency of George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism*, ed. Richard S. Conley (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2004), 108-114.

1.3 Barack Obama and Civil Liberties

After winning the 2008 presidential election Barack Obama took the office in January of 2009. During his first months in office, Obama was presented with a great opportunity to start reforming domestic policy. He completely changed the approach towards the public and other government branches to which George Bush had shown disrespect, by outlining significant changes in government's executive branch.²²

The first goal of the new Obama administration was to create an open government that would not withhold information from the public, but which would be transparent instead. By demanding transparency, Obama took the opposite position of Bush. Obama justified his decision by claiming that the U.S. citizens have the right to know the steps their government takes and to access all the necessary information in order to ensure people's trust. In essence, the American public should be provided with any released information in accordance with the law.²³

When mutual trust is established, then there is space for public participation in government issues. From that perspective, as the public opinion helps improve decision making and the executive departments and agencies should give the public more possibilities to participate in policy making.²⁴

Last but not least, regarding the cooperation between the government branches, Obama stressed how important it is for all three parts of the government to work together. Unlike Bush, he realized that the highest level of national security could be reached only if the executive, legislative and judicial branches cooperated. Therefore the Obama administration started to seek support in Congress again.²⁵

The Obama administration and the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act called for the restoration of civil liberties. Anthony D. Romero, Executive Director of the ACLU stated that "with positive actions in areas like open government and civil rights, the Obama administration has made some significant strides toward restoring civil liberties and the rule of law."

²²Barack Obama, "Transparency and Open Government," *Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies*, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment/

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵American Civil Liberties Union, "ACLU Issues Report on Obama Administration's Civil Liberties Record," American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU Foundation, <http://www.aclu.org/organization-news-and-highlights/aclu-issues-report-obama-administrations-civil-liberties-record> (accessed March 3, 2011).

Nevertheless, the administration failed to protect and reinstate some fundamental civil liberties in other areas as it has continued in the most criticized practices of Bush's policy, primarily in renewing the Patriot Act.²⁶

On one hand Obama as then-Senator of Illinois knew that the Patriot Act had been diminishing civil liberties since it was signed into law. On the other hand he supported the 2006 renewal of this act which left the most crucial issues unchanged. Therefore the new administration did not guarantee that any changes would be made.²⁷

Finally, in September 2009, the Obama administration proposed to extend three key provisions of the USA Patriot Act. The ACLU immediately stood in opposition and classified it as a bad move, because the Obama administration was following the unpopular steps of the Bush policy. The first provision allowed executive agencies to wiretap any communication; the second allows executive agencies with a warrant to obtain business and library records that could be somehow linked to terrorists; and the last one monitors possible “lone wolf” suspects. Michael Macleod-Ball, director of the ACLU’s Washington Legislative Office, claimed that “the privacy rights of all Americans will continue to be at risk if we continue to let these statutes remain as they are. Nevertheless, in February 2011, Obama signed into law extensions of those Patriot Act provisions which had nearly expired.”²⁸

As a result, the Obama administration has neither reformed nor modified the Patriot Act. The extensions made by Obama were not expected by any of the civil liberties organizations, and the direction he has taken has only added to the assault on civil liberties. From that perspective, it appears that Obama has so far continued in Bush’s policy and the previous range of civil liberties might never be fully restored.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ben Conery, “Obama seeks Patriot Act extensions,” *Washington Times*, September 16, 2009. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/sep/16/obama-seeks-patriot-act-extensions/?page=1> (accessed May 1, 2011).; The Associated Press, “Obama signs temporary extension of Patriot Act,” *Washington Post*, February 25, 2011. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/25/AR2011022505562.html> (accessed May 2, 2011).

2 WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

2.1 War in Afghanistan

Not only domestic policy underwent a rapid change. Supposedly, domestic policy reforms were not enough to defend the United States and protect Americans from violence in the future. Therefore in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. government formed a war cabinet which started meeting regularly in order to agree on further steps towards Afghanistan. It appeal that Afghanistan attracted world attention because of its reputation as an incubator of the perpetrators of attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and became primary and the most important foreign policy issue for the United States.

Finally, after unsuccessful negotiations with the Taliban movement, the Bush administration came up with a radical solution. The Taliban, which in those days ruled Afghanistan, repeatedly ignored a request to extradite Osama bin Laden, a terrorist who confessed to organizing September 11 terrorist attacks. As the Taliban did not meet its demand, the USA attacked Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.²⁹

In the midst of much debate, the most aggressive strategy of three potential strategies for an Afghan war was chosen. Deploying bombers, cruise missiles and ground troops, the U.S. started to remove the Taliban from power. According to George Bush as commander in chief, choosing the most aggressive strategy was essential so that the actions of the United States would no longer be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Once the United States showed vulnerability to Islamist terrorists, these radicals started to feel self-confident. The zealots were convinced that they would not pay for committing crimes because of inability of the USA to retaliate effectively. Determined to refute that misconception, Bush stressed the necessity of involvement of all military forces, primarily ground troops. Meanwhile Bush was aware of all the difficulties and risks that a war brings such as a threat of civil war and starvation in Afghanistan together with a fear of uprising Muslims around the world and a wave of reprisal attacks on American soil.³⁰

As early as eighteen days after the war began, the Bush administration was already under fire from critics. A slow pace of operation was criticized in the media. What the

²⁹Česká tisková kancelář, "Všeobecné Zpravodajství:USA chtějí Afgháncům předat moc do konce roku 2014," ČTK, http://www.ctk.cz/sluzby/slovni_zpravodajstvi/vseobecne/index_view.php?id=557589 (accessed February 11, 2011).

³⁰George W. Bush, *Decision Points* (New York: Crown, 2010), 246-66.

American public started to realize, George Bush had known long before. As a goal to defeat the Taliban and to destroy al Qaeda was not an easy task, the war in Afghanistan could not be a short-term issue. Apart from fighting, there was a sense of duty to “leave behind something better.” The Bush administration, thus, claimed to feel responsible for liberating Afghanistan from the Taliban dictatorship and helping to establish a new Afghan government.³¹

On one hand, shortly after launching attacks, the Taliban was indeed ousted and a new leader of Afghanistan’s interim administration was appointed in six months. According to Bush, the ongoing war did not cause an outbreak of a civil war and famine in Afghanistan and there were no uprisings of Muslims around the world. It seemed at first sight that the strategy was working. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the reality was a bit different. The Taliban and al Qaeda gained new members and supporters among the Afghan and Pakistani population, began operating secretly and started planning reprisal attacks. There were, practically, eruptions of violence across the country and a struggle among warlords of different insurgent groups. The United States along with the United Nations demanded insurgents to give up their weapons, but something had to be offered to insurgents in return. Therefore, in order to prevent a civil war, the warlords were promised positions in the newly created Afghan government. The warlords, thus, retained power and entered into active politics as governors, ministers and legislators. Moreover, the appointment of Hamid Karzai as Afghan president was also highly controversial. Simply, most key figures in the newly-formed government behaved unpredictably and were considered untrustworthy.³²

Although a vision of a bright future for Afghanistan remained alive, at least in George Bush’s mind, it was obvious that the concept of the most aggressive strategy, which Bush strongly believed in, was failing. As a matter of fact, the Bush administration devoted eight years to the war in Afghanistan. During that period, in spite of investing much time and a big sum of money into the Afghan problem, there was a lack of progress on reforming the Afghan government, fighting the Taliban or destroying an al Qaeda network. Unfortunately, all the little changes that have been made were reversible and there has

³¹George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, 246-66.

³²Ibid.; Paul D. Miller, “Finish the Job: How the War in Afghanistan Can Be Won,” *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 1 (January 2011): 51-65, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67028/paul-d-miller/finish-the-job> (accessed March 8, 2011)

been no long-term success, as Bush's strategy started with and was based on absolutely wrong assumptions.

When Barack Obama was elected the new president of the United States in 2009, he promised to resolve the situation in Afghanistan as soon as possible. Nevertheless, as the evidence proves, problems have remained the same and the obstacles to progress have not changed since the war started in 2001. Nevertheless, resolving those long outstanding problems has been essential and crucial in order to fundamentally change the situation and to make significant progress. The obstacles to progress which Bush had to face in the past, and which Obama now faces, are discussed in the next sections where an explanation on why the mission in Afghanistan could not be successfully completed is given.

2.2 A new strategy unveiled: a counterinsurgency strategy, 2009

The Obama administration devoted considerable time to developing new tactics for the war in Afghanistan claiming that it is not a war of "choice" but a war of "necessity". After completing a sixty-day policy review, a core goal to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda ... and to prevent their return ... in the future," was introduced as a part of a counterinsurgency strategy, known in the military's jargon as COIN strategy. This new doctrine, adopted on March 27, 2009, was supposed to have a greater effect than the strategy of former president George W. Bush who wanted to establish a democratic government. In Obama's words, this strategy is "stronger, smarter and comprehensive" and that is exactly what Afghanistan needs. There was a plan to deploy 30 000 more troops, which brought the total number of American soldiers fighting in Afghanistan to 100 000. Nevertheless, except for the plan to increase military capacity, most points mentioned in the Bush's strategy and the new Obama's plan were identical. Therefore, it indicated that Obama would continue in George Bush policy towards Afghanistan with just a little change.³³

More detailed information concerning the new strategy was given by Gen. Stanley McChrystal in autumn 2009. McChrystal was appointed commander of U.S. and N.A.T.O. forces in Afghanistan in May 2009. Before his appointment, a counterinsurgency strategy

³³Barack H. Obama, "Remarks by the President on a New Strategy For Afghanistan and Pakistan," transcript, White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/ (accessed March 2, 2011); VOANews, "Obama Strategy Makes Long-Term Commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistan," VOANews.com, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-03-27-voa55-68635417.html> (accessed April 1, 2011).

in its first phase focused on al-Qaeda's sanctuaries. Obama's strategy assumes that first, the U.S. military must take control of the war situation in order to detect terrorist plots and prevent terrorist attacks. Its carefully targeted actions are designed to destroy terrorist bases, and if enough U.S. and N.A.T.O. forces are provided, a return of al-Qaeda supporters to those sanctuaries will be impossible. The second part is to raise public awareness and earn the support of Afghan civilians, taking cultural diversity into account.³⁴

Under McChrystal's command, those two steps have been switched. The Afghan people and their safety have taken precedence over pursuing and fighting the enemy. As a result, McChrystal had to justify his decision to focus on protecting civilians first and foremost. In his opinion, the enemy's intention is to attract attention and to provoke an overreaction that usually results in violence. Beyond that, security is also dependent on cooperation. The Afghan populace needs to be willing to cooperate with military and police forces. Finally, a capable, accountable and transparent government needs to be established from the ground up. Nevertheless, as McChrystal himself admits, "the difficulty lies in the execution."³⁵

During an interview with McChrystal, a PBS reporter notes that, "[i]t seems enormously ambitious to look at a society and believe that you [USA] can change all its [Afghanistan] dynamics, governance, security, and that you as a military organization are charged with that entire task."³⁶ That was a straightforward evaluation of the COIN strategy in Afghanistan in autumn 2009, which time has shown to be correct. The next section deals with the strategy failures and gives explanations on why the strategy could not meet the expectations of the United States and its allies.

2.2.1 Why the counterinsurgency strategy is failing

Since the strategy was unveiled, the issue of whether the war was winnable or not has been widely debated. There have been lots of supportive voices as well as negative voices. One of the COIN's defendants is John Nagl, President of the Center for a New American Security. In an open debate in *The Economist* conducted in May, 2010, he actively supported the theory that the war is winnable. He believed that owing to new actions taken

³⁴PBS Frontline, "Obama's War," *Frontline*, WGBH educational foundation, October 13, 2009, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/obamaswar/interviews/mcchrystal.html> (accessed March 15, 2011).

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

by Gen. McChrystal, the U.S. and its allies were one step closer to victory. Having identified himself with statements of other U.S. officials, Nagel proclaims that the U.S. is in Afghanistan to protect the Afghan population and is trying to continue to ensure their safety. He also mentions that a more effective Afghan government along with an Afghan Army and a Pakistani government can remove the Taliban from power in the future, because lots of safe havens of the Taliban insurgents are being lost. However Nagel also admits that “winning in Afghanistan would not by itself defeat al-Qaeda and associated terror movements.”³⁷

Nagl’s statements are a bit unconvincing and confusing. Destroying all the terrorist networks in the country, mainly al-Qaeda, was considered the main aim. If an attempt to take the initiative to stop terrorist activities was the main reason why the USA and its allies began the war, would it still be a victory if the counterterrorism plan failed?

Apart from a divergence of views, there is another way in which defenders and opponents differ. The opposition talks about facts here and now. Their attitude reflects reality and the current situation rather than predictions or expectations for the future. When looking into the future, there is always a high level of uncertainty. Whereas opinions on strategy failure are based on factuality, claims of strategy supporters are rather vague. From this point of view, it is obvious that opponents are able to offer stronger arguments to support their claims.

Peter W. Galbraith, Former Deputy U.N. Envoy to Afghanistan, participated in the debate in *The Economist* as a counterpart to John Nagl. Being among those who oppose the counterinsurgency strategy and the war itself, Galbraith realistically assessed the Afghan situation. As already mentioned, the strategy is based on a support of Afghan locals. Their cooperation with the U.S. and NATO military and police forces is critically important, but in people’s minds, those forces are perceived as invaders rather than allies.³⁸

The strategy is also based on building a legitimate government that “enjoys the loyalty of enough Afghans to turn the population against the insurgents,” but as Galbraith argues “such a government does not exist.” The government has gained a reputation for being ineffective and corrupt instead. Not surprisingly, President Hamid Karzai does not enjoy much popularity in his country, and many Afghans consider him nothing more than a

³⁷The Economist Newspaper Limited, “Opening statements,” debate, *Economist*, May 17, 2010, <http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/516> (accessed March 1, 2011).

³⁸Ibid.

mayor of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. To what extent the corruption is serious demonstrates the fact that in 2010 it “ranks 176 on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, just ahead of last-placed Somalia, which has no government at all.” Can such a partner in counterinsurgency be trusted and relied on?³⁹

Unfortunately, corruption is not the only obstacle to progress. Basically, the counterinsurgency strategy relies on an assumption that if Americans are putting their lives at risk for the Afghan government, then Afghan forces which are being trained will do the same in return. Thus there is an attempt to increase the size of Afghan Security Forces. In this way, U.S. and NATO military forces want to prepare the ground for the newly trained members of the Afghan army and police who are supposed to take control over the country. An eight-week training, which volunteers undergo to become new security forces, has already cost billions of dollars. Nevertheless, as up to 80% of people being trained are illiterate and drug addicts, an eight-week period is not long enough to train a good force. On the other hand, if the period was prolonged, there would be a high probability that new educated Afghans refuse to expose themselves to risk. Despite all expectations, Afghanistan as a nation of dependency has been created instead. As a result, Afghan soldiers can't ensure security and Afghan police can't provide law and order in the near future.⁴⁰

Thomas Hammes -a former Marine Colonel and a senior research fellow at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies- supports the idea of a non-functionality of the counterinsurgency strategy as well. Giving an explanation why the procedure is incorrect he agrees with Galbraith and states:

The problem is we [USA] got a strategy, a population-centered coined strategy with no discussion of the assumptions. And the assumptions on which the plan is based - ... the concept that the local government is a viable partner, and ... that Afghanistan can be governed centrally. I think these two ... are severely flawed assumptions. We have essentially developed a strategy and not resourced it.⁴¹

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Dexter Filkins, review of *The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan*, by Bing West, *New York Times*, February 24, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/books/review/Filkins-t.html?pagewanted=1&r=2> (accessed March 5, 2011); The Economist Newspaper Limited, “Opening statements,” debate, *Economist*, May 17, 2010, <http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/516> (accessed March 1, 2011).

⁴¹National Public Radio, “Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan,” transcript, NPR, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128061769> (accessed March 5, 2011).

As noted previously, the second step of the COIN strategy led by Gen. McChrystal concerns Al-Qaeda and its sanctuaries which are being subjected to attacks by the U.S. and NATO forces. The difficulty lies in that even if those safe havens in Afghanistan are being lost, the loss as such will not prevent al-Qaeda's activities. Regarding non-verbal as well as verbal communication used to plot terrorism, both types of communication methods can be applied anywhere in the world. Regarding training camps, terrorists can find new sanctuaries for training beyond Afghan borders. That has already happened. As a matter of fact, Pakistan and other neighboring countries have become new safe havens.⁴²

When introducing the COIN strategy for the first time, Obama already remarked that the strategy also concerned Pakistan. Specifically the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan is exclusively connected. Since the al Qaeda network has spread and moved across the Afghan border to the Pakistani frontier, this area has started to be very dangerous. The frontier, at present, is an area where mountainous terrain provides ideal conditions to hide and to create sanctuaries which have become terrorist training camps. However, Pakistan has not been a good partner in the war on terror either. The problem lies in the fact that the Pakistani government does not differ from the government in Afghanistan and it faces the problem of weakness, ineffectiveness and corruption too. In addition, Pakistan pretends to be an ally of the United States while being well aware of a presence of insurgents on its territory. Although the United States puts pressure on Islamabad-the capital of Pakistan-to act against Islamists, Pakistan resists the US push. Apparently, Pakistan won't break ties with Islamist extremists who penetrate to Afghanistan from north-west of the country. According to US diplomatic dispatches, Pakistan probably wants to use radicals against its traditional enemy: India. Considering that the second step is another flawed and erroneous concept, it is unlikely to happen that the conflict will ever be solved by carrying out counterinsurgency operations.⁴³

Furthermore, there is skepticism about effectiveness of any other strategy which would be consistent with a withdrawal of US and NATO troops planned in July, 2011. In

⁴²Steven Metz, "America's Flawed Afghanistan Strategy," Strategic Studies Institute, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1014.pdf> (accessed March 20, 2011).

⁴³Barack H. Obama, "Remarks by the President On a New Strategy For Afghanistan and Pakistan," transcript, White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/ (accessed March 2, 2011); Česká tisková kancelář, "Všeobecné zpravodajství: WikiLeaks: Pákistán nepřeruší vazby s islamisty, myslí si USA," Česká tisková kancelář (ČTK), http://www.ctk.cz/sluzby/slovni_zpravodajstvi/vseobecne/index_view.php?id=563672 (accessed March 20, 2011).

Thommas Hammes's opinion, there is no success in the long run. Afghanistan will not be richer than today's Chad, which is one of the poorest countries in the world, even if a transparent, legitimate government is established and their economy doubles in 10 years. From that perspective, there is no point in investing resources to create for creating another Chad.⁴⁴

2.2.2 A change of command, McChrystal replaced by Petraeus

Under McChrystal's leadership, however, a counterinsurgency strategy really did not lead to the end of the conflict and Gen. McChrystal himself could not have accomplished the mission in Afghanistan. When the general and his aides provided a reporter from Rolling Stone magazine with inappropriate comments about senior officials, Obama had to respond quickly. As a result, McChrystal was dismissed in June, 2010. Soon after, Gen. David H. Petraeus became the new top U.S. and NATO commander.⁴⁵

Although experienced from Iraq, Petraeus realized that Afghanistan was different from Iraq in many aspects. As McChrystal already knew, winning over support in a country where lots of civilians perceive insurgents more as bad relatives than a dangerous threat is a very difficult task. First, an Afghan government needs to win the loyalty of people. Therefore, Petraeus has continued in McChrystal's policy and started to meet regularly with the country's political leader Hamid Karzai. Nevertheless, Petraeus forgets that Karzai has very little public support. To get more public support is unlikely to happen at least until a new efficient government is formed. But in most cases, Afghans do not want a central government.⁴⁶

At the beginning of 2010, Petraeus called his relationship with Karzai just 'healthy'. In fact there was a high level of co-operation between them as the following case demonstrates. In spring 2010, one of the president's aides was accused of soliciting a bribe to stop an investigation into money-laundering. When he was got arrested on suspicion of corruption, Karzai strongly disagreed and engineered his release from jail. Thereafter, public hostility towards the President has deepened. Gen. Petraeus stayed away and avoided criticizing Karzai's steps in public. He allegedly did so in order to secure the

⁴⁴National Public Radio, "Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan," transcript, NPR, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128061769> (accessed March 5, 2011).

⁴⁵Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Gen. David Petraeus says Afghanistan war strategy 'fundamentally sound'," *Washington Post*, August 16, 2010. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/15/AR2010081501514.html?sid=ST2010102204877> (accessed March 14, 2011).

⁴⁶Ibid.

cooperation but Karzai has never been a credible partner. As it turned out, Karzai could easily join the other side. He started to protest against US tactics in the war, once threatened to join the Taliban and, unlike the United States, he was willing to compromise with the Taliban.⁴⁷

Regardless of a change in command, the core strategy in Afghanistan remains the same. As Petraeus said, his adjustments were ‘nothing very dramatic.’⁴⁸ There is still the nation-building in the forefront followed by an effort to disrupt the al Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban insurgents. In the spotlight, an effort to establish a legitimate government has become the primary goal. Nevertheless the COIN strategy hasn’t met expectations yet and it probably never will.⁴⁹

Besides Petraeus, there is another key figure, Defense Secretary Robert Gates. On one hand, stressing the commitment to protect Afghan civilians, he talks about “significant gains” across the country. He also talks about zones of security that were created in Kandahar and Helmand, two of the most dangerous provinces located in southern Afghanistan. On the other hand, there is an annual report prepared by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. The report finds that in 2010, civilian assassinations rose by 588% in Kandahar and 248% in Helmand compared to 2009.⁵⁰

2.2.3 The current situation in Afghanistan

It has been almost two years since the counterinsurgency strategy was implemented. These days, the United States is constantly talking about taking a huge step forward in fighting insurgents in the continuing war in Afghanistan. Derrick Crowe, a Political Director at Brave New Foundation, accuses the Pentagon of misrepresenting facts and fudging the truth. His evaluation of the current situation at the beginning of March, 2011, is as follows:

⁴⁷Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Gen. David Petraeus says Afghanistan war strategy 'fundamentally sound',” *Washington Post*, August 16, 2010. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/15/AR2010081501514.html?sid=ST2010102204877> (accessed March 14, 2011); Joe Klein, “Runners-up,” *Time*, Wednesday, Dec. 15, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2036683_2037118_2037101-2,00.html (accessed March 17, 2011).

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Derrick Crowe, “Pentagon Assertions of 'Progress' In Afghanistan Are a Bad Joke,” *Huffington Post*, March 9, 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/derrick-crowe/pentagon-assertions-of-pr_b_833582.html (accessed March 10, 2011).

⁵⁰Ibid.

Despite the most violent year of the war so far [2010], despite the highest civilian and military toll of the war so far, and despite the continued growth of the insurgency, they want you [Americans] to believe that we're "making progress."⁵¹

The main stumbling blocks to developing stability and security in Afghanistan remain the same. A drug trade continues to flourish and the Afghan government has been drowning in corruption since the very beginning. Despite the numerous scandals, President Hamid Karzai has been in office since 2002. Ranging from a fraudulent and manipulated re-election campaign in 2009 to a recent scandal in the Afghanistan's largest bank, activities of the president and his close associates are absolutely unlawful.⁵²

The revealed truth about a situation in the Kabul Bank showed that bad loans, frauds and mismanagement cost the bank millions of dollars. According to the information given in January, 2011, the bank could have lost as much as 900 million dollars which could result in bankruptcy. Then a financial panic would have occurred throughout the country. Given that the president's brother is the third-biggest shareholder in the bank, but unlike the two others, he is not under investigation, President Karzai does not doesn't seem to fit the legitimate government scheme.⁵³

When dealing with resources devoted to the Afghan war, it is obvious enough which party is a stronger player in this game. Being well equipped, disciplined and more organized, the U.S. and NATO army has an opportunity to leverage its capabilities. Those soldiers and Marines are able to triumph over insurgents in this way. It demonstrates the fact that those military forces are doing quite a good job in fighting the enemy who lacks discipline if nothing else. But at what cost? The more insurgents are killed, the more aggressive and violent their followers are. As violence has risen steadily, there is, logically, an increase in the number of the civilian casualties. Besides corruption, this is another alarming fact.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵² Derrick Crowe, "Pentagon Assertions of 'Progress' In Afghanistan Are a Bad Joke," *Huffington Post*, March 9, 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/derrick-crowe/pentagon-assertions-of-pr_b_833582.html (accessed March 10, 2011).

⁵³ Alissa J. Rubin and James Risen, "Kabul Bank's loss is now put at \$900 million," *STLtoday*, http://www.stltoday.com/business/article_c81f948c-2cf7-11e0-9588-00127992bc8b.html (accessed March 13, 2011); Derrick Crowe, "Pentagon Assertions of 'Progress' In Afghanistan Are a Bad Joke," *Huffington Post*, March 9, 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/derrick-crowe/pentagon-assertions-of-pr_b_833582.html (accessed March 10, 2011).

Given that the number of civilian deaths is higher every year, the year 2010 was the bloodiest year yet in the Afghan war. Afghanistan Rights Monitor (AMR) annual report indicates that “[f]rom 1 January to 31 December 2010, at least 2,421 civilian Afghans were killed and over 3,270 were injured in conflict-related security incidents across Afghanistan. This means every day 6-7 noncombatants were killed and 8-9 were wounded in the war.” AMR admits that there is no certainty that the numbers are accurate. Compared to the information available, the reality could be much worse.⁵⁴

Gen. David H. Petraus often refuses responsibility for deaths claiming that most civilians are being killed by insurgents. He is indeed right. But does it ultimately matter which side killed more innocent people? The United States promised to protect those civilians and secure them from violence. None of the promises have been kept; none of the goals have been achieved. There can be no talk of making progress in stabilizing the country.⁵⁵

This endless war is like a cat and mouse game, but it has become unclear who is the cat and who is the mouse. But there are several facts that are clear enough. The war is in its tenth year and a fear of the rising tide of violence is bigger than ever. While more and more civilians and soldiers are dying, the Taliban movement is growing stronger and only time alone will tell how much strength it might gain in the future. The Afghan domestic policy-making process is terrible and the behavior of government representatives is erratic. Despite all the above mentioned facts, the US government is constantly trying to persuade the public that the counterinsurgency strategy has already taken a step in the right direction and the war is winnable.

2.2.4 A deployment of U.S. troops and its planned withdrawal in July 2011

President Obama himself, however, never speaks about victory in the real sense of the word. Furthermore, there are uncertainties about the future of the conflict as core goals of the strategy in the war of Afghanistan have been redefined several times. Since the second half of year 2010, Obama has started to deny that establishing security in Afghanistan is one of the core objectives of the United States, proclaiming that it is Afghans themselves

⁵⁴Afghanistan Rights Monitor, ARM Annual Report: Civilian Casualties of War January-December 2010 (Kabul: ARM, February 2011), p. 2. accessible from http://www.arm.org.af/index.php?page=en_Home (accessed February 4, 2011).

⁵⁵Derrick Crowe, “Pentagon Assertions of 'Progress' In Afghanistan Are a Bad Joke,” *Huffington Post*, March 9, 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/derrick-crowe/pentagon-assertions-of-pr_b_833582.html (accessed March 10, 2011).

who have to create a stable society. The Obama administration representatives noted that they had been always interested only in elimination of threats that are presented by the al Qaeda terrorist network. Obama also mentioned that every step the United States took must lead to the conflict resolution. It implies that all attention is focused on a strategic plan to reach the point when the U.S. troops, which had been sent to Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010, begin to withdraw from the Afghan soil. According to Obama's statement made in 2010, the withdrawal planned in July 2011 is in the interest of national security.⁵⁶

Thus, in order to discover trends in public opinion concerning the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan, the Gallup organization in conjunction with USA Today conducted a poll. A sample of 1,032 randomly chosen people was polled via telephone survey in January 2011. Respondents aged 18 and older were asked questions about 8 issues that more or less have impact on their lives. One of the issues discussed was whether or not the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan should be accelerated. According to the results of this poll, continuing war in Afghanistan receives little public support. With the vast majority of affirmative voices, the quick withdrawal became the third most supported issue. Not surprisingly, 72% of respondents were in favour of speeding it up. Only 25% of respondents opposed and answered in the negative. As regards party affiliation, a positive reply was given by 86 % of self-identified Democrats, 61% of the Republicans and 72 % of independents. It implies that Americans across the political spectrum do want the U.S. troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan.⁵⁷

Nevertheless, in spring 2011, the U.S. representatives raised doubts about Afghanistan troop withdrawal process. They have started to lower expectations of a significant pull-back of the U.S. troops in July and a number of originally planned withdrawal was decreased from 20 000 to 2 000 troops. Provided that the American public is obviously getting tired starting to be tired of unmet goals and false promises, the Obama administration should weigh all the pros and cons and try to follow the original plan

⁵⁶Česká tisková kancelář, "Obama prý má spory s armádou kvůli strategii v Afghánistánu," ČTK, http://www.ctk.cz/sluzby/slovni_zpravodajstvi/vseobecne/index_view.php?id=531671 (accessed April 15, 2011).

⁵⁷Jeffrey M. Jones, "In U.S., Alternative Energy Bill Does Best Among Eight Proposals," Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/145880/Alternative-Energy-Bill-Best-Among-Eight-Proposals.aspx> (accessed February 28, 2011).

designed in 2009, which envisaged above mentioned withdrawal of 20 000 U.S. troops.⁵⁸

After all, it is for Obama's own good to keep his promise this time and to reduce the number of military forces operating in Afghanistan as soon as possible. The next presidential elections are coming and the government's loss of credibility concerning foreign policy could mean the end of Barack H. Obama as a president of the United States.

⁵⁸ Ewen MacAskill, "US warns against Afghanistan troop withdrawal," *Guardian* (London), March 11, 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/11/us-warns-troop-withdrawal-afghanistan> (accessed April 8, 2011).

3 WAR IN IRAQ

The first step of the war on terrorism has been fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Thus, the second step was the U.S. declaration of war against Iraq.

In the initial debates about Iraq, it was suggested that Iraq should be confronted as well as the Taliban. That meant immediately, because its dictatorship was considered to be one of the most dangerous regimes in the world. The dictatorship openly supported activities of terrorist organizations and did not prove to destroy the weapons of mass destruction which the United Nations demanded. According to Don Rumsfeld, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense, targeting Iraq would have been the best anti-terrorism campaign. On the contrary, dissenting opinions also occurred and those opinions mostly prevailed at meetings of the war cabinet. Rumsfeld's opponents argued that first, the United States had to deal with the current threat posed by al Qaeda and therefore it was not the right time to go and attack Iraq. In essence, Collin Powell, the United States Secretary of State, summarized disadvantages of declaring war against Iraq too quickly and described the messy situation with the country as following. "Going after Iraq now would be viewed as a bait and switch. We would lose the UN [United Nations], the Islamic countries, and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. If we want to do Iraq, we should do it at a time of our choosing. But we should not do it now, because we don't have linkage to this event." In those words, Powell referred to the unproved connection between the September 11 attacks and Iraq. Finally, the war cabinet agreed on a waiting strategy and confronting Iraq was postponed.⁵⁹

3.1 Declaration of the war

As time went by, still, there was not clear evidence that would prove a direct connection between the events of September 11 and Saddam Hussein, a political leader of Iraq. Therefore, the Bush administration started to speak about diplomatic negotiations. Apart from the negotiations, expected victory in Afghanistan and the U.S. requirements to exert "unified pressure from the world" were seen as the best way to force Hussein to meet his obligations and were believed to resolve the problem with Iraq.⁶⁰

On the contrary, negotiations with the reluctant Iraqi leader Hussein were influenced entirely by the attitude of U.S. officials. In spite of the fact that it was the United States

⁵⁹George W. Bush, *Decision Points* (New York: Crown, 2010), 244-50.

⁶⁰Ibid.

itself which proposed a diplomatic solution, its representatives were convinced that Iraqi soldiers closely cooperated with al Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan to plan the 9/11 attacks. Under Hussein's leadership, al Qaeda was allegedly taught to employ weapons of mass destruction, mainly chemical explosives, which seemed to be the most-feared potential threat. Given that there was an indisputable tendency of the Bush administration to demonize Hussein at all costs, a planned diplomatic solution was under threat.⁶¹

3.2 Hussein and his alleged ties to al Qaeda

One year after the September 11 attacks, in 2002, military analysts definitely disproved the Bush administration unsubstantiated claim of al Qaeda being trained by the Hussein government. Nevertheless, the Bush administration abandoned its plan of negotiations with Hussein and chose to fight instead. Thus, In March, 2003, George Bush, the president of the USA, announced that American and Coalition forces started to wage war against Iraq. Finally, the United States opted for the intervention in Iraq despite the fact that there was still an ongoing war in Afghanistan and no direct evidence that would convict Saddam Hussein of cooperation with the Afghan terrorist network called al Qaeda.⁶²

Notwithstanding the given circumstances, George Bush and his aides constantly justified the war in Iraq by stressing the presence of those links between Hussein and al Qaeda. Although war justifications were based on facts that were completely unfounded, Bush made many Americans believe that Hussein was culpable in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon attacks. As it turned out in 2008, persuading the public about the necessity of the Iraq intervention based on Hussein's alleged connections with Afghan terrorists was not one of the proper arguments for declaration of war. As a matter of fact, findings of a large Pentagon study, which examined over 600 000 documents, led to a definitive answer on whether or not Hussein played a role in plotting terrorist attacks. The documents, which were released after Saddam Hussein was overthrown by an invasion of U.S. and British forces, revealed interesting facts. According to findings, there had never been any concrete and direct evidence which would cause Hussein to be confronted with

⁶¹Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the 'War on Terrorism* (Hampshire: Ashgate Pub Ltd, 2007), 17.

⁶²Elana Schor, "Saddam Hussein had no direct ties to al-Qaida, says Pentagon study," *Guardian* (London), March 13, 2008. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/13/iraq.usa> (accessed April 17, 2011).

ties to al Qaeda terrorist network. When a planned report was about to come out, there were even attempts by US Defense Department to prevent its release. Moreover, the Pentagon rejected any public debates and refused to post results of the study on the internet, because the results were interpreted as “too politically sensitive.”⁶³

Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly the epitome of evil. His dictatorship had a huge negative impact on Iraqi people and influenced their lives for many years. Surely, to overthrow such a despotic ruler was a victory of justice and a gate to liberation of Iraqi people. Nevertheless, on the other hand, a few questions arise. To what extent was declaration of war on Iraq related to post 9/11 events in the United States? Under Hussein’s leadership, Iraq repeatedly threatened to use weapons of mass destruction in the past and that undeniably posed a danger not only to the United States but to the whole world. It might seem that there was “the Bush Doctrine’s central tenet of confronting threats before they could strike.”⁶⁴ However, the Bush administration decided not to deal with the threat of employment of chemical and biological weapons in the first place and instead stated that connections with Afghan terrorist groups were the main reason for the U.S. intervention to Iraq, even though those connections had never been proved. Did Americans, thus, have the right to interfere in the internal politics of Iraq as no links to September 11 events and al Qaeda terrorist network were found?

According to Hall Gardner, a Professor of Political Science at the American University of Paris and a member of The World Political Forum, weakening Iraq’s position and defeating Hussein didn’t necessarily mean understanding all the history and strategies of the Hussein regime. It would have been enough if the United States had taken a deeper look at Iran-Iraq and Kuwait-Iraq conflicts and had first tried to study and analyze nature of the conflicts there instead of trying to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime by military intervention. The United States simply focused on individual leader, Hussein, through “politically defined morality” so much that it was blind to any compromises and negotiations.⁶⁵

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Mary Buckley and Robert Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences* (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2006), 12.

⁶⁵American University of Paris, “Hall Gardner,” The American University of Paris, http://www.aup.edu/faculty/dept/icp/gardner_h.htm (accessed April 18, 2011); Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the 'War on Terrorism'* (Hampshire: Ashgate Pub Ltd, 2007), 16-22.

3.3 Ways to build new Iraq

Conforming to the US policy towards Iraq, four key points that had to be reached were outlined in most Bush's addresses to the American nation. The first one was a preventive war against Saddam Hussein. In the end, the war was won as the United States and its allies rid the country of the Hussein's dictatorship. After Hussein was toppled, George Bush notified the American public about the official end of combat operations in Iraq on May 1, 2003.⁶⁶

On the other hand, insufficient time and consideration were devoted to the post war planning. Once the war was over, another two stages of Iraq reform were presented as "a regime change for rogue states" along with "democracy promotion". The Bush administration assumed that a change in political direction in Iraq would automatically bring security; however, the steps taken by the administration were at least thoughtless. Destruction of the former Hussein regime and an attempt to develop a new effective program, which dealt with building a democratic country in the heart of the Middle East, started with a process of 'de-Ba'athification'. The Ba'ath party, those days the ruling party of the Iraqi government, was banned and its members as well as supporters were removed from power and made redundant. These special measures were related to almost 500,000 individuals. Applied to professionals, not only from the political sphere but also teachers or security officials, the measures were responsible for the displacement of those individuals. Removal from a previous post concerned all the Ba'athists even if they were not involved in war crimes committed against Iraqi people during the Hussein's leadership. At first, the United States was obviously not aware of all the possible consequences of such a crucial decision. Massive redundancies of highly trained and experienced professional people, consequently, supported the growing wave of unrest and triggered a new wave of insurgency. Such a reaction of Iraqis who suddenly became unemployed could and should have been anticipated, because this particular situation with insurgents has greatly affected the course of the nation for in recent years.⁶⁷

⁶⁶Mary Buckley and Robert Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, 12; PBS Frontline, "The Invasion of Iraq: Operation Iraqi Freedom," *Frontline*, WGBH educational foundation, February 26, 2004, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/cron/> (accessed March 15, 2011).

⁶⁷Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the 'War on Terrorism'* (Burlington: Ashgate Pub Co, 2007), 16-22; Mary Buckley and Robert Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences* (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2006), 12.

Later on, the Bush administration acknowledged a mistake and tried to change its policy towards former Iraqi Ba'athists. Although there were attempts to slowly engage them into a work process again, this step taken in October 2003 came too late as there had already been an outbreak of guerilla war and the Ba'athists found a new ally in pan-Islamic extremists. Moreover, the Iraqi police and military that cooperated with the U.S. and Coalition forces were subjected to attacks that have continued to destabilize the country. Neither that cooperation between Iraq insurgents nor the guerilla war could have been stopped through the new strategy that the United States adopted.⁶⁸

Last but not least, “confronting the nexus of weapons of mass destruction” was the fourth foreign policy principle of the Bush Doctrine in Iraq. Following the deposition of Hussein in 2003, for the next four years, the United States turned its attention to finding weapons of mass destruction. Americans were so eager to find and destroy the weapons that they forgot to focus also on safeguarding the actual weapons. This disproportion caused many secret weapons depots in Iraq to be left unguarded and undefended. Therefore a significant number of both weapons and ammunition ended up in the hands of guerillas and insurgents, for instance 350 tons of high explosives stored in one place. Before the United States attacked Iraq, the weapon storage areas had been under observation of Internal Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Unlike the agency, Americans underestimated the importance of guarding those areas in Iraq and basically made insurgents armed owing to the lack of responsible approach. Furthermore, searching for weapons of mass destruction has never been successful as it did not bring any results. As the second justification of the war was a possible use of chemical and biological weapons-the first one were already mentioned Hussein's alleged ties to al Qaeda-it implies that even the reality of the threat posed by such weaponry has not been clearly confirmed.⁶⁹

3.4 Bush compared to Hussein

Nevertheless feeling confident about attaining victory over insurgents, the United States was further convinced that the U.S. forces would be perceived as liberators by the rest of the Iraqi people in every situation. Therefore the Bush administration believed that

⁶⁸Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the 'War on Terrorism'* (Burlington: Ashgate Pub Co, 2007), 16-22.; Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the 'War on Terrorism'*, 142-143.

⁶⁹Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the 'War on Terrorism'*, 16-22; Mary Buckley and Robert Singh, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, 12.

its forces were entitled and willing to take whatever action needed against opponents of the new recently established regime. Viewed from the perspective of numerous world experts on Iraq, the anti-insurgent actions taken were exaggerated and unnecessary in many cases. Primarily, there was an increase in the capture and detainment of alleged insurgents. When the case of torture and abuse of those insurgent prisoners at Abu Ghurayb prison came to light, the credibility of the United States and its leadership in general was greatly undermined. As a matter of fact, owing to implementing and tolerating such practices, Bush started being compared to Saddam Hussein. Finally, those who have been engaged in regime change the most, the Iraqi civilians, has stopped believing the Bush government.⁷⁰

Thus, it appeared that during the Bush administration there had always been one step forward and two steps back towards stability in post-war Iraq. In short, the aftermath of the war against Hussein has been very chaotic. Nevertheless, in the meantime, Bush's national security team was persuading American public that the post-war situation in Iraq is not so complicated and that the continued presence of U.S. troops would be neither expensive nor long lasting. In the end, those assumptions turned out to be wrong. U.S. officials did not even agree on how compatible the building of democracy in Iraq is with American interests and ambitions, and the Bush administration "failed to factor in the potential difficulties of a post-Hussein Iraq and the possibility of a protracted and complicated U.S. role in the country." Moreover, the United States had to simultaneously fight against al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and insurgents and guerillas being found in Iraq. As a result, the Bush administration could not have extricated itself from the problem or found a solution to post-war conflicts in Iraq. Therefore Barack Obama was compelled to take control of the situations both in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁷¹

3.5 Barack Obama and intervention of Iraq

As well as George Bush, Barack Obama began his presidency by implementing strategies which assure achieving predominance over insurgents in both Afghanistan and Iraq was only a short-term success. As a matter of fact, there were great weaknesses in long-term strategic plans as both presidents failed in securing lasting stability that would

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the 'War on Terrorism'*, 16-22.; Meghan O'Sullivan, "Eight lessons for Obama from Iraq and Afghanistan," *Power & Policy*, Harvard Kennedy School, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/power/2011/04/04/eight-lessons-for-obama-from-iraq-and-afghanistan/> (accessed April 19, 2011).

lead to complete withdrawal of the U.S. troops from those Islamic countries. From the outset, it has been obvious that in order to establish a government that will endure, issues such as nation-building cannot be understood as a quick process. Nevertheless, the United States has participated in the nation-building process even more than it had assumed it would and more than it wanted. Unlike the situation in Afghanistan where the United States has got largely and deeply involved in the process as such, the initial intention of nation-building in Iraq was a rapid transfer of power to Iraqis. However, the United States remained stuck and “became embroiled in the intricacies of nation-building” in both cases.⁷²

While Barack Obama was still a senator from Illinois, he delivered a speech against the war in Iraq. He claimed that the military power should have been used to a limited extent and long-term consequences of the steps taken should have been taken into consideration as the costs in lives and resources were too high. In February 2009, the newly sworn in Obama remarked that compared to a huge number of both random and premeditated and intentional killings committed by insurgents in the years 2006 and 2007, the situation in Iraq had improved. The violence was reduced, primarily owing to the cooperation between Iraq’s security force and the U.S. and Coalition forces. Although Iraq was not secure yet, there was a relative peace in comparison with the situation in Afghanistan. It appeared that a successful political, economic and social reconstruction of Iraq was finally underway and a withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country was not beyond the realms of possibility. Nevertheless there has been a long journey to achieve all those goals as unrest in Iraq has become rooted in long-simmering resentment. Therefore, Obama took an official position on ending the war in Iraq not earlier than on 31 August, 2010. As the situation in the country seemed to be calming down, Obama has prioritized the Afghanistan interest over the Iraq interest. Thus, the number of U.S. troops was decreased from 170,000 to 50,000 and a part of the troops pulled back was sent to Afghanistan instead. As there has been more positive interaction among Iraq’s security

⁷²Meghan O'Sullivan, “Will Libya Become Obama’s Iraq?” *Washington Post*, April 1, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/will-libya-become-obamas-iraq/2011/03/30/AFEjkhIC_story.html(accessed May 3, 2011).

force and Iraqi civilians, the rest of the troops are supposed to leave Iraq by the end of 2011 unless the Iraqi government requests its presence.⁷³

Regarding foreign policy issues in Islamic countries against which the United States declared war as a reaction to the September 11 attacks, the Obama's strategy in Iraq has been more effective than the one being implemented in Afghanistan. The Obama administration delivered on its promises at least in Iraq as, after eight years of struggle, it has almost accomplished the mission and to a certain extent the administration has managed to arrange a political settlement there. Nevertheless, the country still deals with the consequences of the US intervention and it remains to be seen whether the conflict will be resolved once and for all or whether insurgency will start to rise again.

⁷³Barack H. Obama, "Remarks of President Barack Obama – As Prepared for Delivery, Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq," transcript, White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/; Ewen MacAskill, "Barack Obama ends the war in Iraq. 'Now it's time to turn the page'," *Guardian* (London), September 1, 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/01/obama-formally-ends-iraq-war> (accessed April 12, 2011).

CONCLUSION

As history repeatedly shows, in the time of war, civil liberties have always been exposed to risk. Nevertheless once the war is over, there are usually successful attempts to restore those liberties. Nevertheless in this case, in this specific war on terrorism, the future of civil liberties is unclear. In essence, nobody can say when, if ever this war against an invisible enemy will be brought to an end.

The issue is that the Bush administration responded to terrorist attacks by implementing measures that violated freedoms of individuals rather than helped capture terrorists. The civil liberties were diminished to such an extent that executive powers were enabled to spy on Americans. Meanwhile, the executive agencies were gathering more information than was necessary. The agencies were simply deluged with so much information which the agencies could not process. Thus it appeared that looking for one terrorist among hundreds of innocents is like searching for a needle in a haystack.

As to the foreign policy towards both Afghanistan and Iraq, the interference into the internal politics of the countries is often discussed. One thing is to fight in the name of national security, but the other thing is to try to reform the whole nation Nation-building became one of the core goals in both wars, nevertheless, the actions taken by the U.S. government caused a rising wave of unrest and insurgency. However helpful the U.S. government could be, it has definitely no right to change the political direction beyond its own borders.

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APPENDICES

P I The first appendix.

P II The second appendix.

APPENDIX P I: APPENDIX TITLE